Constanze Binder

A capability perspective on indigenous autonomy

Abstract This paper argues that the capability approach can add to the concept of autonomy (as defined in international law) as a means to provide larger freedoms to indigenous peoples. We show that autonomous regimes established within nation-states – by opening up a space for self-governance – provide a means to facilitate indigenous peoples’ pursuit of their own paths of development. However, such regimes frequently face, and their effectiveness can be reduced by, various problems such as tensions between individual and collective rights, the definition of the ideal scope of autonomies, and the lack of proper implementation. This is illustrated with case studies from Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua. We argue that the capability approach, and in particular its focus on the freedom to choose a life path one has reason to value, can be used to address such problems confronting autonomous regimes.

Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare

The papers in this volume explore various issues relating to theories of individual and collective choice, and theories of social welfare. The topics include individual and collective rationality, motivation and intention in economics, coercion, public goods, climate change, and voting theory. The book offers an excellent overview over latest research in these fields.

An Interview with Nick Baigent

The interview was conducted by Constanze Binder (CB) Miriam Teschl (MT) and Yongsheng Xu (YX) via email over a period of a few weeks in the Summer/Fall of 2014.

The future of the philosophy of economics: papers from the XI. INEM Conference at Erasmus University Rotterdam

How does the future of the philosophy of economics look like? – As we set out to organize the XI. Conference of the International Network of Economic Method (INEM) at the Erasmus Institute for Phil...

Moral Responsibility and Individual Choice

In this paper we analyze within the framework of individual choice theory assignments of moral responsibility. For this purpose we introduce a so-called responsibility function that describes for any choice situation the alternatives for which the agent would be deemed responsible if she were to choose one of them in that situation. We show under which conditions a responsibility function can be rationalized by information about which courses of action constitute reasonable alternatives to other courses of action. After thus having characterized one way of assigning responsibility, we show that it leads to what we call the agency paradox: a rational person will in many cases not be responsible for her actions. It is argued that a decision rule that is formally the same as the ‘never choose the uniquely largest’-rule characterized by Baigent and Gaertner (1996) circumvents the paradox. Turning to a possible counterargument to the analysis presented, we conclude by suggesting that moral responsibility should be seen as a criterion for the assessment of the quality of our choice sets rather than as a consideration that is relevant when making our choices.

Plural identities and preference formation

This article explores under what conditions an agent can derive a transitive all-things-considered preference from a plurality of non-comparable objectives, values or judgements mirroring her plural identity. In contrast to existing contributions, the multiple values are reflected by partial (viz. incomplete) orderings. It is shown that a slight modification of the conditions employed by Arrow implies a spread of the dictate of one identity to its ‘incomplete parts’. The second result reveals that if one requires the decision making power to be spread a bit more equally across the various parts of a person’s identity, then even the derivation of an acyclic all-things-considered preference is rendered impossible. A third result shows that requiring some minimal consistency among a person’s plural identities, introduced via a domain restriction, allows the avoidance of the highlighted impossibilities.