Cristina Fasone

European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation. What Place for the European Parliament

This article aims to analyse the European Parliaments (EP) position in the reform of the European economic governance, in particular after the adoption of the ‘six‐pack,’ the ‘two‐pack’ and the ‘fiscal compact.’ References are made to the involvement of the EP in the decision‐making process that led to the adoption of the new measures as well as to the substantive role assigned to this institution in the new regulatory framework. The article argues that the new provisions, which undermine the budgetary authority of national parliaments while, at the same time, designing a limited role for the EP - though strengthened compared to the previous version of the Stability and Growth Pact - can jeopardise the effectiveness of the landmark principle of ‘no taxation without parliamentary representation’ in the EU.

Transparency vs. Informality in Legislative Committees: Comparing the US House of Representatives, the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the European Parliament

Although committees are deemed to be – in this century, as in the previous one – the ‘legislative backbone’ of legislatures, scholars have not devoted enough attention to how parliamentary committees cope with the challenge of the ‘forced increased transparency’ of their legislative activity, depending on the opportunity to use old and new media as channels of institutional communication with citizens. On the one hand, increased transparency could be an added value of their work. On the other hand, there is the risk that the wider disclosure of legislative committees’ activity could undermine their ability to act as ‘consensus-building’ arenas, and thus affect their legislative capacity. The article argues that increasing levels of transparency can impair committees’ lawmaking performance, so also undermining the lawmaking ability of their legislatures. In three very different legislatures (the US House of Representatives, the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the European Parliament), both in institutional architecture and committees’ legislative powers, the growing transparency of their legislative activity has caused a shifting of the legislative decision-making away from committees or, even, outside the legislature.

Towards a strengthened coordination between the EU and national budgets. A complementary role and a joint control for parliaments

Abstract The European Parliament (EP) and national parliament (NPs) occupy two opposite but complementary positions as budgetary authorities in the EU and, indeed, democratic legitimacy of EU and national budgetary procedures can hardly be conceived without taking into account NPs and the EP together. Framed within the discourse on throughput legitimacy, the article analyses if and to what extent the EP and NPs are involved in the decisions on EU revenues and expenditures as well as in the European Semester and what initiatives has the EP supported to enhance its participation and that of NPs in those domains. Given the unsatisfactory status quo, the article put forwards the proposal of a joint parliamentary control carried out by an interparliamentary committee on EU and national budgets to redress the problem of a lack of coordinated democratic scrutiny over them, in addition to the control carried out by the EP and NPs individually.

Fiscal Councils: Threat or Opportunity for Democracy in the Post-Crisis Economic and Monetary Union?

After the Eurozone crisis, European Union (EU) Member States have the obligation to establish independent fiscal institutions (IFIs)—also known as fiscal councils—composed of recognised experts responsible for the monitoring of the compliance with fiscal rules in accordance with European norms. Eurozone Countries are the first addressees of this obligation and are bound by stricter legal constraints than States outside the Euro area. The form these IFIs take varies from one Member State to the other and so do their powers. In any event, in requiring their creation, the European norms have potentially led to a reorganisation and a change in the institutional balance at national level. At the same time, they may have participated to the improvement of democracy in ensuring more independent expertise, transparent and public information, and knowledge that Parliaments can use to control and scrutinise their Government’s actions, although the fiscal councils themselves remain weak. In this context, this contribution aims to answer the following research question: Do IFIs, according to the new European and national rules of implementation, constitute a threat to democracy or, rather could they, in fact, enhance democracy?

Rola europejskich partii politycznych w ramach ponadnarodowego systemu parlamentarnego

The chapter deals with the role of the European political parties within the composite framework of the Euro-national parliamentary system. To this end, the genesis and the developments of the European political parties are retraced taking into account the evolution of national political parties and their rules, in particular in Italy, as the former are likewise strongly affected by national political and constitutional dynamics, as well as from global challenges like the financial and migration crises, the terrorist threat, and the environmental problems. The chapters focuses first on the main evolutionary stages of the European political parties. In this context, the chapters then examines the relationship, still undervalued, between European political parties and groups in the EP and, finally, analyses the main novelties of the Regulation EU no. 1141/2014, the experiment of the Spitzenkadidaten and the attempt to adopt an uniform electoral procedure for the EP.

PARLAMENTY NARODOWE W DOBIE KRYZYSU GOSPODARCZEGO W STREFIE EURO: SZANSE I WYZWANIA

This article analyses if and how the position of national parliaments of selected member states has changed in reaction to the Euro-crisis by looking at the legal norms which regulate their role and powers in the new economic governance and at their first enforcement. It also tries to explain from which direction and institutions the changes in the parliamentary positions have been driven, whether on the part of the parliament itself or by other actors. Five national parliaments have been selected, namely the French, the German, the Italian, the Portuguese, and the Spanish Parliaments, in the light of the different inter-institutional relationship existing between the legislative and the executive branch and of the economic situation in these Eurozone countries.

Trybunał Obrachunkowy czy parlamentarne biuro budżetowe

The reform of the economic governance in the EU binds the Member States to set up independent bodies monitoring the compliance with fiscal rules entitled to check – either ex ante or ex post – the respect of the balanced budget clause and of the medium term objective as well as to provide macroeconomic forecasts and to prevent macroeconomic imbalances. Such body, which shall be independent or at least endowed with functional autonomy vis a vis budgetary authorities, shall be composed of members selected on the basis of their merits and expertise in matters of economics and public accounts. Italy has just adopted the first measures of adaptation to the new EU norms, in particular by means of Const. Law no. 1/2012 and Organic Law no 243/2012, opting for the establishment of a brand new body, set within the Parliament, the Ufficio parlamentare di bilancio . Following the examination of the most significant EU provisions devoted to the new independent body, in the first place the contribution aims at analysing the constitutional status , the composition and the functions of the Italian Court of Auditors ( Corte dei conti ) that, in theory, could have served as the new “independent fiscal body” for Italy, although after some amendments to the existing norms; in the second place, following the examination of the rules concerning the Ufficio parlamentare di bilancio , the contribution focuses on the reasons behind the choice of the legislator to marginalize the Court of Auditors. Finally, waiting for the revision of the Italian Law on public accounts and of the parliamentary Rules of procedures, some proposals for a prospective and fruitful interplay between the Court of Auditors and the Ufficio parlamentare di bilancio have been made in order to foster a solid and loyal cooperation between the two bodies.