Christodoulos Stefanadis

Tying, investment, and the dynamic leverage theory

The idea that an incumbent supplier may tie two complementary products to fend off potential entrants is popular among practitioners yet is not fully understood in formal economic theory. This article makes sense of the argument by formally deriving a dynamic version of the old leverage doctrine. We show that when an incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry in all complementary components, tying may make the prospects of successful entry less certain, discouraging rivals from investing and innovating. Tie-in sales may reduce consumer and total economic welfare. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial Industry

The paper shows that the presence of continuous innovation may be one of the driving forces of self-regulation. In an infinitely repeated game, there exists a class of subgame perfect equilibria in which the self-regulatory organization, or SRO, pursues socially desirable objectives along the equilibrium path to stave off government intervention. Delegating regulatory authority to the SRO eliminates certification-related delays in the adoption of new services, fosters innovation and leads to higher social welfare.

Bundling, Entry Deterrence, and Specialist Innovators

We examine a mechanism by which bundling may inefficiently deter entry into the market. The model considers an incumbent monopolist in two complementary components that faces a series of entry attempts by rivals. It is shown that the incumbent can practice bundling to buttress its monopoly position by keeping specialist innovators out of the market. Bundling prevents specialist rivals from coordinating in the dynamic entry process, reducing the probability of an eventual displacement of the incumbent. The specialization decisions of rivals are also distorted. Bundling may lead to lower customer and total economic welfare.

The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in Systems Markets

We consider a systems market where two complementary components must be used in combination to provide valuable services. The market for the first component is monopolized whereas the market for the second is potentially served by multiple firms. We show that integration of the monopolist into the competitive complementary market may distort incentives for R&D, reducing total economic welfare.

Ethics, welfare, and capital markets ☆

We examine implications of a societys cultural emphasis on moral sentiments. Entrepreneurs and investors interact in a game that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard; entrepreneurs may attempt to breach their contracts and expropriate investors. An agent is born into a particular culture but chooses whether to develop a moral conscience and thereby subject himself to moral sentiments. In equilibrium, societies that place less emphasis on guilt exhibit a lower risk of expropriation in contracts, a greater net price of capital, a larger size of firms, increased capital inflows and greater social welfare. The results of a greater emphasis on pride are in the same direction.

Can Venture Capital Be a Curse

Abstract We show that partnering with venture capitalists may be a curse to entrepreneurs in that it reduces their profits in the commercialization phase. Agents rationally infer that a likely reason an entrepreneur who has received managerial assistance (from a venture capitalist) refrains from a lucrative IPO and instead opts for an acquisition may be the low quality of his technology (which is unfixable), rather than of his management (which may be fixable). This leads to lower acquisition prices and greater IPO underpricing. From a social welfare standpoint, venture capital services are under-utilized and technologies are under-commercialized.

Import Protection, Export Promotion, and Product Positioning

The argument that import protection may lead to export promotion is examined from the marketing standpoint. The model shows that protection allows home firms to cover a larger portion of the domestic market than they otherwise would and to target market segments that are closer to the mainstream. At the same time, foreign competitors are forced to retreat to more idiosyncratic market segments of narrower appeal. Thus, protection gives home firms a product positioning advantage over their foreign rivals; this advantage translates into higher market share and profits--not only in the protected home market, but also in export markets. Copyright 1998 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.