Clare Palmer

Canine and feline obesity: a One Health perspective

Recent years have seen a drastic increase in the rates of overweight and obesity among people living in some developed nations. There has also been increased concern over obesity in companion animals. In the latest article in Veterinary Records series on One Health, Peter Sandøe and colleagues argue that the relationship between obesity in people and in companion animals is closer and more complex than previously thought, and that obesity should be treated as a One Health problem

Environmental ethics and process thinking

In this study, Clare Palmer challenges the popular conception that process thinking offers an unambiguously positive contribution to the philosophical debate on environmental ethics. She critically examines the approach to ethics which may be derived from the work of process thinkers such as A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, pointing out questions about justice and respect for individual integrity which are raised. With these questions in mind, she compares process ethics to a variety of other forms of environmental ethics, as well as deep ecology. This comparative study reveals a number of difficulties associated with process thinking about the environment. Although some reformulations of process philosophy in the light of these difficulties are offered, the author suggests that a question mark should remain over the contribution which process philosophy can make to environmental ethics.

The Blind Hens' Challenge: Does It Undermine the View That Only Welfare Matters in Our Dealings with Animals?

Animal ethicists have recently debated the ethical questions raised by disenhancing animals to improve their welfare. Here, we focus on the particular case of breeding hens for commercial egg-laying systems to become blind, in order to benefit their welfare. Many people find breeding blind hens intuitively repellent, yet ‘welfare-only’ positions appear to be committed to endorsing this possibility if it produces welfare gains. We call this the ‘Blind Hens’ Challenge’. In this paper, we argue that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons why even those adopting ‘welfare-only’ views should be concerned about breeding blind hens. But we also argue that alternative views, which (for example) claim that it is important to respect the telos or rights of an animal, do not offer a more convincing solution to questions raised by the possibility of disenhancing animals for their own benefit.

Place-Historical Narratives: Road—or Roadblock—to Sustainability?

O’Neill, Holland and Light’s book Environmental Values is wide-ranging, rich and thought-provoking. I will explore here just one theme that’s central to their account: historical narratives of place. Places matter to us, O’Neill, Holland and Light maintain, because of the ways in which historical stories about places are bound into individual and community identity, and are constitutive of our flourishing. Understanding the ways places matter should thus inform, and shape, our policymaking. This is a key idea in Environmental Values and not one widely discussed in environmental ethics (though there are some exceptions). However, there is a substantial body of relevant work on time, narrative and place in human geography, environmental psychology and environmental studies broadly conceived, to which O’Neill, Holland and Light rarely directly refer. This work is largely, though not wholly, supportive of what O’Neill, Holland and Light either assume or propose in empirical terms about place and identity. However, problems and questions are raised with respect to evaluative aspects of O’Neill, Holland and Light’s arguments about place. One particularly significant critique of place-oriented ideas—ideas that at least resemble those argued for in Environmental Values—has been made by Nordhaus and Shellenberger in their popular and influential book, Break Through (2007). Nordhaus and Shellenberger maintain that place-based environmentalism (and though this term may not quite capture O’Neill, Holland and Light’s position, the views Nordhaus and Shellenberger attack at least overlap with it) can be a roadblock to sustainability, rather than a road towards achieving it. It is on claims like this that I will principally focus here. First, then, I will summarize what I take to be important claims made by O’Neill, Holland and Light about place, history and narrative. Then I will outline two important objections: (a) that place-orientation is reactionary (I’ll suggest that the authors largely resist this difficulty); and (b) that place-orientation can be narrow

Assisted Colonization is No Panacea, but Let's Not Discount it Either

Ronald Sandler’s ‘Climate change and ecosystem management’ (2013) provides a fine summary of reasons to modify our approach to ecosystem management given ‘rapid and uncertain ecological change’. We agree with him that traditional ‘reserve oriented’ and ‘restoration’ approaches, including their focus on species preservation, require fundamental rethinking. In this brief response, however, we will focus on Sandler’s related comments about assisted colonization, and argue that there is more reason to be positive about it as a conservation strategy than he suggests. Assisted colonization has recently attracted a mixed reception from ecologists and philosophers (see, Hewitt et al., 2011; Minteer & Collins, 2010). Sandler argues that assisted colonization is unlikely to be successful because there is ‘ecological uncertainty’ about whether deliberately transplanted species will survive; at the other extreme, that they may become invasive; and in any case, that their movement would not preserve important values anyway. We will respond to all three points. First, Sandler claims that assisted colonization is unlikely to be successful in practice because we cannot ‘predict the climatic and ecological future of particular places with any confidence’. Of course, there is tremendous uncertainty associated with predicting future climates. However, Sandler’s view is excessively pessimistic because such predictions need not be completely accurate. Rather, we can experiment with trial introductions of a species across a range of latitudes and habitats, drawing on extensive prior knowledge as we do so. We can do this even for ‘less ecologically flexible’ species. It’s true that movements of some species would need to recur over time, as climate continues to change (though not in all cases, if assisted colonization allowed a species to cross a one-off natural or artificial barrier). Yet it also seems reasonable to think that our success and skill at carrying out assisted colonization would gradually improve over time. Second, Sandler cites concerns that such introduced species could become ‘invasive’. This is the most commonly stated risk of assisted colonization, though ‘risk exists on all sides of the . . . debate’ (Mueller & Hellman, 2008, p. 566). In practical terms, this judgment also seems pessimistic. We are able to make some predictions about potential invasiveness, notwithstanding the additional complications—rightly noted by Sandler—

