Cyanne E. Loyle

Armed conflict and post-conflict justice, 1946–2006 A dataset

This article introduces a new dataset on post-conflict justice (PCJ) that provides an overview of if, where, and how post-conflict countries address the wrongdoings committed in association with previous armed conflict. Motivated by the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding, we study justice processes during post-conflict transitions. We examine: which countries choose to implement PCJ; where PCJ is implemented; and which measures are taken in post-conflict societies to address past abuse. Featuring justice and accountability processes, our dataset focuses solely on possible options to address wrongdoings that are implemented following and relating to a given armed conflict. These data allow scholars to address hypotheses regarding justice following war and the effect that these institutions have on transitions to peace. This new dataset includes all extrasystemic, internationalized internal, and internal armed conflicts from 1946 to 2006, with at least 25 annual battle-related deaths as coded by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The post-conflict justice (PCJ) efforts included are: trials, truth commissions, reparations, amnesties, purges, and exiles. By building upon the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, scholars interested in PCJ can include variables regarding the nature of the conflict itself to test how PCJ arrangements work in different environments in order to better address the relationships between justice, truth, and peace in the post-conflict period.

The economic benefits of justice Post-conflict justice and foreign direct investment

Post-conflict states represent an important research agenda for scholars studying foreign direct investment (FDI). While leaders of post-conflict states have strong incentives for trying to attract international investments, multinational corporations (MNCs) may view these states as high-risk since the reoccurrence of violence in the aftermath of civil conflict is common. Consequently, leaders of post-conflict states desperate to receive FDI to help ignite their stalled economies must convince MNCs that their state is a stable and secure place to invest in. Drawing on the recent literature that identifies the importance of domestic and international institutions for securing FDI, this article argues that post-conflict justice (PCJ) institutions can help post-conflict states attract investment. The domestic and reputation costs associated with implementing PCJ allow states to send a costly and credible signal to international investors about the state’s willingness to pursue the successful reconstruction of the post-conflict zone. Under these conditions, uncertainty is lessened and foreign investors can feel more confident about making investments. Post-conflict states, therefore, that choose to implement PCJ are more likely to receive higher levels of FDI compared with post-conflict states that refrain from implementing these institutions. Statistical tests confirm the relationship between justice institutions and FDI from 1970–2001. Post-conflict states that implement restorative justice processes in the post-conflict period receive higher levels of FDI than those countries that do not implement a process.

The Coercive Weight of the Past: Temporal Dependence and the Conflict-Repression Nexus in the Northern Ireland “Troubles”

After 40 years, we still know very little about how state repression influences political dissent. In fact, to date, every possible relationship, including no influence, has been found. We argue that part of the problem concerns the current practice of treating every repressive event as if it were substantively equivalent, differentiated only by scope (large/small) or type (violent/nonviolent). We advance existing work by arguing that the influence of repression is contingent on when it occurs within the temporal sequences of political conflict. Using new events data on the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1974, results show that when dissent has been decreasing in the recent past, repressive action inspires an increase in dissident action. When dissent has been increasing, however, repression has the opposite effect, decreasing challenging activity. These results provide important insights into resolving a recurrent puzzle within the conflict-repression nexus as well as understanding the interaction between government and dissident behavior.

The Northern Ireland Research Initiative: Data on the Troubles from 1968 to 19981

In recent years the study of conflict has increasingly focused on the analysis of violence at the subnational level. Despite many advances, these efforts have been unable to address key questions within the literature, including inquires concerning the dynamic interactions between governments and challengers—the conflict–repression nexus. In this article, we present a new data project, the Northern Ireland Research Initiative or NIRI, and identify the ways in which this effort is particularly well suited to advance our understanding of the relationship between repression and dissent in Northern Ireland and beyond. NIRI is a disaggregated events-based dataset relying on new sources of conflict data that includes a broad range of actions (e.g. localized, short-term events and aggregate/larger-scale long-term activities) over the period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland (1968–1998).

Transitional Justice and Injustice: the Uses and Misuses of the Liberal Peace

As Christine Bell writes in her 2009 overview of the field of transitional justice (TJ), it is unclear whether in practice transitional justice is “‘good’ (an extension of human rights discourse, or necessary for democratization or peace), ‘bad’ (imperialist, hegemonic, impunity serving or promoting a dangerous legal exceptionalism) or a value-neutral tool with which both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ goals can be pursued” (Bell, 2009, p. 6). Despite this uncertainty within the field itself, the existing transitional justice literature and much of the discussion surrounding it throughout the world has proceeded with the assumption that transitional justice is implemented to advance the normatively “good” goals of the liberal peace—namely, (1) promoting truth and reconciliation, (2) preventing the resumption of armed conflict, and (3) increasing democratization and civic participation. While there is no doubt that these are some of the main motivations of the international community as well as the donor agencies that support transitional justice, these need not be the motivations of the implementing governments themselves, and this should cause us some concern.