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Dive into the research topics where Constance L. Heitmeyer is active.

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Featured researches published by Constance L. Heitmeyer.


ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology | 1996

Automated consistency checking of requirements specifications

Constance L. Heitmeyer; Ralph D. Jeffords; Bruce G. Labaw

This article describes a formal analysis technique, called consistency checking, for automatic detection of errors, such as type errors, nondeterminism, missing cases, and circular definitions, in requirements specifications. The technique is designed to analyze requirements specifications expressed in the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) tabular notation. As background, the SCR approach to specifying requirements is reviewed. To provide a formal semantics for the SCR notation and a foundation for consistency checking, a formal requirements model is introduced; the model represents a software system as a finite-state automation which produces externally visible outputs in response to changes in monitored environmental quantities. Results of two experiments are presented which evaluated the utility and scalability of our technique for consistency checking in real-world avionics application. The role of consistency checking during the requirements phase of software development is discussed.


foundations of software engineering | 1999

Using model checking to generate tests from requirements specifications

Angelo Michele Gargantini; Constance L. Heitmeyer

Recently, many formal methods, such as the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) requirements method, have been proposed for improving the quality of software specifications. Although improved specifications are valuable, the ultimate objective of software development is to produce software that satisfies its requirements. To evaluate the correctness of a software implementation, one can apply black-box testing to determine whether the implementation, given a sequence of system inputs, produces the correct system outputs. This paper describes a specification-based method for constructing a suite of test sequences, where a test sequence is a sequence of inputs and outputs for testing a software implementation. The test sequences are derived from a tabular SCR requirements specification containing diverse data types, i.e., integer, boolean, and enumerated types. From the functions defined in the SCR specification, the method forms a collection of predicates called branches, which “cover” all possible software behaviors described by the specification. Based on these predicates, the method then derives a suite of test sequences by using a model checkers ability to construct counterexamples. The paper presents the results of applying our method to four specifications, including a sizable component of a contractor specification of a real system.


ACM Transactions on Computer Systems | 1984

A security model for military message systems

Carl E. Landwehr; Constance L. Heitmeyer; John McLean

Military systems that process classified information must operate in a secure manner; i.e., they must adequately protect information against unauthorized disclosure, modification, and withholding. A goal of current research in computer security is to facilitate the construction of multilevel secure systems, systems that protect information of different classificationsfrom users with different clearances. Security models are used to definethe concept of security embodied by a computer system. A single model, called the Bell and LaPadula model, has dominated recent efforts to build secure systems but has deficiencies. We are developing a new approach to defining security models based on the idea that a security model should be derived from a specificapplication. To evaluate our approach, we have formulated a security model for a family of military message systems. This paper introduces the message system application, describes the problems of using the Bell-LaPadula model in real applications, and presents our security model both informally and formally. Significantaspects of the security model are its definition of multi-level objects and its inclusion of application-dependent security assertions. Prototypes based on this model are being developed.


computer aided verification | 1998

SCR*: A Toolset for Specifying and Analyzing Software Requirements

Constance L. Heitmeyer; James Kirby; Bruce G. Labaw; Ramesh Bharadwaj

A controversial issue in the formal methods community is the degree to which mathematical sophistication and theorem proving skills should be needed to apply a formal method and its support tools. This paper describes the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) tools, part of a “practical” formal method—a. method with a solid mathematical foundation that software developers can apply without theorem proving skills, knowledge of temporal and higher order logics, or consultation with formal methods experts. The SCR method provides a tabular notation for specifying requirements and a set of “light-weight” tools that detect several classes of errors automatically. The method also provides support for more “heavy-duty” tools, such as a model checker. To make model checking feasible, users can automatically apply one or more abstraction methods.


Requirements Engineering | 1995

Consistency checking of SCR-style requirements specifications

Constance L. Heitmeyer; Bruce G. Labaw; Daniel L. Kiskis

The paper describes a class of formal analysis called consistency checking that mechanically checks requirements specifications, expressed in the SCR tabular notation, for application independent properties. Properties include domain coverage, type correctness, and determinism. As background, the SCR notation for specifying requirements is reviewed. A formal requirements model describing the meaning of the SCR notation is summarized, and consistency checks derived from the formal model are described. The results of experiments to evaluate the utility of automated consistency checking are presented. Where consistency checking of requirements fits in the software development process is discussed.


Requirements Engineering | 2002

Requirements Engineering and Technology Transfer: Obstacles, Incentives and Improvement Agenda

Hermann Kaindl; Sjaak Brinkkemper; Janis A. Bubenko; Barbara Farbey; Sol J. Greenspan; Constance L. Heitmeyer; Julio Cesar Sampaio do Prado Leite; Nancy R. Mead; John Mylopoulos; Jawed I. A. Siddiqi

For many years, research results in requirements engineering (RE) have been developed without much interaction with, or impact on, industrial practice. Why is it so difficult to introduce RE research results into mainstream RE practice? This paper attempts to provide answers to this question by describing obstacles that researchers and practitioners have encountered when they attempted technology transfer. In addition, major incentives for using RE methods are discussed, along with ideas for improving current RE practice. The paper summarises, clarifies and extends the results of two panel discussions, one at the Twelfth Conference on Advanced information Systems Engineering (CAiSE’00) and the other at the Fourth IEEE Conference on Requirements Engineering (ICRE’00).


