Christoph Bühren

Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game

We draw an unusually detailed picture of a discovery, the beauty contest game – with Herve Moulin as the center of the initial inspiration. Since its inception, the beauty contest game and the descriptive level k model has widely contributed to the growth of experimental and behavioral economics and expanded also to other areas within and outside of economics. We illustrate, in particular, the recent interaction between macroeconomic theorists and experimenters, who independently had worked on the puzzles and consequences due to beauty contest features. Furthermore, we introduce a new variety of the two-person beauty contest game with two different payoff structures that leads to different game-theoretic properties unperceived by naive subjects and game theory experts alike.

Worker or Shirker - Who Evades More Taxes? A Real Effort Experiment

With the help of a real effort experiment, we analyze if tax evasion depends on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or hard to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than in the moderate work treatment.

Using warm-up stages before measuring preferences for innovative products

This study proposes two new methods to familiarise respondents with innovative attributes and thereby ensure their stable preference statements within customer tests in the product development process. These warm-up phases differ in how the participants gather information about the product category, namely, independently or in the lab. A qualifying examination tests the appropriateness of study participants as respondents in a following preference measurement task. Both approaches effectively prepare respondents, though the independent search version offers slight advantages. Our study offers useful tools for evaluating the warm-up phases of preference measurement studies.

Market research with the aid of a smartphone application – a case study

Abstract We discuss using the presumed ‘wisdom of the crowd’ to reduce the bullwhip effect in supply chains by enhancing the accuracy of demand forecast. Our case study describes a joint project of a leading European technology company (We chose RAGD as a pseudonym for the company throughout the study.) and the University of Kassel on a smartphone application for end customers to gather early information for this producer’s forecast. Our results confirm the ‘wisdom of the crowd’ hypothesis: A group of experts, in our case technicians who install and maintain RAGD-products, is capable of anticipating market fluctuations six weeks in advance. This only holds true if the ‘crowd’ of technicians is large enough. Our business climate index outperforms the company forecast in the first six months, when on average 22 technicians took part per week. We discuss successes and limitations of the cooperation and provide recommendations for similar projects.

Rating Agencies – An Experimental Analysis of Their Remuneration Model

Abstract Does it matter who pays for ratings? Yes, but not for the rating agencies’ behavior. These are the findings of our experiment where we analyze the effect of the remuneration model of rating agencies on their assessments as well as on investors’ and issuers’ behavior. First, we find that rating agencies’ assessments are comparable whether the agency is (partially) paid by issuers, investors or solely by the experimenter. Issuers, on the other hand, more often do not return investor’s trust when they or investors pay for ratings. Further, investors more often act according to the agencies’ recommendations when they have to pay for this information.