Christopher Storrs

Disaster at Darien (1698–1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs

Between November 1698 and April 1700, a serious, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt was made by the recently (1695) established Company of Scotland for Trading with Africa and the Indies to establish a Scots colony on the isthmus of Darien, in Spanish central America. Not surprisingly, this abortive project, which was typical of the way numerous states, large and small, sought in one way or another in the later seventeenth century to break into the lucrative colonial and overseas trades, has attracted a great deal of attention from Scottish historians, for whom the failure figures largely in interpretations of the background to the Union of Scotland and England of 1707. For some, the failure of the project, and the loss of the substantial proportion of Scotland’s liquid capital which it had mobilized (to say nothing of the loss of life and shipping), was a crucial blow to Scotland’s economy, and ultimately to its independence; for others its failure merely exposed the realities of Scottish economic weakness and the need for economic and political integration with its larger and more powerful southern neighbour. Despite their interest, Scottish (and English) historians have, again not entirely surprisingly — particularly given the problems of language and availability of source materials — largely ignored the crucial Spanish dimension to this subject. One recent survey of eighteenth-century Britain, for example, sees the explanation for the Darien fiasco as a choice between English indifference and Scottish incompetence. Yet the interest of Scottish Christopher Storrs

The Military Revolution and the European Nobility, c. 1600-1800

Warfare was a permanent and ubiquitous feature of early modern Europe, stimulating new developments in military technology and organization. Firearms became more important and, eventually, dominant, and armies more specialized and complex. By 1600 the proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry were roughly equal. Thereafter, the proportion of cavalry declined even more rapidly, while its nature also underwent fundamental change. The heavily armoured knights, the backbone of medieval warfare, came to be replaced by lighter horsemen, and the rnêœe by the more disciplined though less effective caracole. New artillery made traditional fortifications redundant and necessitated much reconstruction along more modern lines. Armies were broken down into smaller units, while training and discipline became more important. Above all, the military forces of most states grew rapidly in size, reaching a peak in the first decade of the eighteenth century, and

Machiavelli Dethroned: Victor Amadeus II and the Making of the Anglo-Savoyard Alliance of 1690

In 1690 Victor Amadeus II of Piedmont-Savoy entered the Nine Years War on the side of the Grand Alliance, abandoning the French alliance which had characterized Savoyard foreign policy for much of the previous half-century. His defiance of Louis XIV, his participation in the Nine Years War (mounting the allies’ only invasion of France, in 1692), and his acquisition of Pinerolo in 1696 by means of a separate peace with the French king (helping to force the allies to make the general peace at Rijswijk in 1697) gained for the Savoyard state, and its prince, a European prestige neither could claim before. Belated membership of the Grand Alliance in the War of the Spanish Succession brought Victor Amadeus greater renown and a Crown at last (of Sicily), further distinguishing him and his states from their Italian neighbours. Piedmont-Savoy acquired a new independence in the European states system and became an integral part of that ’Old System’ of European equilibrium beloved of English eighteenth-century politicians, a role confirmed by alliance with England and Austria in the War of the Austrian Succession.’ 1

The Spanish Risorgimento in the Western Mediterranean and Italy 1707–1748

The reign of Philip V of Spain (1700–46) remains one of the most neglected in the history of that country, and in terms of its significance for the rest of Europe. Philip is widely regarded, on the one hand, as little more than the instrument of his wives – above all, Isabel Farnese – and, on the other hand, as a major innovator in Spain. This article seeks to show that Philip’s revanchist aspirations in Italy – and in Africa – after the losses incurred during the War of the Spanish Succession, and which ensured that Spain represented the single greatest threat to peace in Europe between the end of that conflict and the conclusion of the War of the Austrian Succession, were not simply imposed by his spouse. It also suggests that Philip’s ambitions were backward looking, and that in seeking to reconstitute his Habsburg inheritance, Philip drew on traditional institutions, practices and values at least as much as he innovated.

War, Neutrality and Commercial Treaties: The Savoyard State 1660–1789

The later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed great efforts to stimulate the economy of the Savoyard state whose rise by 1748 had posed it with the challenge of funding its enhanced status without the wartime subsidies paid by allies. These efforts included negotiations with a number of other powers: with Britain, resulting in a commercial treaty in 1669, and much later with Portugal, Russia and Denmark. None of these later negotiations resulted in a formal, wide-ranging commercial treaty. At a far less ambitious level, however, the Savoyard state concluded agreements whereby various states bought out the obligation on foreign merchant shipping to pay the duty known as the droit de Villefranche. Similarly, reciprocal agreements with various governments removed the equally burdensome droit d’aubaine. Diplomacy thus achieved instruments of a less grand nature than full-blown commercial treaties but nonetheless favoured the expansion of commercial relations with the states concerned.

Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim, eds, European Warfare 1350–1750

unity in the Soviet bloc. In contrast to Western Europe (where there was ‘only’ fear from a potential Soviet or Warsaw Pact invasion), many East Europeans ‘did not always see the capitalist West as their only, or even primary, external security threat; East Europeans were equally concerned about Soviet and – later on – Warsaw Pact interventions. This inherent tension made internal Warsaw Pact politics inherently paranoid’ (291–2). As the suppression of uprisings in East Berlin (1953) and Hungary (1956) and the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) showed, this paranoia was understandable. It also made few Eastern Europeans, in contrast to Western Europeans, enthusiastic about political and economic integration. In recent years, perhaps paradoxically, it seems to be the other way round. Politics is understandably an important part of this volume. Fortunately, it has far more to offer, ranging from contributions on economics (for example on the most recent crisis), culture, remembrance, architecture and television culture. In doing so, Stone has assembled a team of expert authors who offer a broad panorama of Europe since 1945. Emphasising lines of continuity as well as discontinuity from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the book has a clear red line, and asks interesting questions, for example whether there really was a ‘Zero Hour’ in 1945 and when indeed ‘postwar’ Europe starts. This makes for a fascinating and well-informed read, making The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History a useful resource for years to come.

