Claus Emmeche

EXPLAINING EMERGENCE: TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF LEVELS

The vitalism/reductionism debate in the life sciences shows that the idea of emergence as something principally unexplainable will often be falsified by the development of science. Nevertheless, the concept of emergence keeps reappearing in various sciences, and cannot easily be dispensed with in an evolutionary world-view. We argue that what is needed is an ontological non reductionist theory of levels of reality which includes a concept of emergence, and which can support an evolutionary account of the origin of levels. Classical explication of emergence as “the creation of new properties” is discussed critically, and specific distinctions between various kinds of emergence is introduced for the purpose of developing an ontology of levels, framed in a materialistic and evolutionary perspective. A concept of the relation between levels as being inclusive is suggested, permitting the “local” existence of different ontologies. We identify, as a working hypothesis, four primary levels and explicate their nonhomomorphic interlevel relations. Explainability of emergence in relation to determinism and predictability is considered. Recent research in self-organizing non-linear dynamical systems represents a revival of the scientific study of emergence, and we argue that these recent developments can be seen as a step toward a final “devitalisation” of emergence.

From language to nature: The semiotic metaphor in biology

The teleonomic character of living systems continues to challenge the conception of life prevailing among biologists. No matter how forcefully vitalistic or finalistic explanations have been defeated through developments in experimental biology, such attitudes apparently never totally disappear, even among professional biologists. Rather, they reappear in new guises for every new generation. In the history of science, controversies of this kind going on for centuries have rarely, if ever, been resolved through the unambiguous victory of one of the sides. In the first decades following the neo-Darwinistic synthesis of the 1940s, however, most biologists considered the matter settled once and for all. The purposeful character of living organisms was seen as an inevitable consequence of evolution to be causally explained by the mechanism of natural selection gradually favoring the spread of adaptive mutations within populations. This provisional cease-fire, however, did not survive the 1970s. Severe criticism from areas ranging from paleontology to embryology and molecular biology succeeded in provoking a renewed theoretical debate on the role of natural selection in evolution, and thus the gradual and adaptive character of this process (Gould 1982, 1985; Vrba and Eldredge 1984; Webster and Goodwin 1982; Goodwin 1984; L0vtrup 1987; Ho and Saunders 1979; Dover 1982). At the deepest level, this renewed criticism concerns the question of biological form. Is the development of form to be explained simply through the gradual improvement of function? Do organisms and parts of organisms develop their characteristic forms just because such forms were the most functional (the most successful)? This problem is an old one: what is the relation between substance and form? In reflecting on Korzybskis famous statement, Gregory Bateson traces the problem back to Pythagoras:

On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation

In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biological research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, property emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and downward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of organicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosophy, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducibility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to emergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicalism does not lead, arguably, to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O’Connor’s definition of an emergent property, we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward causation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an explanation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-reductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, even if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.

A semiotic analysis of the genetic information system

Abstract Terms loaded with informational connotations are often employed to refer to genes and their dynamics. Indeed, genes are usually perceived by biologists as basically ‘the carriers of hereditary information.’ Nevertheless, a number of researchers consider such talk as inadequate and ‘just metaphorical,’ thus expressing a skepticism about the use of the term ‘information’ and its derivatives in biology as a natural science. First, because the meaning of that term in biology is not as precise as it is, for instance, in the mathematical theory of communication. Second, because it seems to refer to a purported semantic property of genes without theoretically clarifying if any genuinely intrinsic semantics is involved. Biosemiotics, a field that attempts to analyze biological systems as semiotic systems, makes it possible to advance in the understanding of the concept of information in biology. From the perspective of Peircean biosemiotics, we develop here an account of genes as signs, including a detailed analysis of two fundamental processes in the genetic information system (transcription and protein synthesis) that have not been made so far in this field of research. Furthermore, we propose here an account of information based on Peircean semiotics and apply it to our analysis of transcription and protein synthesis.

A semiotical reflection on biology, living signs and artificial life

It is argued, that theory sf signs, especially in the tradition of the great philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) can inspire the study of central problems in the philosophy of biology. Three such problems are considered: (1) The nature of biology as a science, where a semiotically informed pluralistic approach to the theory of science is introduced. (2) The peculiarity of the general object of biology, where a realistic interpretation of sign- and information-concepts is required to see sign-processes as immanent in nature. (3) The possibility of an artificial construction of life, hereby discussed as a conceptual problem in the present form of the artificial life project and its implied definition of life.

