Craig R. Barclay

Accuracies and inaccuracies in autobiographical memories

Records of everyday autobiographical events were gathered from a small group of adults during a 4-month period. This was followed by five memory tests extending over 2% years. Recognition memory, temporal ordering, and dating accuracy declined as the events tested became more remote. Recognition accuracy on original items was high over the entire study; whereas the false recognition of nonevent, foil items increased after a I- to 3-month delay. Confidence ratings of recognition accuracy remained consistently high over all tests, even though recognition accuracy deteriorated. Additional analyses of foil items indicated that false recognitions of nonevents as one’s own memories were related positively to the semantic similarity between foils and the original records from which they were constructed. Taken together, the data support the hypothesis that the same autobiographical schemata account for the correct recognition of actual events, the false recognition of certain nonevents as one’s own memories, the correct rejection of other nonevents, and an overconfidence in the “facts” of one’s life.

Peer assessment of professional competence.

Background  Current assessment formats for medical students reliably test core knowledge and basic skills. Methods for assessing other important domains of competence, such as interpersonal skills, humanism and teamwork skills, are less well developed. This study describes the development, implementation and results of peer assessment as a measure of professional competence of medical students to be used for formative purposes.

Autobiographical Remembering: Creating Personal Culture

A model of autobiographical remembering and the creation of personal culture is proposed. In this model we hypothesize that autobiographical memories are instantiations--objectifications as in metaphors or idioms-constituted through reconstructive processes that come to be recognized as self. Such memories are subsequently subjectified as personal culture. Our emphasis is on the functions and uses of autobiographical remembering, especially in interaction with others, where reconstructed memories are marked with affective significance. We propose that memories become autobiographical as a function of how they are used--to establish and maintain intimacies or to calm ourselves during times of hightened anxiety-and signified by affect and emotion. From an object-relations theory perspective, autobiographical memories are seen as transitional phenomena (selfobjects) that reconstitue caregiving relationships both when we are alone and when we are interacting with others.

Autobiographical remembering and self-composing

Abstract A interpretive synopsis based on our empirical research and theoretical perspectives on autobiographical remembering and self-composing is presented. Conceptual links are made among Kellys notions of personal constructs, autobiographical remembering, and self. The influences of attitudes on remembering personally significant information, either by oneself or with others, are emphasized. The possible functions of autobiographical remembering are explored through an ecological perspective. Two functions are identified: a coherence or unity function and an interpersonal function. A sense of coherence is achieved in (re)constructive or productive remembering; intimacies are established and maintained in productive interactions. It is proposed that a sense of self can be instantaneously experienced directly through an improvisational process of self-composition in autobiographical remembering and interacting.

Chapter 7 Remembering Ourselves

Publisher Summary Claiming that we can remember ourselves implies that there are selves to be remembered. The authors perspective is that there is no one stable self or collection of selves to be remembered; instead, the author believes that one composes oneself anew through a process of remembering that is constrained by historical, sociocultural, emotional, psychological and momentary inter- and intrapersonal factors, especially the flow of affect in-between people that creates intersubjectivity. This chapter distinguishes (autobiographical) memory as a faculty from remembering as an adaptive process. The chapter presents recent research on autobiographical memory, with an emphasis on relationships between theory and data. The concept of autobiographical memory is discussed and elaborated in a theoretical argument that claims autobiographical memories are memories that have acquired personal significance and meaning through embodied experiences—for example, movements associated with feelings that are interpreted within the context of cultural models that provide explanatory systems for understanding our everyday experiences and emotions. These memories not only objectify self but are the fabric of self-knowledge. The chapter explores the consequence of conceptualizing remembering oneself as the objectification of autobiographical memories. The chapter also examines the notion of an essential self or existential selves with a special concern for the historical and sociocultural conditions that yield coherent or “divided selves.” The case of Holocaust victims is used to illustrate the notion of potentially divided and incoherent selves.

Creative activity in the context of real life: A response to Csikszentmihalyi☆

Csikszentmihalyi (1988) argues convincingly that thinking in general and creativity in particular involves more than rational problem solving. He states that “A purely rational model of cognitive processes is inadequate because it does.not represent human thought as it actually occurs in real life” (p. 173). Cognition seems to occur mostly in the context of social, emotional, and personal relationships, often involving ill-formed problems that have no clear resolutions but that beg to be solved. Cognition is frequently in the service of discovering and constructing coherence in a seemingly chaotic world, a world in which knowing what is also necessitates understanding what is meant by what is. Vague problems of importance may require greater efforts after meaning than after verity, although both meaningfulness and truthfulness (in the strict sense) appear necessary for creative acts to take place. Furthermore, it is oftentimes undesirable or impossible to manipulate or correlate factors presumed to influence these fuzzy, real life problems. Unlike most structured problem-solving situations, such real life problems are invested with fundamental personal value. Decoupling cognition, emotion, and motivation by design from the contextual soup of real life is certainly one important strategy when trying to untangle the various effects of person (organic and active) and environmental (efficient and reactive) factors (Medin & Wittenmaker, 1987; Shepard, 1984). However, decoupling does not imply dissociating these genuine relationships. The worry is that efforts aimed at isolating elements of thinking from their related motives and emotions for’ instance, in the case of creativity-without regard for the interdependence of cognition and motivation-may only lead to narrow theories of epiphenomena. The apparent dilemma, and perhaps crux of Csikszentmihalyi’s perspective, is to understand the nature of creativity in terms of both meaning making-in the sense of understanding human intentions-and the discovery of truth as it exists. Creative acts and their outcomes may occur because of the tension caused by efforts to make sense from experience. The views expressed here are sympathetic to those presented by Csikszentmihalyi. This contribution is an attempt to broaden the discussion about the nature

Rejoinder: Reflections on Professors Robinson's and Larsen's Comments

Publisher Summary This chapter presents reflections on Professors John Robinsons and Steen Larsens comments on Craig R. Barclays work on autobiographical remembering and self. Their welcomed insights come from two sources: their intense curiosity regarding the nature and role of thinking—for example, remembering, in the context of everyday life and their genuineness. Autobiographical memories are meaningful to the person—that is, they are infused with personal significance associated with affect or how the person feels and evaluates embodied experiences. Accordingly, there is a welding of cognition and affect in a unique phenomenon, and not the deconstruction of the person into component parts. Much autobiographical remembering is therefore motivated by affect and emerges as a process of justifying feeling. If autobiographical memories are meaningful, then their accuracy can be manipulated by changing the affect or evaluation of experiences. The evaluation can be changed a little or a lot depending on how well the person is known to the researcher or by the person him-or herself, thereby increasing or decreasing accuracy. “Remembering ourselves” is concerned with another strand of work—namely, the social-psychological and cultural uses of contextualized autobiographical remembering, and the inadequacy of narrative skill as a tool for objectifying self in canonical story forms, given experiences like trauma.