Christopher Yeomans

Freedom and reflection : Hegel and the logic of agency

Acknowledgements Abbreviations Part I: Introduction Chapter 1: Hegel and Free Will 1.1: Hegel and the Traditional Problem of Free Will 1.2: Hegels Theory of Free Will Chapter 2: The Problem of Expression as the Problem of Reflection 2.1: Introduction 2.2: Internal and External Determination in the Doctrine of Being 2.3: Internal and External Determination in the Concept of Reflection 2.4: Elements of the Theory of Reflection in Hegels Moral Psychology 2.5: The Shape of the Project Part II: Agency as Self-Explanation Chapter 3: The Externality of Explanations and the Problem of an Infinite Regress Chapter 4: Self-Explanation as the Basic Form of Explanation 4.1: Ground as Expression 4.2: Internal and External Determination in Explanations 4.3: The Argument for Explanation as a Three-Term Relation 4.4: The Role of Conditions as the Third Term in Explanation 4.5: The Infection of Internality by the Conditions 4.6: Holism about Explanation Chapter 5: The Agent as a Locus of Self-Explanation Part III: Agency as True Necessity Chapter 6: The Necessity of Action and the Problem of Alternate Possibilities Chapter 7: Modality in Hegels Logic 7.1: Modality as the Structure of Self-Expression 7.2: Contingency as a Unity of Actuality and Possibility 7.3: The Modal Continuum 7.4: The Necessity of Alternate Possibilities Chapter 8: Agency as True Necessity 8.1: Willkur and Wille 8.2: The Modal Argument for Hegels Conception of the Free Will Part IV: Agency as Teleological Reciprocal Interaction Chapter 9: The Mechanistic Challenge and the Problem of Passivity Chapter 10: Teleology, Mechanism and Causation 10.1: The Question of Priority 10.2: Productivity as Expression 10.3: Freedom as Substance-Causation 10.4: The Passivity of Mechanical Causation 10.5: Causation as Reciprocal Interaction 10.6: Reciprocal Interaction as Freedom 10.7: The Teleological Form of Reciprocal Self-Determination Chapter 11: Teleological Agency 11.1: Arguments Against Determinism 11.2: A Teleological Philosophy of Action Chapter 12: Conclusion Bibliography Index Notes

The expansion of autonomy : Hegel's pluralistic philosophy of action

Abbreviations Acknowledgments Introduction Part I: General Framework Chapter 1: Virtue and Individuality 1. Virtue as the Individualization of Duty 2. Virtue as Duties that Persons have in Virtue of also Being Animals 3. Virtue as the Fight between Reason and the Inclinations 4. The Development of Talents as a Duty of Virtue Chapter 2. The Empty Formalism Objection in the Context of Individualized Virtue Chapter 3: Fichte and the Problem of Individual Effectiveness Chapter 4: A Moral Psychology of Talents and Interests 1: Talents and Interests 2: Subjectivity and Objectivity Part II: Experiments in Individuality Chapter 5: The Changing Nature of Objective Content 1: The Distinctively Moral Form of Objective Content 2: Farmers 3: Soldiers Chapter 6: Talents and the Shaping of Action 1: Talent and Intentional Self-Knowledge 2: Craft and Industrial Producers 3: Scholars Chapter 7: The Concreteness of the Good 1: The Effectiveness of the Good 2: The Public Estate 3: Merchants Part III: Conclusion Chapter 8: Hegelian Self-Determination 1: The Reciprocal Inversion of Moral and Material Ends 2: Character as Medium and Process of Expression 3: Non-Empiricist Action Explanations 4: Objective Criteria and Deception Index

Thomas reid and some regress arguments

Abstract This paper reconstructs Reids responses to regress arguments against the possibility of free will, highlighting the role played by long-term decisions (“general fixed purposes”) in the explanation of paradigmatic free actions on Reids account. In addition to reconstructing Reids response to the two versions of the regress argument that he explicitly discusses, I also construct a Reidian response to Galen Strawsons contemporary version of the regress argument. The depth of Reids position is most apparent in the resources it provides for responding to this sophisticated articulation of a traditional argument against freedom of the will.