Christopher Hookway

Naturalized epistemology and epistemic evaluation

The paper explores Quines ‘naturalized epistemology’, investigating whether its adoption would prevent the description or vindication of normative standards standardly employed in regulating beliefs and inquiries. Quines defence of naturalized epistemology rejects traditional epistemological questions rather than using psychology to answer them. Although one could persuade those sensitive to the force of traditional epistemological problems only by employing the kind of argument whose philosophical relevance Quine is committed to denying, Quine can support his view by showing how scientific inquiry need not confront any evaluative issues which cannot be addressed in naturalistic terms. A survey of Quines own epistemological writings supports this account of his position: naturalized epistemology, it is argued, requires acceptance of the shallowness of epistemic reflection, and traditional epistemology employs general epistemic norms and principles which Quine endeavours to show that we can do without. ...

Common sense, science and scepticism: A historical introduction to the theory of knowledge

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The epicurean argument: Determinism and scepticism

This paper examines Honderichs attempt to make sense of the widespread view that acceptance of determinism undermines reason and knowledge. Since I am largely in sympathy with Honderichs approach to these issues, the paper develops a theme suggested by his discussion and disagrees with some details of the focus of his argument rather than challenging the general principles he employs. After introducing the issue and sketching Honderichs version of the argument from determinism to scepticism, I present an alternative which is closer to traditional patterns of sceptical argument. The concluding sections compare the two arguments and the anti‐determinist assumptions about agency and the self which each employs: scepticism results from determinism against the background of a conception of rationality and justification which supports a Cartesian approach to epistemology and an internalist theory of justification.