Claudia Meo

Coalition formation in games without side payments

We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notion of stability a la Hart and Kurz [Hart, S., Kurz, M., 1983. Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econometrica 51, 1295-1313] into the classical Shapley [lambda]-transfer value. Our analysis starts by first defining a new solution concept, the [lambda]-transfer stable CS value, and then providing an existence result for the three-player case.

Cooperative Solutions for Large Economies with Asymmetric Information

A proof of the existence of private core allocations is provided for an exchange economy ε where consumers and commodities are both infinite in number, supposing however that only finitely many types can be distinguished among traders. It is obtained passing through the Edgeworth equilibrium notion considered for a suitably associated discrete setting. For this setting a preliminary result - which is interesting in itself - is proved: in every discrete economy E with asymmetric information and unequal numbers of traders with the same characteristics there is a private core allocation which treats agents of the same type equally.