Claire El Mouden

Spatial Structure and Interspecific Cooperation: Theory and an Empirical Test Using the Mycorrhizal Mutualism

Explaining mutualistic cooperation between species remains a major challenge for evolutionary biology. Why cooperate if defection potentially reaps greater benefits? It is commonly assumed that spatial structure (limited dispersal) aligns the interests of mutualistic partners. But does spatial structure consistently promote cooperation? Here, we formally model the role of spatial structure in maintaining mutualism. We show theoretically that spatial structure can actually disfavor cooperation by limiting the suite of potential partners. The effect of spatial structuring depends on the scale (fine or coarse level) at which hosts reward their partners. We then test our predictions by using molecular methods to track the abundance of competing, closely related, cooperative, and less cooperative arbuscular mycorrhizal (AM) fungal symbionts on host roots over multiple generations. We find that when spatial structure is reduced by mixing soil, the relative success of the more cooperative AM fungal species increases. This challenges previous suggestions that high spatial structuring is critical for stabilizing cooperation in the mycorrhizal mutualism. More generally, our results show, both theoretically and empirically, that contrary to expectations, spatial structuring can select against cooperation.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF COOPERATION BY POLICING

Policing is regarded as an important mechanism for maintaining cooperation in human and animal social groups. A simple model providing a theoretical overview of the coevolution of policing and cooperation has been analyzed by Frank (1995, 1996b, 2003, 2009) , and this suggests that policing will evolve to fully suppress cheating within social groups when relatedness is low. Here, we relax some of the assumptions made by Frank, and investigate the consequences for policing and cooperation. First, we address the implicit assumption that the individual cost of investment into policing is reduced when selfishness dominates. We find that relaxing this assumption leads to policing being favored only at intermediate relatedness. Second, we address the assumption that policing fully recovers the loss of fitness incurred by the group owing to selfishness. We find that relaxing this assumption prohibits the evolution of full policing. Finally, we consider the impact of demography on the coevolution of policing and cooperation, in particular the role for kin competition to disfavor the evolution of policing, using both a heuristic “open” model and a “closed” island model. We find that large groups and increased kin competition disfavor policing, and that policing is maintained more readily than it invades. Policing may be harder to evolve than previously thought.

Triumphs and trials of the risk paradigm

A paper by Caraco, Martindale and Whittam (1980, Animal Behaviour , 28 , 820–830) transformed foraging behaviour research by the fundamental realization that actions in nature only rarely have precisely predictable outcomes. They showed that the consequences of risk, understood as the unpredictability and variance of consequences, must play a central role in functional and mechanistic analysis of animal decision processes. Here we examine the articles theoretical and experimental contribution with the benefit of over three decades of hindsight, review developments in the intervening time and discuss the future. Our review confirms previous ones showing that although the earliest results supported the predictions of the original models, a full analysis of the literature does not. In spite of a likely positive publication bias, the majority of studies fail to support a shift from risk proneness when in negative energetic budget to risk aversion when in positive budget, as embodied in the budget rule, and the proportion of failures increases with time. Furthermore, re-examining the earlier experiments we conclude that support should not have been expected, mostly because they implausibly assumed that all probabilities were known to the subjects. We argue that such assumptions should be abandoned, being replaced by realistic, evidence-based models of learning and information processing, such as associative learning and Webers Law. Our overall message is that models are research tools that can be fecund even if they are transformed and even refuted with the passage of time and the associated accumulation of knowledge.

Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments

Significance The finding that people vary in how they play economic games has led to the conclusion that people vary in their preference for fairness. Consequently, people have been divided into fair cooperators that make sacrifices for the good of the group and selfish free-riders that exploit the cooperation of others. This conclusion has been used to challenge evolutionary theory and economic theory and to guide social policy. We show that variation in behavior in the public-goods game is better explained by variation in understanding and that misunderstanding leads to cooperation. Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

Leadership in Mammalian Societies: Emergence, Distribution, Power, and Payoff

Leadership is an active area of research in both the biological and social sciences. This review provides a transdisciplinary synthesis of biological and social-science views of leadership from an evolutionary perspective, and examines patterns of leadership in a set of small-scale human and non-human mammalian societies. We review empirical and theoretical work on leadership in four domains: movement, food acquisition, within-group conflict mediation, and between-group interactions. We categorize patterns of variation in leadership in five dimensions: distribution (across individuals), emergence (achieved versus inherited), power, relative payoff to leadership, and generality (across domains). We find that human leadership exhibits commonalities with and differences from the broader mammalian pattern, raising interesting theoretical and empirical issues.

