D. Michael Kuhlman

A comparison of three structural models for personality : the Big Three, the Big Five, and the Alternative Five

The major factors from 3 models of personality are compared: Eysencks Three Factor model, Costa and McCraes version of the Big Five, and Zuckerman and Kuhlmans Alternative Five. The 1st study describes the development of a questionnaire measure for the Alternative Five and the reliability assessments of the scales. The 2nd study used factor analysis to compare the factors among the scales from the 3 models. Extraversion and Neuroticism were quite similar across all 3 models. Eysencks Psychoticism scale marked a factor that included Conscientiousness and Impulsive Sensation Seeking factors from the other 2 models. Agreeableness and Aggression-Hostility formed a 4th factor. Openness could be identified as a factor using facet scales, but it showed no convergence with other factors. Four of the five factors showed convergence across at least 2 of the models.

Personality and Risk-Taking: Common Biosocial Factors

The first part of this article describes a study of the relationships between personality and risk-taking in six areas: smoking, drinking, drugs, sex, driving, and gambling. The participants, 260 college students, were given self-report measures of risky behaviors in each of the six areas and the Zuckerman-Kuhlman five-factor personality questionnaire. Generalized risk-taking (across all six areas) was related to scales for impulsive sensation seeking, aggression, and sociability, but not to scales for neuroticism or activity. Gender differences on risk-taking were mediated by differences on impulsive sensation seeking. The second part discusses biological traits associated with both risk-taking and personality, particularly sensation seeking, such as the D4 dopamine receptor gene. the enzyme monoamine oxidase, and augmenting or reducing of the cortical evoked potential. Comparative studies show relationships between biological markers shared with other species and correlated behaviors similar to sensation seeking in humans. A biosocial model of the traits underlying risk-taking is presented.

Social value orientations and impressions of partner's honesty and intelligence: A test of the might versus morality effect.

This research evaluates the might vs. morality effect (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986) by examining whether the manipulation of the perception of partners honesty and intelligence interacts with the observers own social value orientation to influence the latters expectations regarding partner cooperation and own cooperation in a social dilemma. Results reveal that greater cooperation was expected from an honest partner than from a dishonest partner and that this effect was stronger for prosocial Ss than for individualists and competitors. Conversely, individualists and competitors expected greater cooperation from an unintelligent partner than from an intelligent partner, whereas prosocial Ss did not expect differences between these partners. Similar findings were obtained for own cooperation, although social value orientations did not interact with partner intelligence. Considerable research has been focused on how individuals form, maintain, and organize personality impressions, revealing that people readily form impressions of others, that such impressions are fairly stable, and that such impressions frequently are organized along dimensions of social meaning, such as honesty and intelligence (e.g., for theoretical analyses, see Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Rosenberg SSkowronski

Five (or three) Robust Questionnaire Scale Factors of Personality without Culture

Abstract Thirty-three personality scales, which were good markers for personality factors in a previous study, were analyzed in a new study involving 525 subjects in four samples: men and women in Fall and Spring terms. Two techniques for the computation of factors were employed: (a) traditional factor analysis via the SPSSX Factor procedure, and (b) Simultaneous Component Analyses (SCAs), via a program developed by Kiers (SCA: a program for simultaneous component analysis, Groningen: IEC ProGamma, 1990). The latter approach showed that sets of common factors defined over all four groups had virtually the same explanatory power as separate components computed for each group separately, and results from traditional factor analyses of the separate groups showed that the loadings of corresponding factors were highly related. A robust five-factor solution, very similar in males and females, included the following factors: Sociability, Neuroticism-Anxiety, Aggression-Hostility (vs Social Desirability), Impulsive-Unsocialized-Sensation Seeking, and Activity.

Where do motivational and emotional traits fit within three factor models of personality

Abstract The purpose of the study was to determine the location of emotional and motivational traits within three major dimensions of personality. Subjects were 396 undergraduates. Generalized expectancies and sensitivities to signals of reward and punishment were measured by questionnaires. An exploratory factor analysis was followed by a Procrustes-rotation in a second sample. Factors were highly reliable. Generalized punishment expectancy, sensitivity to signals of punishment, and trait anxiety were primarily associated with the neuroticism factor. Generalized reward expectancy, sensitivity to signals of reward, and the surgent type of positive affect were primarily associated with the extraversion factor. Trait hostility loaded positively and positive affect loaded negatively on the psychoticism factor. Results are discussed in terms of five models of personality.

