Christos Constantatos

On the Economics of Labels: How Their Introduction Affects the Functioning of Markets and the Welfare of All Participants

Are labels good or bad for consumers and firms? The answer may seem straightforward since labels improve information, yet economic theory reveals situations where their introduction reduces the welfare of at least some market participants. This essay reviews the theoretical literature on labels in order to identify and explain the main reasons that may cause labeling to produce undesirable side-effects. In contrast to earlier reviews that either concentrate on narrow topics or treat the subject in a more or less informal way, we bring together the main results from all the relevant topics by presenting and discussing the assumptions and model-building techniques that underpin them. The advantage of this approach is that it identifies the origin of the differences between results, thus allowing the synthesis of results that sometimes appear even to be contradictory. We focus on “quality labels” and examine the impact of labeling on market structure, the side-effects of costly certification, issues related to the labels trustworthiness, the rationale for mandatory vs. voluntary labeling, the level at which the labels standard is set according to the agency that selects it, the political economy of labels, that is, pro- or anti-label lobbying, lobbying to affect the labels standard, and lobbying in favor or against the labels mandatory imposition. These topics cover a wide range of applications, including Genetically Modified Organism (GMOs), organic produce, geographic indicators, controlled origin, eco-labels, etc. We conclude by identifying topics that require further research.

Airline network structure under demand uncertainty

In this paper, we provide another reason that may explain the adoption of the hub-and-spoke network structure in the airline industry. We show that when an airline has to decide on its capacity before the demand conditions are perfectly known, a hub-and-spoke (h&s) network structure by pooling passengers from several markets into the same plane helps the firm to lower its cost of excess capacity in the case of low demand and to improve its capacity allocation in the case of high demand.

Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision

This paper examines the effects of the imposition of minimum quality standards (MQS) on a vertically differentiated natural duopoly with free entry. It is shown that the welfare effects of MQS are crucially dependent upon the timing of the quality choice with respect to the decision to enter the market. If irreversible decision to enter is taken without pre-commitment to a specific quality level then a welfare improving MQS always exists. If, however, a firms product quality must be decided prior to entry then a MQS is either redundant or counterproductive, since it can induce a monopoly.

Environmental Regulation and International Trade

In this paper, we investigate how a countrys choice of environmental policy instrument affects the international competitiveness of its firms. We show that in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, the total market share of firms regulated through tradeable emission permits increases relative to that of the firms operating under command and control due to better allocation of total abatement among the firms in the country. Our work suggests that free trade situations should not only result in similar environmental standards but also in similar regulatory regimes. It may come as no surprise that the environmental authorities in Canada are seriously considering following the United States in instituting a tradeable emission permits mechanism.

Strategic interactions and airline network morphology under demand uncertainty

Abstract In this paper, we examine how strategic interactions affect airline network under demand uncertainty. We develop a three-stage duopoly game: at stage 1 airlines determine their network structure (linear versus hub-and-spoke); at stage 2 they decide on their capacities; at stage 3 firms compete in quantities. The main feature of the model is that firms have to decide on network structure and capacities while facing demand uncertainty. We show that while hubbing is efficient, airlines may choose a linear network for strategic reasons. Furthermore, we show that this structure softens competition by preventing contagion of competition across markets.

On commodity taxation in vertically differentiated markets

Abstract We examine the impact of commodity taxation on vertically differentiated product markets when entry is allowed. We show that an ad valorem tax may have a dramatic effect on market structure by inducing the entry of a large number of firms in what was previously a natural monopoly. The producers of high quality products reduce market share after an increase in their unit production cost, leaving more room for lower quality products. While within a given market structure aggregate quality decreases monotonically with the tax rate, quality jumps upwards at tax rates that cause a change in market structure.

Free entry may reduce total willingness-to-pay1

Abstract In a natural oligopoly with quality commitments, entry accommodation may induce an incumbent to adopt a lower quality relative to a protected monopolist. Due to quality distortion a protected monopoly may be welfare superior to a duopoly even absent cost considerations.