Promiscuity and the evolution of cooperative breeding

Empirical data suggest that low levels of promiscuity have played a key role in the evolution of cooperative breeding and eusociality. However, from a theoretical perspective, low levels of promiscuity can favour dispersal away from the natal patch, and have been argued to select against cooperation in a way that cannot be explained by inclusive fitness theory. Here, we use an inclusive fitness approach to model selection to stay and help in a simple patch-structured population, with strict density dependence, where helping increases the survival of the breeder on the patch. Our model predicts that the level of promiscuity has either no influence or a slightly positive influence on selection for helping. This prediction is driven by the fact that, in our model, staying to help leads to increased competition between relatives for the breeding position—when promiscuity is low (and relatedness is high), the best way to aid relatives is by dispersing to avoid competing with them. Furthermore, we found the same results with an individual-based simulation, showing that this is not an area where inclusive fitness theory ‘gets it wrong’. We suggest that our predicted influence of promiscuity is sensitive to biological assumptions, and that if a possibly more biologically relevant scenario were examined, where helping provided fecundity benefits and there was not strict density dependence, then low levels of promiscuity would favour helping, as has been observed empirically.

Exploring the effects of working for endowments on behaviour in standard economic games

In recent years, significant advances have been made in understanding the adaptive (ultimate) and mechanistic (proximate) explanations for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation. Studies of cooperative behaviour in humans invariably use economic games. These games have provided important insights into the mechanisms that maintain economic and social cooperation in our species. However, they usually rely on the division of monetary tokens which are given to participants by the investigator. The extent to which behaviour in such games may reflect behaviour in the real world of biological markets – where money must be earned and behavioural strategies incur real costs and benefits – is unclear. To provide new data on the potential scale of this problem, we investigated whether people behaved differently in two standard economic games (public goods game and dictator game) when they had to earn their monetary endowments through the completion of dull or physically demanding tasks, as compared with simply being given the endowment. The requirement for endowments to be ‘earned’ through labour did not affect behaviour in the dictator game. However, the requirement to complete a dull task reduced cooperation in the public goods game among the subset of participants who were not familiar with game theory. There has been some effort to test whether the conclusions drawn from standard, token-based cooperation games adequately reflect cooperative behaviour ‘in the wild.’ However, given the almost total reliance on such games to study cooperation, more exploration of this issue would be welcome. Our data are not unduly worrying, but they do suggest that further exploration is needed if we are to make general inferences about human behaviour from the results of structured economic games.

Social learning and the demise of costly cooperation in humans

Humans have a sophisticated ability to learn from others, termed social learning, which has allowed us to spread over the planet, construct complex societies, and travel to the moon. It has been hypothesized that social learning has played a pivotal role in making human societies cooperative, by favouring cooperation even when it is not favoured by genetical selection. However, this hypothesis lacks direct experimental testing, and the opposite prediction has also been made, that social learning disfavours cooperation. We experimentally tested how different aspects of social learning affect the level of cooperation in public-goods games. We found that: (i) social information never increased cooperation and usually led to decreased cooperation; (ii) cooperation was lowest when individuals could observe how successful individuals behaved; and (iii) cooperation declined because individuals preferred to copy successful individuals, who cooperated less, rather than copy common behaviours. Overall, these results suggest that individuals use social information to try and improve their own success, and that this can lead to lower levels of cooperation.

Evidence for strategic cooperation in humans.

Humans may cooperate strategically, cooperating at higher levels than expected from their short-term interests, to try and stimulate others to cooperate. To test this hypothesis, we experimentally manipulated the extent an individuals behaviour is known to others, and hence whether or not strategic cooperation is possible. In contrast with many previous studies, we avoided confounding factors by preventing individuals from learning during the game about either pay-offs or about how other individuals behave. We found clear evidence for strategic cooperators—just telling some individuals that their groupmates would be informed about their behaviour led to them tripling their initial level of cooperation, from 17 to 50%. We also found that many individuals play as if they do not understand the game, and their presence obscures the detection of strategic cooperation. Identifying such players allowed us to detect and study strategic motives for cooperation in novel, more powerful, ways.

Optimal control of malaria: combining vector interventions and drug therapies

BackgroundThe sterile insect technique and transgenic equivalents are considered promising tools for controlling vector-borne disease in an age of increasing insecticide and drug-resistance. Combining vector interventions with artemisinin-based therapies may achieve the twin goals of suppressing malaria endemicity while managing artemisinin resistance. While the cost-effectiveness of these controls has been investigated independently, their combined usage has not been dynamically optimized in response to ecological and epidemiological processes.ResultsAn optimal control framework based on coupled models of mosquito population dynamics and malaria epidemiology is used to investigate the cost-effectiveness of combining vector control with drug therapies in homogeneous environments with and without vector migration. The costs of endemic malaria are weighed against the costs of administering artemisinin therapies and releasing modified mosquitoes using various cost structures. Larval density dependence is shown to reduce the cost-effectiveness of conventional sterile insect releases compared with transgenic mosquitoes with a late-acting lethal gene. Using drug treatments can reduce the critical vector control release ratio necessary to cause disease fadeout.ConclusionsCombining vector control and drug therapies is the most effective and efficient use of resources, and using optimized implementation strategies can substantially reduce costs.