Dale Ballou

Controlling for Student Background in Value-Added Assessment of Teachers

The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System measures teacher effectiveness on the basis of student gains, implicitly controlling for socioeconomic status and other background factors that influence initial levels of achievement. The absence of explicit controls for student background has been criticized on the grounds that these factors influence gains as well. In this research we modify the TVAAS by introducing commonly used controls for student SES and demographics. The introduction of controls at the student level has a negligible impact on estimated teacher effects in the TVAAS, though not in a simple fixed effects estimator with which the TVAAS is compared. The explanation lies in the TVAAS’s exploitation of the covariance of tests in different subjects and grades, whereby a student’s history of test performance substitutes for omitted background variables.

Recruiting Smarter Teachers

In recent years many states have raised teacher salaries to attract more capable teachers. Since teacher labor markets are typically in a state of excess supply, success of such policies is contingent on containing perverse feedbacks which arise among exit decisions, vacancy rates, and the willingness of prospective teachers to invest in occupation-specific human capital. Using SAT scores as a measure of ability, we find that an across-the-board raise produces modest improvements in the work force at best. Indeed, under plausible parameter values, it is possible for mean ability to decline.

Test Scaling and Value-Added Measurement

Conventional value-added assessment requires that achievement be reported on an interval scale. While many metrics do not have this property, application of item response theory (IRT) is said to produce interval scales. However, it is difficult to confirm that the requisite conditions are met. Even when they are, the properties of the data that make a test IRT scalable may not be the properties we seek to represent in an achievement scale, as shown by the lack of surface plausibility of many scales resulting from the application of IRT. An alternative, ordinal data analysis, is presented. It is shown that value-added estimates are sensitive to the choice of ordinal methods over conventional techniques. Value-added practitioners should ask themselves whether they are so confident of the metric properties of these scales that they are willing to attribute differences to the superiority of the latter.

Teacher recruitment and retention in public and private schools

Private school salaries are substantially below those in public school systems. Nonetheless, private school heads are as satisfied as public school principals with the quality of their new teachers and substantially more satisfied with their experienced instructors. This difference remains after controlling for school and community characteristics and for the principals tenure and educational priorities. In addition, appraisals of experienced and new teachers suggest that private schools are more successful in retaining the best of their new teachers and in developing the teaching skills of their faculties. Apparent reasons include greater flexibility in structuring pay, more supervision and mentoring of new teachers, and freedom to dismiss teachers for poor performance. These findings suggest that improvement in the quality of public school performance will require the use of accountability tools such as pay-for-performance and dismissal.

Teachers' attitudes toward merit pay: Examining conventional wisdom

This examination of data from the 1987–88 Schools and Staffing Survey challenges the common supposition that most teachers oppose merit pay. The authors find that teachers in districts that use merit pay do not seem demoralized by the system or hostile toward it, and teachers of disadvantaged and low-achieving students are generally supportive of merit pay. Private school teachers favor merit pay more than do public school teachers, a difference that may reflect differences in management in the two sectors and a more entrepreneurial spirit among staff in private schools.

Using Student Test Scores to Measure Teacher Performance Some Problems in the Design and Implementation of Evaluation Systems

Our aim in this article is to draw attention to some underappreciated problems in the design and implementation of evaluation systems that incorporate value-added measures. We focus on four: (1) taking into account measurement error in teacher assessments, (2) revising teachers’ scores as more information becomes available about their students, and (3) and (4) minimizing opportunistic behavior by teachers during roster verification and the supervision of exams.

Returns to Seniority among Public School Teachers.

Returns to seniority account for a substantial share of public K-12 expenditures. Over the first ten to 15 years of a career, public school teachers enjoy average wage growth at least equivalent to that of other white-collar workers. Explanations for this structure in terms of human capital or costly monitoring lack theoretical and empirical support. A steeper wage-tenure profile reduces turnover, but it is doubtful that the costs of turnover are high enough to make this an optimal use of school resources. We conclude that the structure of teacher pay in public education is more consistent with rent-seeking than efficient contracting.

What makes a good principal? How teachers assess the performance of principals

Abstract This paper examines the performance of public school principals as rated by teachers they supervise. Work experience outside of education does not raise performance ratings, nor does administrative experience at the current or previous schools. The only experience which is associated with higher performance ratings is teaching experience. Graduate training, even in school administration, is generally associated with lower performance ratings, a finding which raises questions about the licensing requirements for principals in most states. Finally, teachers tend to rate a principal of their own race or sex higher, an effect most pronounced for women, who consistently give male principals lower evaluations. [JEL I21]

Causes and Consequences of Teacher Moonlighting

Causes and consequences of teacher moonlighting are investigated, using a nationwide survey of US teachers conducted in the mid-1980s. A model of teacher time allocation is estimated by maximum likelihood methods. Moonlighting is shown to be highly insensitive to levels of teacher pay, even when controlling for variations in costs of living and local labor market conditions. However, teachers who moonlight do not appear to shortchange their students when it comes to preparing lessons, grading papers or assigning homework.

Has NCLB Encouraged Educational Triage? Accountability and the Distribution of Achievement Gains

The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has been criticized for encouraging schools to neglect students whose performance exceeds the proficiency threshold or lies so far below it that there is no reasonable prospect of closing the gap during the current year. We examine this hypothesis using longitudinal data from 2002–03 through 2005–06. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that as NCLB was phased in, states had some latitude in designating which grades were to count for purposes of a school making adequate yearly progress. We compare the mathematics achievement distribution in a grade before and after it became a high-stakes grade. We find in general no evidence that gains were concentrated on students near the proficiency standard at the expense of students scoring much lower, though there are inconsistent signs of a trade-off with students at the upper end of the distribution.