COMPASS '95 Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Conference on Computer Assurance Systems Integrity, Software Safety and Process Security' | 1995

SCR: a toolset for specifying and analyzing requirements

Constance L. Heitmeyer; Alan R. Bull; Carolyn Gasarch; Bruce G. Labaw

A set of CASE tools is described for developing formal requirements specifications expressed in the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) tabular notation. The tools include an editor for building the specifications, a consistency checker for testing the specifications for consistency with a formal requirements model, a simulator for symbolically executing the specifications, and a verifier for checking that the specifications satisfy selected application properties. As background, the SCR method for specifying requirements is reviewed and a formal requirements model is introduced. Examples are presented to illustrate the tools.


automated software engineering | 1999

Model Checking Complete Requirements Specifications Using Abstraction

Ramesh Bharadwaj; Constance L. Heitmeyer

Although model checking has proven remarkably effective in detecting errors in hardware designs, its success in the analysis of software specifications has been limited. Model checking algorithms for hardware verification commonly use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) to represent predicates involving the many Boolean variables commonly found in hardware descriptions. Unfortunately, BDD representations may be less effective for analyzing software specifications, which usually contain not only Booleans but variables spanning a wide range of data types. Further, software specifications typically have huge, sometimes infinite, state spaces that cannot be model checked directly using conventional symbolic methods. One promising but largely unexplored approach to model checking software specifications is to apply mathematically sound abstraction methods. Such methods extract a reduced model from the specification, thus making model checking feasible. Currently, users of model checkers routinely analyze reduced models but often generate the models in ad hoc ways. As a result, the reduced models may be incorrect. This paper, an expanded version of (Bharadwaj and Heitmeyer, 1997), describes how one can model check a complete requirements specification expressed in the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) tabular notation. Unlike previous approaches which applied model checking to mode transition tables with Boolean variables, we use model checking to analyze properties of a complete SCR specification with variables ranging over many data types. The paper also describes two sound and, under certain conditions, complete methods for producing abstractions from requirements specifications. These abstractions are derived from the specification and the property to be analyzed. Finally, the paper describes how SCR requirements specifications can be translated into the languages of Spin, an explicit state model checker, and SMV, a symbolic model checker, and presents the results of model checking two sample SCR specifications using our abstraction methods and the two model checkers.


foundations of software engineering | 1998

Automatic generation of state invariants from requirements specifications

Ralph D. Jeffords; Constance L. Heitmeyer

Automatic generation of state invariants, properties that hold in every reachable state of a state machine model, can be valuable in software development. Not only can such invariants be presented to system users for validation, in addition, they can be used as auxiliary assertions in proving other invariants. This paper describes an algorithm for the automatic generation of state invariants that, in contrast to most other such algorithms, which operate on programs, derives invariants from requirements specifications. Generating invariants from requirements specifications rather than programs has two advantages: 1) because requirements specifications, unlike programs, are at a high level of abstraction, generation of and analysis using such invariants is easier, and 2) using invariants to detect errors during the requirements phase is considerably more cost-effective than using invariants later in software development. To illustrate the algorithm, we use it to generate state invariants from requirements specifications of an automobile cruise control system and a simple control system for a nuclear plant. The invariants are derived from specifications expressed in the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) tabular notation.


computer and communications security | 2006

Formal specification and verification of data separation in a separation kernel for an embedded system

Constance L. Heitmeyer; Myla Archer; Elizabeth I. Leonard; John McLean

Although many algorithms, hardware designs, and security protocols have been formally verified, formal verification of the security of software is still rare. This is due in large part to the large size of software, which results in huge costs for verification. This paper describes a novel and practical approach to formally establishing the security of code. The approach begins with a well-defined set of security properties and, based on the properties, constructs a compact security model containing only information needed to rea-son about the properties. Our approach was formulated to provide evidence for a Common Criteria evaluation of an embedded soft-ware system which uses a separation kernel to enforce data separation. The paper describes 1) our approach to verifying the kernel code and 2) the artifacts used in the evaluation: a Top Level Specification (TLS) of the kernel behavior, a formal definition of dataseparation, a mechanized proof that the TLS enforces data separation, code annotated with pre- and postconditions and partitioned into three categories, and a formal demonstration that each category of code enforces data separation. Also presented is the formal argument that the code satisfies the TLS.

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Myla Archer

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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Bruce G. Labaw

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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Elizabeth I. Leonard

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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Ralph D. Jeffords

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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Ramesh Bharadwaj

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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James Kirby

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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John McLean

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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Carl E. Landwehr

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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James A. Ballas

United States Naval Research Laboratory

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