Chung-Ying Cheng

Contemporary Chinese Philosophy

Notes on Contributors. Preface: Chung--ying Cheng. Introduction: Nicholas Bunnin. Part I: Pioneering New Thought from the West:. 1. Liang Qichaoa s Political and Social Philosophy: Yang Xiao. 2. Wang Guowei: Philosophy of Aesthetic Criticism: Keping Wang. 3. Zhang Dongsun: Pluralist Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy: Xinyan Jiang. 4. Hu Shia s Enlightenment Philosophy: Hu Xinhe. 5. Jin Yuelina s Theory of Dao : Hu Jun. Part II: Philosophizing in the Neo--Confucian Spirit:. 6. Xiong Shilia s Metaphysics of Virtue: Jiyuan Yu. 7. Liang Shuming: Easten and Western Cultures and Confucianism: Yanming An. 8. Feng Youlana s New Principle Learning and His Histories of Chinese Philosophy: Lauren Pfister. 9. He Lina s Sinification of Idealism: Jiwei Ci. Part III: Ideological Exposure to Dialectical Materialism:. 10. Feng Qia s Ameliorism: Between Relativism and Absolutism: Huang Yong. 11. Zhang Dainian: Creative Synthesis and Chinese Philosophy: Cheng Lian. 12. Li Zehou: Chinese Aesthetics from a Post--Marxist and Confucian Perspective: John Zijiang Ding. Part IV: Later Development of New Neo--Confucianism:. 13. Fang Dongmei: Philosophy of Life, Creativity, and Inclusiveness: Chengyang Li. 14. Practical Humanism of Xu Fuguan: Peimin Ni. 15. Tang Junyi: Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture: Sin Yee Chan. 16. Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition: Refeng Tang. Afterwords. Recent Trends in Chinese Philosophy in China and the West: Chung--ying Cheng. An Onto--Hermeneutic Interpretation of Twentieth--Century Chinese Philosophy: Identity and Vision: Chung--ying Cheng. Glossary. Index.

Chinese philosophy: A characterization

This article offers a synthetic characterization of Chinese philosophy based on an analytical reconstruction of its main traditions and thinking. Three main traditions in Chinese philosophy, Confuc...

Preliminary Study of the Question of Categories in Chinese Philosophy

In the study of Chinese philosophy, whether looking at its historical development or comparing different schools of one particular period, the question of categories inevitably appears. The question of categories, in simple terms, may be understood as the question of those concepts concerned with basic thinking. Analyzed more closely, the question of Chinese philosophical categories can be divided into the following topics: (1) the types and content of categories; (2) standards for defining categories; (3) the special characteristics of categories; (4) category changes and their functions; (5) comparing categories; and (6) judging categories.

Deconstruction and Différance: Onto‐Return and Emergence in A Daoist Interpretation of Derrida

In inquiring into the nature of deconstruction in Derrida we see that it hides an opposite aspect of onto-generative emergence as stated in the wording of the Yijing. What is hidden is the movement of difference-making and generalizing repetition by way of certain presupposed reality. In examining Derridas notion “differance” (difference), his contrast between an ontology of presence and a philosophy of absence, in explaining the origin of meaning a la de Saussure, has transformed into the polaristic structure of all differences, whether it be in language or in things. The Saussurian distinction between the signifier and the signified no doubt reflects this polarity but not reveals an underlying transcendent-immanent principle called “differance,” or, the dao 道 in Chinese philosophy. This “difference” in language leads to ramification of meanings which could be self-deconstructive such as the extended use of the word “spirit” demonstrates.

Confucian Methodology and Understanding the Human Person

Chinese Philosophy may be characterized as concretely rationalistic, organically naturalistic, intrinsically humanistic and morality-oriented pragmatistic.1 Although these features characterize Chinese philosophy in general, they characterize the Confucian philosophy in specific particularity par excellence. With a strong emphasis on the holistic integrity and unity of the human person and with a concentration on the human person as a vehicle for fulfilling the ultimate value in the world, the Confucian philosophy is unquestionably intrinsically humanistic and is staunchly opposed to a bifurcation of human existence by either contrasting and confronting it with an external divinity to be submitted to, or doing so with an external material world to be controlled and exploited. The Confucian philosophy is no doubt concretely rationalistic, specifically because of its dedication to the human use of human reason for solving human problems and for formulating criteria for the solution of human problems in concrete reference to an understanding of human potentiality and perfectibility.

Comments on Hintikka’s Paper

Professor Hintikka in his highly suggestive paper made a good case for the possible fruitful application of modal logic and semantics of possible worlds to contemporary linguists’ studies of language. Hintikka made his point by offering a clear critique of linguists’ claims and then providing ways of dealing with issues at hand from the point of view of logical semantical theory. Now the purpose of my comments here is not intended to make a defense of any linguists’ view or to advance their views in a better context, but on the contrary, to lay bare certain fundamental problems in the interpretation of the possible-worlds semantical approach and to suggest possible lines of solution.

Phenomenology and Onto-Generative Hermeneutics: Convergencies

In examining phenomenology as a base onto-generative hermeneutics (onto-hermeneutics) I find the gradual movement from pure phenomenology in Husserl to an ontological phenomenology in Merleau-Ponty through Heidegger and Gadamer. I argue thus that there is an implicit connection between the phenomenological and the ontological. In order to bring out the desirable connection between the two we must have hermeneutic interpretation of one in terms of the other. This leads to the idea of onto-hermeneutic circle of phenomenology and ontology based on the integration of the four phenomenologies which represent a wider comprehension and deeper intuition. It is in terms of this wider comprehension and deeper intuition of reality I introduce the Chinese notion “ben-ti 本體” (root-body) as “onto-generative” as well as onto-phenomenological. I suggest five principles as constituting the basic formulation of such a hermeneutic system as both theory and methodology: (i) Principle of comprehensive observation (guan 观) (the Yijing); (ii) Principle of objective reference (wu 物)1 (the Yijing); (iii) Principle of perception, reflection, and memory (gan 感) (the Yijing and the Confucian); (iv) Principle of intersubjective understanding and interpretation based on (ren 仁) (the Confucian); and (v) Principle of practical end and action (xing 行) (the Confucian).

A Generative Ontological Unity of Heart-Mind and Nature in the Four Books

Traditional scholarship seems not to pay sufficient attention to the fact that Daxue 《大學》 has established a system of ethical and political philosophy on the basis of the idea of xin 心 (heart-mind) whereas the Zhongyong 《中庸》 has argued for the participation of the human person in the creativities of heaven and earth based on the onto-generative nature (xing 性) of the human person. How to explain this fact and interrelate and integrate these two systems become both a historical challenge and a theoretical issue in the understanding of the Confucian philosophy of humanity as we find in the Lunyu 《論語》.

Requirements for the Validity of Induction

In this Chapter I shall examine two requirements which Peirce considers to be essential for the validity of inductive inference. One, as we have seen, is that of fair sampling or obtaining fair samples for the inductive premises. Peirce says, “The first premises of a scientific inference (i.e., an ampliative inference such as induction) is that certain things (in the case of induction) or certain characters (in the case of hypothesis) constitute a fairly chosen sample of the class of things or the run of characters from which they have been drawn.”1 The other requirement is that of predesignation, which Peirce calls a condition sine qua non of valid inductions.2 It requires us to ascertain with respect to which particular character we are to sample a given population and how many instances we propose to sample the population, before instances of the population are actually selected, and, therefore, before we know whether they are instances of the population or how many of them are instances of the population.