Chung Min Lee

Rethinking future paths on the Korean Peninsula

For a nation such as Korea whose history has been shaped by brutal and unrelenting geopolitics, the dominance of political realism, balance of power logic, and dispassionate definitions of its vital national interests would seem to be natural components of its security discourse. These traits remain imbedded in Korea’s overall strategic culture but one of the most curious aspects of the post-1998 public security debate in South Korea is the rise of normative discourses and the parallel contraction of realist assumptions and paradigms. Such developments are not entirely new of course given that bifurcated security perceptions in general, and assessments of North Korea in particular, have always been affected by the twin forces of inter-state and intra-national dynamics on the Korean Peninsula, e.g., the urge for national reunification coupled with the need to coping with key national issues. But the inconsistencies and parallel tensions in the ongoing security debate accelerated sharply during the tenure of the Kim Dae Jung Administration (1998–2003) and specifically, through the so-called sunshine policy or comprehensive engagement towards the North. The Roh Moo Hyun government, which came into office in February 2003, has also retained the basic framework of the sunshine policy but renamed as the socalled peace and prosperity policy. While the key objective of this paper lies in examining and isolating looming security challenges on the Korean Peninsula and not reviewing the pros and cons of sunshine policy, three major points should be emphasized. First, notwithstanding positive dividends stemming from the sunshine policy, it is important to also articulate its major shortcomings such as the

North Korean missiles: strategic implications and policy responses

Analysts remain sharply divided on the underlying motivations behind North Koreas ballistic missile program, more than two years after Pyongyang startled the world by test firing its Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998. In the aftermath of the historic South-North summit meeting in June and US Secretary of State Madeline Albrights path-breaking trip to Pyongyang in October, proponents of the engagement school argue that with a mixture of patience and inducements, North Korea will ultimately negotiate away its missiles. They point to the 1994 Agreed Framework as a key reminder that North Korea uses its weapons of mass destruction capability as a bargaining chip. Conversely, countervailing arguments point out that North Koreas ballistic missile program serves multiple purposes such as shifting the correlation of forces to its favor, supporting the militarys modernization goals, and as the primary symbol of military prowess and that, as a result, a negotiated settlement is unlikely. This paper assesses North Koreas potential reasons for pursuing a robust ballistic missile program over the past two decades and the broader strategic consequences of North Koreas missile arsenal, particularly if it succeeds in developing intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. In addition, it also analyzes South Koreas political and military responses to North Koreas accelerated ballistic missile program including South Koreas own ballistic missile modernization goals. The paper also reviews the problems associated with trilateral policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Finally, policy options are analyzed but none appear to be able to satisfy the seemingly contradictory objectives of the key players in the ongoing North Korean missile saga.

East Asia's Awakening from Strategic Hibernation and the Role of Air Power

Abstract In sharp contrast to land-dominant forces with only limited technological capabilities, key armed forces such as the PRCs Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), Japans Self Defense Forces (SDF), and the South and North Korean militaries have built up significant power projection capabilities since the 1980s. North Koreas weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and assets (including a potential nuclear weapons capability) have surfaced as key security concerns since the early 1990s and for its part, China has begun to implement its own revolution in military affairs (RMA) strategies that may enable the PRC to have very robust power projection capabilities by 2020 or 2030. If one includes Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs into the broader strategic equation, Asia may well face an increasingly volatile arms race over the next 20–30 years. Seen within this context, the role of air power is likely to assume growing importance in East Asias projected force modernization programs, given the ...

Asia's new long march: bottling conflicts and managing political turbulences

ABSTRACT This paper explores the probable causes and consequences of an Asian Paradox or the highly incongruous structure of Asia within the broader international system: at once the engine of global economic growth while at the same time, the repository of all of the worlds outstanding security threats and challenges. Asia in the 21st century is going to be a key test bed of the commercial peace theory and whether the U.S.-China strategic rivalry will result in some type of a conflict. Attention is also paid to the potential consequences flowing from the end of Asias Meiji era or when all of Asias major powers and key middle powers have achieved or are well on their way of achieving what Japan accomplished by the late 1890s: a wealthy economy and a strong military. How an increasingly wealthy, technologically advanced, and a militarily sophisticated Asia decides to cope with numerous security dilemmas is Asias new Long March including the extent to which the regions strategically consequential states are willing to preserve and to strengthen the prevailing liberal international order.

Security issues in Europe: An Asian perspective

The future of European and Asian security can no longer be separated owing to pervasive globalization, the rise of East Asia as a new geopolitical hub, and the increasing web of interests that binds the United States, the European Union (EU), and East Asia together. Of the three key relationships‐the transatlantic, the transpacific, and the Eurasian‐the latter remains the weakest owing to a combination of historical, political, and economic reasons. Improving this relationship from the strategic, economic, and conceptual dimensions will bring significant dividends to the two regions. Operationalizing this challenge, however, is going to be cumbersome and time consuming given the historical lack of strategic interaction between East Asia and Europe.