D. Geoffrey Hall

When it is better to receive than to give: Syntactic and conceptual constraints on vocabulary growth

Abstract We ask how children solve the mapping problem for verb acquisition: how they pair concepts with their phonological realizations in their language. There is evidence that nouns but not verbs can be acquired by pairing each sound (e.g., ‘elephant’) with a concept inferred from the world circumstances in which that sound occurs. Verb meanings pose problems for this word-world mapping procedure, motivating a model of verb mapping mediated by attention to the syntactic structures in which verbs occur (Landau and Gleitman 1985, Gleitman 1990). We present an experiment examining the interaction between a conceptual influence (the bias to interpret observed situations as involving a casual agent) and syntactic influences, as these jointly contribute to childrens conjectures about new verb meanings. Children were shown scenes ambiguous as to two interpretations (e.g., giving and getting or chasing and fleeing ) and were asked to guess the meaning of novel verbs used to described the scenes, presented in varying syntactic contexts. Both conceptual and syntactic constraints influenced childrens responses, but syntactic information largely overwhelmed the conceptual bias. This finding, with collatoral evidence, supports a syntax-mediated procedure for verb acquisition.

Infant individuation and identification of objects

Abstract Recent studies of the infants object concept have focused on the role of property information in individuation. We draw a distinction between individuation and identification. By individuation, we mean the setting up of an object representation (OR). By identification, we mean using the information stored in an OR to decide which, if any, previously individuated object is presently encountered. We investigate this distinction in experiments with 12-month-old infants. We find that for infants of this age, a shape difference between two objects has a large effect on both individuation and identification. However, a color difference between two objects has a large effect on individuation, but little or no effect on identification. This suggests that, somewhat surprisingly, information used to establish an OR may not always be incorporated into that representation.

Continuity and the persistence of objects: when the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

In three experiments, a total of 480 participants heard a version of the story of the ship of Theseus (Hobbes, 1672/1913), in which a novel object, labeled with a possessive noun phrase, underwent a transformation in which its parts were replaced one at a time. Participants then had to decide which of two objects carried the same possessive noun phrase as the original: the one made entirely of new parts (that could be inferred to be continuous with the original) or one reassembled from the original parts (that could not be inferred to be continuous with the original). Participants often selected the object made of new parts, despite the radical transformation. However, the tendency to do so was significantly stronger (1) if the object was described as an animal than if it was described as an artifact, (2) if the animals transformation lacked a human cause than if it possessed one, and (3) if the selection was made by adults or 7-year-olds than if it was made by 5-year-olds. The findings suggest that knowledge about specific kinds of objects and their canonical transformations exerts an increasingly powerful effect, over the course of development, upon peoples tendency to rely on continuity as a criterion for attributing persistence to objects that undergo change.

Domain effects in lexical development: learning words for foods and toys

Abstract We investigated 3-year-olds’ and adults’ use of domain cues in learning words for solid and nonsolid material entities. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants heard a novel neutral noun (e.g., “my X”) for a standard solid or nonsolid entity described as either a toy or a food. They then were asked to extend the word to one of two other entities. Both options matched the standard in solidity; but one differed from it in an object-relevant property (shape) and the other in a substance-relevant property (color, texture, or smell). Both children and adults were more likely to select the same-shaped entity if the standard was (1) solid than if it was nonsolid, and (2) described as a toy than if it was described as a food. Their interpretations of novel words for material entities were thus affected not only by perceptual information (about solidity) but also by conceptual information (about domain). In Experiment 3, the novel noun was presented in a syntactic context that suggested the solid entity should be interpreted as an object (e.g., “an X”) and that the nonsolid entity should be interpreted as a substance (e.g., “some X”). For adults, these changes largely eliminated the effect of the entity’s domain (toy, food) on interpretation. We interpret these findings in terms of the proposal that domain cues, like solidity cues, furnish information about whether an entity’s structure should be thought of as arbitrary or nonarbitrary and, hence, about whether a word should be interpreted as naming an object or a substance construal.

Basic-level individuals.

In this experiment, 4-year-old children interpreted a novel count noun taught ostensively for an unfamiliar object as referring to a basic-level kind (such as PERSON or DOG) rather than to a kind that individuates its members by type of situation (such as PASSENGER or PUPPY). Because ostension does not distinguish a basic-level kind from a situation-restricted kind, this finding suggests that children assume, as a default, reference to a basic-level kind rather than to a situation-restricted kind when they hear a count noun applied to an unfamiliar object in an ostensive definition. The experiment shows that the assumption guides childrens interpretation only if the object is unfamiliar, and if no specific information is available calling for a situation-restricted kind interpretation. The proposed word-learning assumption is critical to an understanding of the psychologically privileged manner of individuation, and therefore, of quantification (e.g., counting) involving objects.

