Cynthia S. Kaplan

Categorically wrong? Nominal versus graded measures of ethnic identity

Ethnic identity is a fundamental concept for understanding the dynamics of contemporary political change, but there has been very little exploration of how to measure ethnic identity and even less discussion of the implications of these measurements for understanding ethnic conflict. Through an analysis of Estonians and Slavs (Russians, Byelorussians, and Ukranians) in Estonia, we show that the ethnic identity of different groups is “salient” to different degrees and that this has significant implications for within-group agreement about political issues and for between-group differences. We show that nominal ethnic identity fully predicts political attitudes when ethnicity is highly salient because a highly salient ethnic identity sets in motion forces that cause individuals within a group to form similar attitudes based upon their ethnic identity. These forces were fully active for Estonians in Estonia in the early 1990s. In this case, nominal ethnic identity was sufficient to explain the attitudes of Estonians. But ethnicity must be treated as graded when it is not highly salient, as with Slavs in Estonia, because only degrees of ethnicity can explain the within-group differences in political attitudes that arise because of a lack of salient identity. Researchers, therefore, should typically treat ethnicity as if it were graded, and they should devise graded measures of it. Although nominal measures are sometimes appropriate (i.e., when ethnicity is highly salient), they will cause the researcher to miss something important in other situations. For example, our work suggests that if events discrupt the social processes that maintain a group’s sense of itself, then a graded measure of ethnicity is useful for predicting attitudes concerning ethnic identity and survival. In short, it is not categorically wrong to treat ethnicity as nominal, but it is best to begin by treating it as graded.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Local Policy Implementation

The dominant image of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is of a highly centralized, hierarchical political organization. An examination of the local partys role in economic policy implementation after World War II, however, shows two distinct patterns of informal party behavior. The study found that the party in agricultural activities acted as a line administrator, whereas the urban party assumed the role of a staff coordinator. Personnel characteristics of party and economic leaders, industrial and agricultural production environments, and the degree of difficulty of plan fulfillment gave rise to different patterns of crisis management in agriculture and industry. The nature of crisis management was instrumental in determining the informal role of local party organizations. The partys bifurcated behavior in policy implementation has persisted due to the dominance of the post-war political generation in the party during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. An important consequence of local party behavior is its inhibiting effect on agricultural reforms.

Subjects to citizens: From non-voting, to protesting, to voting in Estonia during the transition to democracy

Abstract The political behaviour of ethnic Estonians and Slavs during the Soviet and transition (1989–1991) years reflects differing political orientations towards and grievances with the Soviet regime. Survey data from Estonia show that the reasons for non-voting during the Soviet era vary between ethnic Estonian and Slavic non-voters with ethnic Estonians choosing not to vote for system rejecting reasons. Estonians who did not vote in elections from 1983 to 1988 were more likely to be young, to live in urban areas and to have had a family member repressed. They were also much more likely to engage in petitioning, picketing, and meetings and demonstrations in support of independence between 1986 and 1990, especially if they did not vote for system rejecting reasons between 1983 and 1988. Non-voting among Slavs in the 1980s was not only much rarer than for Estonians with few citing system rejecting reasons for not-voting, but it had no relationship with later protest activities. Estonian non-voters joined independence organizations and increasingly voted during the transition years 1988–1990. But non-voting increased among Slavs in 1989 and 1990 during the transition, and some of this non-voting was clearly a form of protest against increasing Estonian influence over the state.

International Negotiations and Plural Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Tatarstan

Multi-ethnic societies create special contexts for international negotiations. Chief governmental officers (CGOs) , domestic constituencies, and public protest may affect both the nature of agreements and the domestic structures of regimes. Employing a two-level negotiations perspective, the role of third parties and the ability of CGOs to modify domestic constituencies is highlighted. The contraction of participation and the cooptation of nationalism by CGOs distinguishes these cases which involve plural societies from other international negotiations.