Claire Loupias

Régime de retraite et chute de la natalité : évolution des moeurs ou arbitrage micro-économique ?

In this paper, we develop an overlapping generations model where fertility is endogenous. The utility of the parents is a function of the number of their children, and each child implies two types of fixed costs: the financial cost and the cost in terms of time. A pay-as-you-go pension scheme introduces an externality in that the number of children will be fewer than optimal because their favorable impact on the level of pension income is not taken into account. First, we define the competitive equilibrium dynamics and the steady state. This allows comparisons with the optimal stationary state, a notion which generalizes the golden rule. Two instruments, pensions and child benefits, are necessary to decentralize the optimal state. Next, we compare the scenario depicted by the model with historical fact. Variations in welfare allowances may explain the entire decrease in fertility rates.

A theory of the optimal amount of public ownership of land

A major issue in reforming previously planned economies is the creation of assets markets. In this paper, it is argued that the mere characteristics of the assets to be privatized matter. Indeed, private ownership of land. It is the purpose of this paper to provide a theory of such rate. We make use of a two-sectors overlapping generations model economy with land and capital. We find a version of the second welfare theorem : the command optimum can be decentralized using one and only one instrument, i.e. the rate of land publicly held. We call such a rate the optimal rate of public ownership of land.

Vieillissement et inégalités intergéné rationnelles en france

This paper investigates the impact of demographic shocks and budgetary policy on the welfare of all generations. For this purpose, we build a large scale OLG model that captures most crucial variables for the analysis of population shocks conse- quences in France. We introduce life uncertainty (implying precautionary saving) and a bequest motive (stimulating wealth accumulation at old age) so as to repro- duce realistic wealth profiles per age. The microeconomic foundations provide an intertemporal indicator of welfare for each generation. Five policy scenarios are distinguished (indexation of pension through transfer adjustments, imperfect index- ation of transfers on growth in order to keep the tax rate constant, the creation of an implicit fund, increase in the public debt, or increase in the retirement age).

Croissance et modes de propriete des terres

Private property in land has often been criticized because it is supposed to bring about a waste of productive resources weakening economic growth. Indeed, because it is non reproductible, land earns a rent which increases in a growing economy and whose capitalization decreases the productive savings. However, public property in land does not imply the removal of rents neither insure a faster growth rate. If rents are given back to agents during the end of their life, this weakens the need of savings and diminishes growth. If rents are given back to agents at the beginning of their life-cycle, this can boost their savings. This paper contrasts the two preceding arguments within the framework of an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth. We find that, in effect, public property in land leads to faster growth. However, equilibria are Pareto-optimal under either property rights schemes. We conclude that the comparison of the two equilibria cannot be settled on the sole ground of Pareto-efficiency.