Children’s and Adults’ Understanding of Proper Namable Things:

In two studies, we explored 5-year-olds’ and adults’ beliefs about entities that receive reference by proper names. In Study 1 we used two tasks: (1) a listing task in which participants stated what things in the world can and cannot receive proper names, and (2) an explanation task in which they explained why some things merit proper names. Children’s lists of proper namable things were more centred than adults’ on living animate entities and their surrogates (e.g., dolls and stuffed animals). Both children’s and adults’ lists of non-namable things contained a predominance of artefacts. Both age groups offered similar explanations for proper namability, the most common of which pertained to the desire or need to identify objects as individuals (or to distinguish them from other objects). In Study 2 we replicated the main results of the Study 1 listing task, using a modified set of instructions. The findings establish a set of norms about the scope and coherence of children’s and adults’ concept of a proper namable entity, and they place constraints on an account of how children learn proper names (Macnamara, 1982, 1986).

Reconstruing U-Shaped Functions.

It is refreshing to read an issue devoted entirely to U-shaped developmental functions. These functions, and their N-shaped cousins, have intrigued developmental psychologists for decades because they provide a compelling demonstration that development does not always entail a monotonic increase across age in a single underlying ability. Instead, the causes of development are much more complex. Indeed, well-documented U-shaped developmental functions have often led to a re-evaluation of theory and/or a questioning of underlying assumptions. Some U-shaped developmental functions have become so well known as to represent classics in our field. It is doubtful that there is a developmental psychology textbook that doesn’t include coverage of the U-shaped developmental functions in auditory localization, in infant stepping, in a perceptual preference for human faces, or in use of the irregular past tense. It has been suggested that a classic interpretation of this type of finding is that there is a temporary loss or regression in a particular competency which then re-emerges at a later point in development. We would argue, however, that the number of developmentalists who offer such an explanation today is close or equal to zero. Instead, heuristically quite valuable explanations have been offered. For example, in accounting for the U-shaped developmental function in preference for human faces, Morton and Johnson (1991) posited an instinct-like preference for human faces in newborns which is engaged only when face-like stimuli move in the peripheral visual field. This biologically based orienting bias, which they called CONSPEC, gives infants enough experience with human faces to facilitate the emergence by 3 to 4 months of a new mechanism, CONLERN, that enables preferential looking at human faces presented foveally, and supports further learning about particular faces. Morton and Johnson argued that the reason a preference is not evident for either peripherally or foveally JOURNAL OF COGNITION AND DEVELOPMENT, 5(1), 147–151 Copyright

Basic-level kinds and object persistence.

In three experiments, we explored the basis of adults’ judgments of individual object persistence through transformation. Participants watched scenarios in which an object underwent a transformation into an object belonging to the same or a different basic-level kind. Participants were queried about the object’s persistence through the transformation as an individual (indexed by its proper name) and as a member of the original kind (indexed by its basic-level count noun in Experiments 1 and 2, or by its superordinate-level noun in Experiment 3). In all experiments, participants rated objects that were altered in a way that maintained basic-level kind to be less likely to retain their proper name than those that were altered in a way that changed basic-level kind. These findings suggest that shared basic-level kind membership serves as a dimension of similarity over which objects’ unique individual identities are highlighted. We discuss the implications of the results for existing theoretical accounts of adults’ judgments of individual object persistence.

Learning Count Nouns and Adjectives: Understanding the Contributions of Lexical Form Class and Social-Pragmatic Cues

In two experiments, one hundred ninety-two 3-year-olds, 4-year-olds, and adults heard a novel word for a target object and then were asked to extend the label to one of two test objects, one matching in shape-based object category (the shape match) and the other matching in a property other than shape (the property match). We independently manipulated the lexical form class cues (count noun, adjective) and social-pragmatic cues (point actions, property-highlighting actions) accompanying the label. The impact of these two types of cue on extension differed markedly across age groups. Adults and 4-year-olds extended the word to the property match significantly more often when the term was modeled as an adjective and when it was presented with property-highlighting actions; but adults extended both adjectives and count nouns systematically to the property match when the speaker highlighted the non-shape property, whereas 4-year-olds systematically extended only adjectives to the property match under these conditions. Three-year-olds extended the word to the property match significantly more often when the label was modeled as an adjective but were not significantly affected by the social-pragmatic cues; and they failed to extend either adjectives or count nouns systematically to the property match when the speaker highlighted the non-shape property. We discuss the results in terms of the proposal that word learning draws on cues from multiple sources and the nature of the “shape bias” in lexical development.

Monkey business: children's use of character identity to infer shared properties.

Childrens toys provide a rich arena for investigating conceptual flexibility, because they often can be understood as possessing an individual identity at multiple levels of abstraction. For example, many dolls (e.g., Winnie-the-Pooh) and action figures (e.g., Batman) can be construed either as characters from a fictional world or as physical objects in the real world. In two experiments, 72 4- and 5-year-olds took part in a property extension task, the results of which provide evidence of an understanding that (1) two representations of a character share certain properties in virtue of their shared character identity, and this sharing does not stem simply from having the same name, and (2) one representation of a character is more likely to share properties with another representation of the character if the properties were acquired by the character than if they were acquired by the representation. Childrens understanding of a representational objects abstract character identity thus enabled them to transcend using its unique spatio-temporal history as a sole basis for inferring its idiosyncratic properties.