Colin Jennings

AN ECONOMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT

Tullock (1971) demonstrated that the cause of politial rebellion is perhaps more to do with private expected utility that collective discontent. There is much to suggest that pecuniary motivation plays a large part in the North Irland (N.I.) conflict given the substantial amount of black market activity which is present. This paper therefore puts forward an economic model in the N.I. paramilitaries blending their gangster and political activities which are commonly geared to earn revenue.

Domestic Violence and Football in Glasgow: Are Reference Points Relevant?

A growing body of evidence suggests that people exhibit loss aversion – the displeasure from suffering a loss is larger than the pleasure enjoyed from an equivalent-sized gain – and that expectations are important in determining what is perceived as a loss. Recent research suggests that disappointing results in sporting fixtures relative to prematch expectations play an important role in triggering domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011), consistent with the idea of loss aversion around expectations-based reference points. This paper seeks to investigate whether such behaviour is exhibited by football fans in Glasgow by looking at the relationship between match outcomes relative to expectations and levels of domestic violence using a data set that contains every domestic violence incident in Glasgow over a period of more than eight years. Whilst we find that when the ‘Old-Firm’ Glasgow rivals Celtic and Rangers play there are large increases in domestic violence (regardless of the outcome of the match), in other matches disappointing results relative to expectations are not linked to increased domestic violence, except when those matches occur at the very end of the season where the title is still being contended.

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence in situations where violence does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.

INTRA-GROUP COMPETITION AND INTER-GROUP CONFLICT: AN APPLICATION TO NORTHERN IRELAND

This paper reviews four economic theories of leadership selection in conflict settings. The ‘credibility rationale’, argues that hawks may actually be necessary to initiate peace agreements. The ‘bargaining rationale’ predicts that while doves are more likely to secure peace, post‐conflict hawks may be rationally selected. The ‘social psychological rationale’ captures the idea of a competition over which group can form the strongest identity. Dove selection can be predicted during conflict, but hawk selection post‐conflict. Finally, the ‘expressive rationale’ predicts that regardless of the underlying nature of the game the large group nature of decision‐making in rendering individual decision makers non‐decisive in determining the outcome of elections may cause them to make choices based primarily on emotions. Finally, the paper analyses the extent to which the theories can throw light on Northern Ireland electoral history over the last 25 years.

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

Group support for political violence: The role of emotions and expressive choice in creating conflict or providing peace

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence which does not provide a material benefit. Rabin’s (1993) theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be a Nash equilibrium it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifice in choosing peace.