Cindy R. Alexander

Evaluating Data on Corporate Sentencing: How Reliable are the U.S Sentencing Commission's Data?

During a recent study of how 1991 federal sentencing guidelines have affected the penalties that federal courts impose on public corporations, we performed an independent evaluation of the quality of the data on corporate sanctions that the U.S. Sentencing Commission releases to the public. Our initial findings led us to use other, independently-compiled data for our own research. This paper presents the main findings of our evaluation, which focused on the quality of the Commissions 1988-1996 (ICPSR) data on public corporations. First, the Commissions post-Guidelines data on penalties for public corporations appear to be incomplete and non-representative of the underlying case population. For example, the ICPSR post-1991 data appear to exclude a disproportionate number of large fines imposed on public corporations. No similar difficulties in the ICPSR pre-Guidelines (1988-1989) data were found. Shortfalls in the post-Guidelines data on other kinds of defendants, such as individuals, appear to be less marked. Second, the Commissions data are missing variables that may explain a substantial part of the case-by-case variation that occurs in sentencing. The data reveal little about the harm caused by the offense, which is often estimated in court papers. Also missing is information about the identity of the sentencing judge and about the identity of the corporation being sentenced. We review the history of the Commissions efforts to collect data on federal sentencing, highlighting institutional constraints and other factors that appear relevant to the difficulties we have found in the data that the Commission releases to the public.

Does conviction matter? The reputational and collateral effects of corporate crime

Critics of deferred prosecution agreements claim they undermine deterrence by lowering the cost to firms from reputational damage or stigma resulting from a criminal settlement. We evaluate whether the choice between a DPA and a guilty plea affects the cost to corporations of reputational damage arising from the reactions of interested outsiders – e.g., customers and suppliers – to the settlement, holding constant other factors such as the offender and offense magnitude. We introduce a framework for this purpose in which differences in the qualitative information that is released at settlement may cause differences in outsider reaction and, thus, the firm’s cost of reputational damage. We review the contents of the DPA and plea agreements and find no differences in the information they directly convey to interested outsiders that would cause differences in the expected cost of reputational damage to the firm. We then identify three channels through which the choice of settlement form might indirectly signal information to outsiders: direct revelation, prosecutorial selection, and managerial selection. The differences in the information that interested outsiders may receive through these channels according to the form of settlement appear unlikely to cause differences in the expected costs of reputational damage between DPA and plea to firms at settlement, however. We then turn to the impact of DPAs on the ability of federal agencies acting as interested outsiders to protect their interests by excluding or delicensing a firm whose criminal settlement reveals that it presents an enhanced risk of causing future harm to the agencies’ interests that is best addressed by exclusion instead of by mandated reforms. We conclude that agencies may be better able to serve their interests as interested outsiders when prosecutors employ DPAs than pleas because DPAs leave many agencies free to use permissive exclusion and enable them to exclude when, but only when, appropriate.