Corinne Zimmerman

Educational Interventions to Advance Children’s Scientific Thinking

The goal of science education interventions is to nurture, enrich, and sustain children’s natural and spontaneous interest in scientific knowledge and procedures. We present taxonomy for classifying different types of research on scientific thinking from the perspective of cognitive development and associated attempts to teach science. We summarize the literature on the early—unschooled—development of scientific thinking, and then focus on recent research on how best to teach science to children from preschool to middle school. We summarize some of the current disagreements in the field of science education and offer some suggestions on ways to continue to advance the science of science instruction.

Gaming science: the “Gamification” of scientific thinking

Science is critically important for advancing economics, health, and social well-being in the twenty-first century. A scientifically literate workforce is one that is well-suited to meet the challenges of an information economy. However, scientific thinking skills do not routinely develop and must be scaffolded via educational and cultural tools. In this paper we outline a rationale for why we believe that video games have the potential to be exploited for gain in science education. The premise we entertain is that several classes of video games can be viewed as a type of cultural tool that is capable of supporting three key elements of scientific literacy: content knowledge, process skills, and understanding the nature of science. We argue that there are three classes of mechanisms through which video games can support scientific thinking. First, there are a number of motivational scaffolds, such as feedback, rewards, and flow states that engage students relative to traditional cultural learning tools. Second, there are a number of cognitive scaffolds, such as simulations and embedded reasoning skills that compensate for the limitations of the individual cognitive system. Third, fully developed scientific thinking requires metacognition, and video games provide metacognitive scaffolding in the form of constrained learning and identity adoption. We conclude by outlining a series of recommendations for integrating games and game elements in science education and provide suggestions for evaluating their effectiveness.

The Impact of the MARS Curriculum on Students' Ability to Coordinate Theory and Evidence.

The Model-Assisted Reasoning in Science (MARS) project seeks to promote model-centered instruction as a means of improving middle-school science education. As part of the evaluation of the sixth-grade curriculum, performance of MARS and non-MARS students was compared on a curriculum-neutral task. Fourteen students participated in structured interviews in which they experimented with a balance apparatus that provided three manipulable variables (two affected balance, one was a non-causal distractor variable). Although both groups were equally able to identify and test variables, all MARS students discovered a quantitative rule to describe the operation of the balance, whereas only one non-MARS student did so. MARS students discovered this numerical relationship through experimentation, regardless of their scientific reasoning profile (i.e. theory-generating, theory-modifying, or theory-preserving). The critical components of MARS instruction that may foster the ability to flexibly coordinate theory and evidence include multiple opportunities to draw conclusions from data and an emphasis on the successive refinement of models.

The Emergence of Scientific Reasoning

Scientific reasoning encompasses the reasoning and problem-solving skills involved in generating, testing and revising hypotheses or theories, and in the case of fully developed skills, reflecting on the process of knowledge acquisition and knowledge change that results from such inquiry activities. Science, as a cultural institution, represents a “hallmark intellectual achievement of the human species” and these achievements are driven by both individual reasoning and collaborative cognition (Feist, 2006, p. ix).

Interpreting the Internal Structure of a Connectionist Model of the Balance Scale Task

One new tradition that has emerged from early research on autonomous robots is embodied cognitive science. This paper describes the relationship between embodied cognitive science and a related tradition, synthetic psychology. It is argued that while both are synthetic, embodied cognitive science is antirepresentational while synthetic psychology still appeals to representations. It is further argued that modern connectionism offers a medium for conducting synthetic psychology, provided that researchers analyze the internal representations that their networks develop. The paper then provides a detailed example of the synthetic approach by showing how the construction (and subsequent analysis) of a connectionist network can be used to contribute to a theory of how humans solve Piagets classic balance scale task.