Individual differences in the game motives of Own, Relative, and Joint gain

Abstract Two hundred and eighteen undergraduates (94 males and 124 females) made decisions in same-sex dyads across four types of 3-choice decomposed games. An analysis of each subjects choices was performed to see if he or she consistently pursued one of the three motives of Own (Individualism), Relative (Competition) or Joint (Cooperation) gain across all four decomposed games. Sixty-six percent of the subjects manifested such consistency, and sex of subject was unrelated to which goal was pursued. Of the remaining 32%, a sizable subgroup ( 1 3 ) was shown to be making its choices in an Altruistic fashion, attempting to maximize the outcomes of the other subject. An analysis of variance of the F scale scores of subjects in these motivational categories yielded an effect (p

Fairness judgements in an asymmetric public goods dilemma

Dawes (1980) and Marwell and Ames (1979) have suggested that decision making in social dilemmas is importantly influenced by considerations of fairness. The present study examined subjects’ fairness judgements in an asymmetric public goods dilemma. Subjects stated the fairest possible contribution each of six persons could make to provide a public good. These six persons differed in terms of individual wealth (resource asymmetry). The subjects’ attributions for resource asymmetries were manipulated so that for some, attributions were Internal (people are rich or poor due to their own efforts/abilities) and for others, External (people are rich or poor due to task difficulty/luck). This manipulation was the major independent variable. As expected, subjects making internal attributions stated that poor persons should contribute a larger proportion of their wealth than rich ones. The subjects making external attributions judged equal proportional contributions to be most fair. Fairness judgements appeared to influence subjects’ own contributions and their expectations of others’ contributions. The subject’s Social Orientation (Cooperative, Noncooperative) was also measured. Cooperators judged equal proportional contributions as fair, whereas Non-cooperators felt the poor should contribute a higher proportion of their wealth than the rich. Cooperators and Non-cooperators contributed equal proportions, in contrast to the hypothesis.

Social Value Orientation, Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others’ behaviour to adapt ones own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another persons outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta–analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well–established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright

Computer Simulation of Social Value Orientation: Vitality, Satisfaction, and Emergent Game Structures

We examined dyadic interaction among eight archetypal social value orientations, or SVOs. (McClintock, 1978). These 8 SVOs differ in terms of two value systems: (1) concern with the well being of others and (2) concern with the well being of self (+,0 for Altruism; +,+ for Cooperation; 0,+ for Individualism; -,+ for Competition; -,0 for Aggression; -,- for Sadomasochism; 0,- for Masochism; and +,- for Martyrdom). All different pairs of SVOs (n=36) were formed, and each dyad played 60,000 2x2 games. For each game, the 2 payoffs in each cell of the matrix were generated randomly so that games had no particular structure (i.e., Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, etc), or symmetry. The decision process was based 0on Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) notion of transforming the given matrix into the effective matrix. That is, each SVO transformed the pair of given payoffs in each cell to a single number, or effective payoff (utility) based on its SVO (e.g., Cooperators took the sum of the payoffs to self and other; Altruists only considered the payoffs to the partner; Competitors subtracted the other’s points from their own). Next, each SVO chose the row or column with the largest average utility. We examined the long term outcomes of each SVO in two ways: (1) accumulated given points referred to as vitality, and (2) accumulated effective points (utilities) referred to as satisfaction. Vitality was completely determined by two things: (1) player’s concern with its own (given) outcomes, and (2) partner’s concern with player’s (given) outcomes. Although Individualism was the most vital SVO at the single person level, at the dyadic level, pairs of Cooperators were more vital than pairs of Individualists. For Satisfaction, no SVO did best overall. Satisfaction depended completely on the particular SVO pairing. The strongest mutual satisfaction was achieved by SVO pairs with identical effective matrices (e.g., Cooperator/Cooperator, Individualist/Altruist). Emergent Games: We also examined the long-term payoff matrices (the average of given points over 60,000 trials) produced by the pairings of different SVOs. A variety of such Emergent Games occurred, and the structure of each was tied perfectly to the SVO pair that formed it. Thus, the origins of structures are rooted in the social value systems of the involved parties. Notably, the Emergent Game produced by Cooperation versus Individualism is a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Social value orientation modulates the FRN and P300 in the chicken game

Social dilemmas pervade daily life, business, and politics. The manners in which these dilemmas are resolved depend in part on the personal characteristics of those involved. One such characteristic is Social Value Orientation (SVO), a trait-like predisposition to maximize cooperative (Pro-Social) or non-cooperative (Pro-Self) outcomes in social relationships. The present study investigated the role of SVO in modulating neural responses to outcomes in a type of social dilemma known as the Chicken Game. The Chicken Game models real-world situations involving two parties independently making a decision between cooperation and aggression. The EEG of Pro-Socials and Pro-Selfs was recorded while playing Chicken with a computer Opponent. Two ERP components were extracted: Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) and the P300. Despite no behavioral differences in decision (i.e., cooperation, aggression), FRN results indicate that Pro-Socials experienced unreciprocated cooperation as the least desired outcome. Further, P300 results show a main effect for the Opponents choice, such that the Opponents cooperation was more salient than aggression. Additionally, an interaction between the Participants and Opponents choice showed that the effect for the Opponents choice only occurred when the Participant chose cooperation. None of the results for P300 were moderated by SVO. For both ERP components, Pro-Selfs showed no differential responding to Chicken outcomes. In addition, FRN magnitude on trial n predicted choice on trial n+1 for Pro-Socials, but not for Pro-Selfs. P300 magnitude on trial n showed no relationship to choice on trial n+1. Results indicate that individual differences in SVO modulate FRN responses to Chicken outcomes, and that these neural reactions may have utility in predicting subsequent behaviors. For P300, there is no evidence of SVO modulation. Our general pattern of FRN responsiveness in Pro-Socials, but not in Pro-Selfs, is related to similar findings in fMRI and EEG research.