Christoph Buchheim

The Role of Private Property in the Nazi Economy: The Case of Industry

Private property in the industry of the Third Reich is often considered a mere nominal provision without much substance. However, that is not correct, because firms, despite the rationing and licensing activities of the state, still had ample scope to devise their own production and investment profiles. Even regarding war-related projects, freedom of contract was generally respected; instead of using power, the state offered firms a number of contract options to choose from. There were several motives behind this attitude of the regime, among them the conviction that private property provided important incentives for increasing efficiency.

Der Mythos vom Wohlleben. Der Lebensstandard der deutschen Zivilbevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg

Vorspann Christoph Buchheim, der vor kurzem verstorbene bedeutende Wirtschaftshistoriker, gibt Antworten – präzise, souverän, auf der Grundlage neuer Quellen und auf der Höhe der Forschung. Seine Frage lautet: Wie gut oder wie schlecht ging es den Deutschen im Zweiten Weltkrieg? Buchheim, in den 1980er Jahren Mitarbeiter des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, bezieht sich damit auf eine aktuelle Forschungsdebatte, die nun als entschieden gelten kann. Der Lebensstandard der Deutschen, so Buchheim mit differenziertem Blick auf unterschiedliche gesellschaftliche Schichten und Phasen des Krieges, war schon bei Kriegsbeginn relativ dürftig und verschlechterte sich ab 1942/43 kontinuierlich, ehe er 1945 einen Tiefpunkt erreichte. Von „Wohlleben“ könne allenfalls bei einer kleinen Oberschicht aus Staat, Partei und Wirtschaft die Rede sein, die es sich selbst in der Katastrophe noch gut gehen ließ. Abstract The article tackles with an especially explosive topic which has been widely contested for a long time and has once again been taken up intensely during the last few years. Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Götz Aly in particular provoked the discussion with their pointed theses about the Good Life of the Germans during the Third Reich. Buchheim first reports on the current state of research and then presents his new sources before describing the rationing system introduced in 1939 and finally analysing the allocation of foodstuffs. He never just makes general statements: He covers the allocation of individual foodstuffs and takes individual social groups into account chronologically until 1945. The result is unambiguous: The standard of living of the Germans was already relatively frugal at the beginning of the War and continued to worsen as of 1942/43 before reaching a nadir in 1945. While keeping a differentiated view of everyday reality, the situation regarding the provisioning with consumer goods can be characterised as leaving a great deal to be desired as well - sometimes it was even more dismal than that regarding food. Only a small upper class among the party, state and economic elites enjoyed the Good Life despite the surrounding catastrophe.

Das NS-Regime und die Überwindung der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Deutschland

Vorspann Die Legende ist zählebig. Hitler, so lautet sie, habe nach der Machtergreifung sofort energische Maßnahmen ergriffen, um die Arbeitslosigkeit zu bekämpfen, und damit binnen kurzem beachtliche Erfolge erzielt. Christoph Buchheim, einer der renommiertesten deutschen Wirtschaftshistoriker, widerlegt diese apologetische Sicht: Die Konjunktur sprang bereits vor dem 30. Januar an, außerdem griffen die von den Vorgängerregierungen eingeleiteten rbeitsbeschaffungsprogramme, während die Regierung Hitler viel zu spät und viel zu halbherzig tätig wurde, um den Aufschwung in nennenswertem Maße beeinflussen zu können. Schließlich räumt Buchheim auch mit der Vorstellung auf, der Arbeiterschaft sei es nach 1933 rasch besser ergangen. Noch 1938 war beim Nettolohn das Niveau von 1928 nicht erreicht. Abstract Already in autumn 1932, private economic forces resulted in the first stage of recovery from serious crisis in Germany. They were also primarily responsible for the continuation of the business cycle upswing in 1933. In contrast, public employment creation programmes were relatively unimportant, while other Nazi regime actions even disrupted entrepreneurial confidence during much of 1933. In 1934/35 however, further endogenous stimulation of growth was largely suppressed, with state demand and rearmament taking over in its place. As a consequence, the economic development of Germany was increasingly distorted and destabilized.

Monetary Integration of Eastern Europe Into the World Economy

There is a widespread feeling in all Eastern European countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, Russian acronym Comecon) that an essential element of their market-oriented reforms has to be a closer integration into the world economy. For only then will the internal price structure of non-autarkic countries be right — i.e., permanently adapting to true scarcities. That, however, is an indispensable prerequisite for efficient production and the disappearance of immisering trade. In addition such integration would — through imports — increase competition on the domestic market and thus put firms under pressure to enhance their own competitiveness, which would benefit demand. And attraction of much-needed foreign capital and know-how can also not be secured unless a greater degree of openness is achieved in the Eastern European economies.