Causal Processes, Semiosis, and Consciousness

The evolutionary emergence of biological processes in organisms with inner, qualitative aspects has not been explained in any sufficient way by neurobiology, nor by the traditional neo-Darwinian paradigm — natural selection would appear to work just as well on insentient zombies (with the right behavioral input-output relations) as on real sentient animals. In consciousness studies one talks about the ‘hard’ problem of qualia. In this paper I sketch a set of principles about sign action, causality and emergent evolution. On the basis of these principles I characterize a concept of cause that would allow for a naturalistic explanation of the origin of consciousness. The suggested account of causation also turns the ‘hard problem’ of qualia into the easier problem of relating experimental biology to experiential biology.

Closure, Function, Emergence, Semiosis and Life: The Same Idea? Reflections on the Concrete and the Abstract in Theoretical Biology.

Abstract: In this note epistemological problems in general theories about living systems are considered; in particular, the question of hidden connections between different areas of experience, such as folk biology and scientific biology, and hidden connections between central concepts of theoretical biology, such as function, semiosis, closure, and life.

Ontic Openness as Key Factor in the Evolution of Biological Systems

The heterogenic character of biological systems has as a consequence that calculations of their possible combinatorial constellations very soon run into numerical explosions. This means, that the resulting numbers—so-called immense numbers—exhibit orders of magnitude beyond any physical meaning. Such a high number of possibilities cause another property—named ontic openness by the physicist W. M. Elsasser—to emerge within such systems. All biological systems possess the feature of being ontic open and this is of great importance to evolution, as ontic openness not only guarantees a development of the system to take place, but also interferes with our chances to fully comprehend this evolutionary processes sensu lato. Thus ontic openness implies an extremely high level of uncertainty and unpredictability. On the one hand, we have a certainty that “something” is bound to happen within the system—on the other hand, we can be totally sure that we will never be able to forecast exactly whatever that “something” will be. At lower levels of biological hierarchy, e.g., the molecular level represented by molecules like DNA, RNA, and proteins, ontic openness seems pretty easy to comprehend. When it comes to more aggregate and even conglomerate systems, i.e., at higher levels of biological hierarchy, the emergence as well as the expression of this property becomes increasingly obscure. Although definitely present, the property at superior levels tends to be overlooked or neglected. Although the calculations may take different forms—and in spite of finding different causes—the property penetrates through all levels of biological hierarchy. To prevent systems from ending up in a situation where the evolutionary state described by calculations that are incomprehensible or even intractable constraints of the systems are needed. From the different levels some systematic patterns seem to be recognizable. Whereas lower levels find causes inside–upwards to be dominating, at upper levels causes become dominated by outside–inwards interactions. Eventually, the ontic openness is likely to be limited not only by physical dimensions but is also constrained by downward acting factors. One reason for this is that space and time scales are well-known to be tightly coupled throughout the biological hierarchy—smaller scales have fast reaction rates as opposed to large scale with slower functions. Thus, space and time scales become important to the realization of ontic openness. At the same time, a shift occurs that stresses information exchange and treatment together with cognitive processes to be increasingly dominant in the biosemiotics of the ongoing processes. The whole leads to a shift from dominance of objective factors to more subjective ones in the process of evolution. Viewing evolutionary systems as ontic openness systems and pursuing the constraints influencing them may turn out to be a fruitful strategy to the investigation of all developmental processes.

Semiotic Scaffolding of the Social Self in Reflexivity and Friendship

The individual and social formation of a human self, from its emergence in early childhood through adolescence to adult life, has been described within philosophy, psychology and sociology as a product of developmental and social processes mediating a linguistic and social world. Semiotic scaffolding is a multi-level phenomenon. Focusing upon levels of semiosis specific to humans, the formation of the personal self and the role of friendship and similar interpersonal relations in this process is explored through Aristotle’s classical idea of the friend as ‘another self’, and sociologist Margaret Archer’s empirical and theoretical work on the interplay between individual subjectivity, social structure and interpersonal relations in a dynamics of human agency. It is shown that although processes of reflexivity and friendship can indeed be seen as instances of semiotic scaffolding of the emerging self, such processes are heterogeneous and contingent upon different modes of reflexivity.

Robot Friendship: Can a Robot be a Friend?

Friendship is used here as a conceptual vehicle for framing questions about the distinctiveness of human cognition in relation to natural systems such as other animal species and to artificial systems such as robots. By exploring this very common form of a human interpersonal relationship, the author indicates that even though it is difficult to say something generally true about friendship among humans, distinct forms of friendship as practiced and distinct notions of friendship have been investigated in the social and human sciences and in biology. A more general conceptualization of friendship as a triadic relation analogous to the sign relation is suggested. Based on this the author asks how one may conceive of robot-robot and robot-human friendships; and how an interdisciplinary perspective upon that relation can contribute to analyse levels of embodied cognition in natural and artificial systems.