Dale H. Carley

Peanut price transmission asymmetry in peanut butter

Price transmission asymmetry for peanuts used in peanut butter was examined using monthly data from 1984 to 1992. Results show an incomplete price passthrough from the wholesale to the retail level. Furthermore, the results indicate that the initial price response of peanut butter price to a reduction in peanut prices occurs later than the response to an increase in peanut prices. The price transmission is asymmetric in the short-run but symmetric in the long-run.

Factors Influencing Farmers' Selection of a Milk Handler

A structural probit model is estimated to determine the change in the probability of selecting a milk handler. Cooperatives are thought to have lower prices and higher deductions than independent milk handlers and these factors reduce the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.39 and 0.32. Cooperatives are thought to have better services and an assured market and payment than independent mile handlers and these factors increase the probability that a farmer will select a cooperative by 0.20 and 0.26. This indicates that many cooperative members value monetary characteristics over non-monetary characteristics.

Japan's peanut import demand: implications for United States exports

Japans import demand for both raw peanuts and processed peanut products was estimated using the Rotterdam model in order to determine the impact of an increase in the Japanese raw peanut quota on peanut imports from the USA and its competitors. The results indicate that if a larger import budget were allocated to raw peanut imports by Japan, most of the increase would be allocated to imports of Chinese raw peanuts. Furthermore, U.S. exports of peanut products could be affected if Japanese expenditures on peanut product imports change as a result of an increase in the quota for raw peanut imports. Thus, this study concludes that an increase in the Japanese import quota for raw peanuts provides only limited market opportunity for U.S. peanut exports, and China appears to benefit more than the USA from an increase in the Japanese raw peanut import quota. In contrast, the value added trade of peanut products could provide a better market opportunity for the U.S. peanut industry.

FACTORS AFFECTING PRODUCER BARGAINING POWER IN SOUTHERN FLUID MILK MARKETS

Dairy farmers in the South have become increasdependency of these two developments. ingly interested in gaining a stronger bargaining position in the market arena for the purpose of obtaining CONSEQUENCES OF PRODUCER a more favorable price for their milk. They have imBARGAINING POWER plemented this objective by organizing cooperative associations. Cooperative bargaining relationships have Bargaining power depends on the degree of control been of three types (1) bargaining between seller and exercised over the variables that affect prices and buyer (bilateral competition), (2) bargaining between quantities. If price enhancement, with possible insellers or bargaining between buyers (interfirm concreased gross income to farmer members, is the obpetition), and (3) bargaining in or through the political jective then a cooperative association must ask itself economy [3]. what variables affect the price and revenue and what control does it have over the identified variables. Bargaining through the political economy has been the primary means of obtaining a protected price. With Several illustrations are used to show the probable state and federal milk orders, dairy producers have longer run consequences resulting from bargaining bargained at open hearings over provisions of the action by a producers association. Each of the actions orders rather than submit to price bargaining in the taken is one of several variables in which an association market [3]. Prices are then administered by public may be able to exercise varying degrees of control. authority. Producer associations in the South have Certain assumptions are made with regard to supply also enjoyed success by bargaining directly with buyers response and demand response to price changes. The to obtain negotiated Class I prices above the minimum supply response, due to price changes, may be differfederal order Class I prices. Bargaining between proent for each individual producer but for the aggregate ducer associations has occurred under conditions of all producers it is assumed to be inelastic. The where a market is short of milk. The cooperative in price elasticity of demand for fluid milk products is the market bargains with an association outside the also assumed to be inelastic. market for a necessary supply of milk to satisfy the short run needs. Price as a Variable

ADMINISTERED PRICING BY COOPERATIVES: EFFECT ON PRODUCER AND CONSUMER PRICES AND SALES OF FLUID MILK

Considerable controversy exists with regard to pricing agricultural commodities, especially when pricing departs from classical market concepts dependent on equating supply and demand. In a recent study of alternative Class I pricing systems, it was suggested that “pricing of milk and dairy products is one of the major policy issues to be resolved in the 1970s”. A different pricing system in federal milk orders was considered urgent enough that a concentrated study of pricing alternatives was pursued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.