Book Review: Marshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France. James FalknerMarshal Vauban and the Defence of Louis XIV’s France. FalknerJames. Pen & Sword Military: Barnsley. 2011. 256 pp. £25.00. ISBN 978 1 84415 927 7

interconnected with naval strength. This strength was the product of cooperation between interest groups. Military change, which has typically been taken as a catalyst for the development of administrative centralization and increasing state power and reach, was actually a consequence of these changes. From the late seventeenth century most Western states managed to co-opt the support and resources of their socio-political elites more successfully than hitherto. These advances ensured that if the problematic notion of an early modern military revolution is to be applied, it is better devoted to 1660–1725 than to the years conventionally considered, 1450–1660. The new collection ranges widely but is particularly good on the navies – British, Dutch, French, and Spanish – and on aspects of the supply chain and contract management. Thus, Jöel Félix provides an effective account of the contracting system for military supply to the French army during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, a piece ably paralleled by Stephen Conway’s account of the supply to the British forces in Germany in 1758–62. The latter draws on a wide range of sources, but the papers of the 3rd Duke of Marlborough as well as archival material in the Beinecke Library might be added. The common soldier emerges as a serious loser. Huw Bowen reveals the scale of British arms sales by private traders to rivals of the East India Company, indicating their importance for the transfer of technology from the West to south Asia. Governmental limitations emerge in the account by Christina Moreira and Jari Eloranta of the Portuguese military provisioning and supply system in the early nineteenth century. There is lots of interest in this fine volume but, like others in the series, an inadequate grasp of alternative views.

Provincial Governors and the Absolute State: Piedmont 1713-48

Most studies of absolutism, particularly in Piedmont (and more broadly the Savoyard state of which it was part) focus on the emergence of intendants as an agent of the centralizing state. However, this completely ignores the role of the provincial governors. This article therefore looks in closer detail than has been done hitherto, at the role, recruitment, remuneration and social background of the provincial governors of Piedmont as an important but still rather obscure period of Savoyard state formation. Provincial governors were essentially soldiers in a highly militarized state, which was one reason for their prominent role, and they fulfilled many of the absolutist or centralizing functions (monitoring, punishing) usually attributed to other agents of the state. Among their responsibilities was watching over the local nobility. The modus operandi of governors reflected a growing formalization of practice within the Savoyard state. At the same time, however, governors sometimes clashed with the other agents of that state. In terms of remuneration, governors scored much higher than did intendants. Governors were also of more exalted social origin. More work needs to be done on the provincial governors of the early modern Savoyard state but clearly they cannot be ignored as an instrument of that state, or as an indicator that the older elite successfully inserted itself into that structure to its own advantage.

G. Rowlands, The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV: royal service and private interest, 1661–1701 . (Cambridge University Press, 2002.) Pages xxi+404. £45.00.

Louis XIV has long been regarded as the exemplary absolute monarch, and his creation of a large standing army – one more clearly than before an instrument of the royal will – as one of the pillars of his success at home and abroad. Recent decades, however, have witnessed a transformation of our understanding of both absolutism and the Sun King. Guy Rowlands builds on this revisionist critique and extends it to the royal army. While acknowledging that Louis did assert royal authority over his armed forces more successfully than did Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin between 1635 and 1659, Rowlands questions both the means whereby the king achieved this and the attitude which inspired him. Rowlands doubts the extent to which Louis or his subordinates were ‘modernizing’or ‘statebuilding’ and instead views all those connected with the army – the king, his ministers, his army officers – as involved in a variety of fundamentally dynastic enterprises. At the top, Louis XIV sought to preserve his own inheritance and to assert his dynastic rights, using his enlarged army against rival foreign claimants ; he also gave important military posts to his brother, his sons – legitimate and illegitimate – and his grandsons. Administration of the army was the responsibility of the Secretary of War and his subordinates. However, far from being made up of the bureaucrats of legend, this structure too was permeated by personal and family ambition. The most striking example of this was the tenure of the office of Secretary by Michel Le Tellier (1643–1677), by his son, the marquis de Louvois (1677–1691) and by the latter’s younger son – the eldest son proving incapable – the marquis de Barbezieux (1691–1701). The Le Telliers’ successful direction of France’s military machine depended in part upon a hierarchy of officials Continuity and Change 19 (2), 2004, 313–334. f 2004 Cambridge University Press Printed in the United Kingdom

Politics and Diplomacy in Early Modern Italy: The Structure of Diplomatic Practice, 1450-1800@@@War, Diplomacy and the Rise of Savoy, 1690-1720

List of illustrations Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Map: the Savoyard state, 1690-1720 Introduction 1. The Savoyard army, 1690-1720 2. Savoyard finance, 1690-1720 3. Savoyard diplomacy, 1690-1720 4. Government and politics in the Savoyard state, 1690-1720 5. The Savoyard nobility, 1690-1720 6. Regions and communities in the Savoyard state, 1690-1720 Conclusion Select bibliography Index.