A test of the survival processing advantage in implicit and explicit memory tests

The present study was designed to investigate the survival processing effect (Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33, 263–273, 2007) in cued implicit and explicit memory tests. The survival effect has been well established in explicit free recall and recognition tests, but has not been evident in implicit memory tests or in cued explicit tests. In Experiment 1 of the present study, we tested implicit and explicit memory for words studied in survival, moving, or pleasantness contexts in stem completion tests. In Experiment 2, we further tested these effects in implicit and explicit category production tests. Across the two experiments, with four separate memory tasks that included a total of 525 subjects, no survival processing advantage was found, replicating the results from implicit tests reported by Tse and Altarriba (Memory & Cognition, 38, 1110–1121, 2010). Thus, although the survival effect appears to be quite robust in free recall and recognition tests, it has not been replicated in cued implicit and explicit memory tests. The similar results found for the implicit and explicit tests in the present study do not support encoding elaboration explanations of the survival processing effect.

Development of Science Process Skills in the Early Childhood Years

The developmental trajectory of learning to do science is long. Though some mechanisms of science learning – like curiosity, asking questions, and exploration – seem to develop spontaneously in children, all science process skills require support, scaffolding, and instruction to mature into the sophisticated process skills seen in scientifically literate adults and trained scientists. Using the first dimension of newly published science education standards as a guide, this chapter focuses on three specific process skills: asking questions, conducting investigations, and interpreting and using evidence. Our discussion of these skills is motivated by the idea that young children are “naturally curious” and that uncertainty is one of the factors that prompts curiosity, as well as a driving force of the scientific process. As such, we begin the discussion with what is known about children’s curiosity. Second, we focus on dealing with uncertainty – or the process skill of asking questions. Next, we review process skills aimed at investigating uncertainty – what young children understand about investigation by examining what they know about using experiments and how they interpret patterns of data and use evidence. Finally, we consider some educational interventions designed for preschool and young elementary children that incorporate some or all of these process skills, and link these skills to the more sophisticated processes observed in later scientific thinking.

“Which Feels Heavier—A Pound of Lead or a Pound of Feathers?” A Potential Perceptual Basis of a Cognitive Riddle

“Which weighs more—a pound of lead or a pound of feathers?” The seemingly naive answer to the familiar riddle is the pound of lead. The correct answer, of course, is that they weigh the same amount. We investigated whether the naive answer to the riddle might have a basis in perception. When blindfolded participants hefted a pound of lead and a pound of feathers each contained in boxes of identical size, shape, and mass, they reported that the box containing the pound of lead felt heavier at a level above chance. Like the size—weight illusion, the naive answer to the riddle may reflect differences in how easily the objects can be controlled by muscular forces and not a perceptual or cognitive error.

A Prospective Cognition Analysis of Scientific Thinking and the Implications for Teaching and Learning Science

With increased focus on the importance of teaching and learning in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics disciplines, both educational researchers and cognitive psychologists have been tackling the issues of how best to teach science concepts and scientific thinking skills. As a cultural activity, the practice of science by professional scientists is inherently prospective. Recent calls to make science education more “authentic” necessitate an analysis of the prospective, cumulative, and collaborative nature of science learning and science teaching. We analyze scientific thinking through the lens of prospective cognition by focusing on the anticipatory, social, situated, and multiscale aspects of engaging in science. We then address some of the implications for science education that result from our analysis.

Prior experience and complex procedures

The role of prior knowledge in learning complex procedures was investigated in a transfer task in which subjects learned two related procedures in sequence. In Experiment 1, we manipulated the conceptual and structural similarity between the two procedures; in Experiment 2, we manipulated whether the order of the steps within subprocedures was the same or different during training and transfer, or whether the order of the subprocedures was the same or different. The results lead us to hypothesize that transfer in complex procedures is mediated primarily by a memory for specific steps rather than by conceptual understanding or problem solving. In particular, we were able to model the results precisely on the assumption that subjects use superficial similarity to retrieve the sequences of steps needed to perform segments of the procedure.