Landscape and value in the work of alfred wainwright (1907 – 1991)

Abstract Alfred Wainwright was arguably the best known British guidebook writer of the 20th century, and his work has been highly influential in promoting and directing fell-walking in northern Britain, in particular in the English Lake District. His work has, however, received little critical attention. This paper represents an initial attempt to undertake such a study. We examine Wainwrights work through the lens of the landscape values and aesthetics that, we suggest, underpins it, and by an exploration of what might be called Wainwrights ‘environmental identity’. We argue that Wainwright manifests a strikingly contemporary embodied landscape aesthetic and a strongly place-attached environmental identity. We consider some possible implications of this landscape aesthetic and place attached identity, including their relation to broader environmental commitments and the possibility that the endorsement of such values may have exclusionary consequences for members of ‘outsider’ groups.

A Bibliographical Essay On Environmental Ethics

Questions concerning the ways in which human beings can and should interact with the nonhuman natural world can hardly be said to be new. Throughout recorded human history prescriptions concerning human behaviour towards the nonhuman world have existed. Although with reference to restricted periods of time and restricted geographical locations, attempts have been made to categorise such prescriptions and to consider the attitudes which underlie them, to attempt a comprehensive survey would be an enormous task.

Does breeding a bulldog harm it? Breeding, ethics and harm to animals

It is frequently claimed that breeding animals that we know will have unavoidable health problems is at least prima facie wrong, because it harms the animals concerned. However, if we take ‘harm’ to mean ‘makes worse off’, this claim appears false. Breeding an animal that will have unavoidable health problems does not make any particular individual animal worse off, since an animal bred without such problems would be a different individual animal. Yet, the intuition that there is something ethically wrong about breeding animals — such as purebred pedigree dogs — in ways that seem negatively to affect welfare remains powerful. In this paper, an animal version of what is sometimes called the non-identity problem is explored, along with a number of possible ways of understanding what might be wrong with such breeding practices, if it is not that they harm the animal itself. These possibilities include harms to others, placeholder arguments, non-comparative ideas of harm, an ‘impersonal’ approach, and concerns about human attitudes and dispositions.

Rethinking Animal Ethics in Appropriate Context: How Rolston's Work Can Help

Holmes Rolston has long been regarded as a leading figure both in environmental philosophy and in science and religion. In this chapter, though, I argue that Rolston’s work also paves the way towards rethinking animal ethics. Given the well-known hostility between many forms of environmental philosophy and animal ethics, to turn to Rolston—a notorious champion of the former field—in order to advance work in the latter field, may seem singularly perverse. But, I will maintain, Rolston’s arguments— whilst undeveloped and in some respects problematic—provide a better basis for advancing work in animal ethics than the advocacy or rejection of utilitarian or rights positions that have dominated animal ethics for several decades. In particular, I will suggest, Rolston’s work provides tools for thinking through the complicated location of domesticated animals both conceptually and ethically. So, at the end of the chapter, I make some initial moves in outlining how Rolston’s position might be developed to contribute to new thinking with respect to animals and ethics. In focusing on the place of animals in Rolston’s environmental ethics, I will touch only obliquely on the area of his work that has caused most controversy: his endorsement of a theory of objective intrinsic value in nature. That topic has been exhaustively discussed elsewhere, and I will not revisit that discussion here. The place of animals in Rolston’s work is not, though, entirely virgin territory either. Some attention has been paid to it before (notably by Peter Wenz [1989], to which Rolston responded, and later by Ned Hettinger [1994] and Moriarty and Woods [1997]). But my interest takes a somewhat different trajectory to that of existing debates, concentrating on Rolston’s understanding of nature and culture as part of the architecture of a context-oriented approach to animal ethics. In order to develop this argument, I will begin by outlining—in a very basic way—what seem to be some central problems in what we might call “philosophical animal liberation” approaches to animal ethics. Then I will move on to draw out key aspects of Rolston’s understanding of “nature” and “culture”. I will consider how animals are located within these categories, and then make some suggestions as to how Rolston’s position might contribute to a more contextual approach to animal ethics. Two further initial comments should be made for clarification. First, in using the term “animals”, I intend to confine my discussion to non-human mammals and birds. Second, I will be assuming—as does Rolston—that, on grounds of sentience at least, it makes sense to talk about these animals as being morally considerable (no stronger claim, such as that animals have rights, is intended). I will not be putting forward arguments to defend the moral considerability of these animals here.

Three Questions on Climate Change

Climate change will have highly significant and largely negative effects on human societies into the foreseeable future, effects that are already generating ethical and policy dilemmas of unprecedented scope, scale, and complexity. One important group of ethical and policy issues raised here concerns what I call environmental values. By this I do not mean the impact that climate change will have on the environment as a valuable human resource, nor am I referring to the changing climate as a threat to humans in terms of floods, storms, and droughts, important as these are. Rather, I am concerned with the way climate change—and the policies that may be adopted to respond to it—threatens both things we value and, potentially, some of our environmental values themselves.