Christopher M. Davidson

THE EMIRATES OF ABU DHABI AND DUBAI: CONTRASTING ROLES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Almost everything is remarkable about the United Arab Emirates (UAE), from its enormous oil wealth and tiny indigenous population to its record-breaking socio-economic development, resting awkwardly astride one of the region’s most opaque and constricted political systems. Most extraordinary of all, however, at least in terms of immediate impact and sheer visibility, is the stark contrast between the UAE’s two most powerful constituent members, the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai; a contrast made particularly spectacular given that their eponymous cities are just a 90 minute car journey apart. The skylines of both cities are dominated by modern steel and glass skyscrapers, but Dubai has always held the edge and can now boast some of the world’s tallest and most innovative buildings, the flagship properties of many prestigious international hotel chains and real estate developers, man-made islands rising out of the sea, and enormous artificial lakes and canals. Moreover, while Abu Dhabi continues to exude a certain sleepiness and still retains many of its Arabic and Islamic traditions and customs, Dubai is well on its way to becoming the ‘Las Vegas of the Middle East’: it is regularly visited by millions of sun seeking and bargain hunting tourists, is home to thousands of prostitutes, turns a blind eye to public homosexuality, is awash with alcohol and narcotics, is perfectly tolerant of beachwear being paraded down the streets, and has long since adopted English as its lingua franca. By outlining their differing histories and leadership, their geographical variances, and of course their crucial disparity in oil reserves, this article will highlight the very distinct development strategies employed by the two emirates and demonstrate how these have led to markedly different roles within the highly flexible UAE federation and within the international system. Finally, the respective advantages and disadvantages of these strategies will be considered, in addition to the long-term political ramifications of such divergent paths for the survival of the UAE’s non-democratic and extremely delicate ‘ruling bargain’ between its rulers and citizens.

Arab Nationalism and British opposition in Dubai, 1920–66

The sheikhdom of Dubai is generally thought to have enjoyed a close and peaceful relationship with Britain before the Empire’s eventual withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 and Dubai’s subsequent incorporation into the federation of United Arab Emirates. Moreover, for much of the first half of the twentieth century Dubai seemed to have achieved something close to political stability, with the ruling Al-Maktoum dynasty consolidating its ranks, and with the city’s large indigenous merchant community ostensibly preferring to focus on expanding regional trade networks rather than involving itself in domestic power struggles. In stark contrast, many of Dubai’s closest neighbours were exhibiting signs of dissension and discord. Indeed, introverted rulership in Abu Dhabi had frustrated British interests and forced local merchants to emigrate throughout this period; merchant movements in Kuwait in the 1930s had sparked much debate and controversy; martial law had been declared in Bahrain following alarming levels of Suez-inspired unrest in the 1950s; and in the mid-1960s the ruler of Sharjah had even permitted the opening of an Arab League office, thereby openly undermining British control. Such a view of relative serenity in Dubai would be fairly accurate, but only up until the late 1920s, as during this early period the sheikhdom’s merchants were able to coexist profitably with their rulers and the British: they continued to supply enormous international demand for the Gulf’s lucrative pearls whilst also benefiting from fresh business contacts and links provided by the many Persian and expatriate Arab merchants that had relocated to Dubai’s ‘freeport’ following restrictive legislation in their home ports. However, until significant oil revenues began to flow in the 1960s (allowing the rulers to placate and absorb their merchants by removing taxation and granting exclusive construction and retail licences thereby making them co-beneficiaries of the oil boom), there was something of a downswing. The pearling industry had collapsed due to international recession and the introduction of less expensive, although considerably inferior, Japanese ‘cultured’ pearls. Moreover, the merchant community’s other trading activities also suffered, including Dubai’s many re-export businesses, as the double blow dealt by the Great Depression and the Second World War severed their previously extensive overseas trade networks. Focusing on this economic lull between the 1920s and the 1960s, this piece will demonstrate how political instability and merchant unrest were proportionately linked to the region’s wealth. Thus, while most texts limit their discussion of antiBritish sentiments and Arab nationalism in Dubai to the subject of the sheikhdom’s Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No. 6, 879 – 892, November 2007

From Traditional to Formal Education in the Lower Arabian Gulf, 1820-1971.

This article charts the development of education in the lower Arabian Gulf from its traditional beginnings in the nineteenth century to the provision of more formal schooling and eventually a ministry of education following Britains withdrawal from the region in 1971. In order to provide a better understanding of the complexities and relative advances and setbacks to this development, special emphasis is placed on the social, economic and political context of educations trajectory; including the lower Gulfs dependent relations with its Imperial protector and its reliance on foreign educational aid from Kuwait.

E-Learning in the Arab Gulf: Responding to the Changing World of Education

E-learning is an umbrella concept for self-paced or instructor-led online learning in and outside schools worldwide. E-learning refers to computer-enabled transfer of skills and knowledge. It concerns a variety of electronically supported learning and teaching activities. The information and communications technology (ICT) and the Internet serve as mediums and provider for the e-learning process. In the last two decades, the e-learning domain is rapidly growing, since the Internet was made widely available to the public and industry in the 1990s. Nowadays, e-learning activities such as content transfer, training exercises, and communication may be enabled via the Internet or the intranet of a school or university. Electronic means like audio, CD ROMS, video, TV, or the latest mobile (phone) devices may further facilitate the e-learning environment and create connectivity almost everywhere you go.

EXPATRIATES AND THE GULF MONARCHIES: POLITICS, SECURITY AND THE ARAB SPRING

For many years huge expatriate populations have played a much documented role in the economic development of the Gulf monarchies. But a less well-told story is how expatriates have also contributed to their political stability. As non-citizens their presence in such large numbers has reinforced the elite status of most citizens in the region – an important non-pecuniary legitimacy resource for the various ruling dynasties. Moreover, the primarily employment-driven status of expatriates has meant that they have usually adopted either an apolitical or even prostatus quo stance. In some cases their perceived loyalty has led to selective naturalization or even direct co-option into security services. Disrupting this decades-old relationship, however, have been the recently changing political and economic circumstances of the Gulf monarchies. Already decisions have been made to reduce significantly expatriate populations due to accumulating pressures. Such measures are likely to threaten the historic political advantages the presence of expatriates has provided for these polities.