Dalia Nassar

From a Philosophy of Self to a Philosophy of Nature: Goethe and the Development of Schelling's Naturphilosophie

Abstract One of the most significant moments in the development of German idealism is Schellings break from his mentor Fichte. On account of its significance, there have been numerous studies examining the origin and meaning of this transition in Schellings thought. Not one study, however, considers Goethes influence on Schellings development. This is surprising given the fact that in the fall of 1799 Goethe and Schelling meet every day for a week, to go through and edit what came to be Schellings most path-breaking work. This paper considers Goethes influence on the development of Schellings thought, and argues that it was by appropriating Goethes idea of metamorphosis that Schelling was able to put forth a conception of nature as independent from the mind.

The metaphor of epigenesis: Kant, Blumenbach and Herder.

Over the last few decades, the meaning of the scientific theory of epigenesis and its significance for Kants critical philosophy have become increasingly central questions. Most recently, scholars have argued that epigenesis is a key factor in the development of Kants understanding of reason as self-grounding and self-generating. Building on this work, our claim is that Kant appealed to not just any epigenetic theory, but specifically Johann Friedrich Blumenbachs account of generation, and that this appeal must be understood not only in terms of self-organization, but also in terms of the demarcation of a specific domain of inquiry: for Blumenbach, the study of life; for Kant, the study of reason. We argue that Kant adopted this specific epigenetic model as a result of his dispute with Herder regarding the independence of reason from nature. Blumenbachs conception of epigenesis and his separation of a domain of the living from the non-living lent Kant the tools to demarcate metaphysics, and to guard reason against Herders attempts to naturalize it.

Analogy, Natural History and the Philosophy of Nature

In 1785 Kant published a series of critical reviews of Johann Gottfried Herder’s Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humanity (1784–1785), in which he not only challenges Herder’s conception of nature but also, and more importantly, his methodology. Kant’s complaint is that by relying on analogy, Herder draws deeply mistaken conclusions that overlook fundamental differences between human and nonhuman beings. But was Kant’s critique of Herder entirely fair? And how does it compare to Kant’s own use of analogy? My claim is that Herder’s use of analogy posed a fundamental methodological challenge to Kant, a challenge he sought to meet in the years following the reviews. In so doing, however, Kant found himself in the untenable situation of, on the one hand, granting analogy greater significance, and, on the other, severely restricting its use. By tracing the shifts in Kant’s thought through the lens of analogy, I aim to show that Kant’s transformed understanding of analogy reveals a fundamental tension between his a priori “metaphysics of nature” and empirical science, a tension that fundamentally shaped the philosophies of nature after Kant.

Interpreting Novalis’ Fichte-Studien

The recent philosophical interpretations of Novalis have argued that the so-called Fichte-Studien, notes taken during Novalis’ study of Fichte (1795-1796), are the most important contribution to philosophical Romanticism. These notes, however, are often contradictory and incoherent. Thus, in the Fichte-Studien, one can locate two mutually exclusive conceptions of being and of the Status of being. Furthermore, the Fichte-Studien do not appear to provide a unique understanding of the meaning and role of the work of art, as many scholars have argued. Therefore, although the Fichte-Studien provide valuable insights into the direction of Novalis’ thought, they cannot be understood as providing a consistent and philosophically-cohesive worldview, but must be read alongside and in relation to Novalis’ later writings.ZusammenfassungDie neueren philosophischen Novalisinterpretationen gehen davon aus, dass die sogenannten Fichte-Studien (Notizen aus den Jahren 1795-1796) den wichtigsten Beitrag zur philosophischen Frühromantik darstellen. Diese Notizen sind aber häufig widersprüchlich und inkohärent. Zwei sich gegenseitig ausschließende Auffassungen des Begriffs »Seyn« und des Status des Seins sind in den Fichte-Studien zu finden. Außerdem bieten die Fichte-Studien keine originelle Auslegung der Bedeutung und Rolle des Kunstwerks an, wie mehrere Deutungen behaupten. Obwohl die Fichte-Studien wichtige Einblicke in die Richtung von Novalis’ Denken geben, dürfen sie deshalb nicht als eine einheitliche und philosophisch geschlossene Weltanschauung begriffen werden und müssen in Bezug zu den späteren Werken Novalis’ interpretiert werden.

Analogical reflection as a source for the science of life: Kant and the possibility of the biological sciences.

In contrast to the previously widespread view that Kants work was largely in dialogue with the physical sciences, recent scholarship has highlighted Kants interest in and contributions to the life sciences. Scholars are now investigating the extent to which Kant appealed to and incorporated insights from the life sciences and considering the ways he may have contributed to a new conception of living beings. The scholarship remains, however, divided in its interest: historians of science are concerned with the content of Kants claims, and the ways in which they may or may not have contributed to the emerging science of life, while historians of philosophy focus on the systematic justifications for Kants claims, e.g., the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of Kants statement that living beings are mechanically inexplicable. My aim in this paper is to bring together these two strands of scholarship into dialogue by showing how Kants methodological concerns (specifically, his notion of reflective judgment) contributed to his conception of living beings and to the ontological concern with life as a distinctive object of study. I argue that although Kants explicit statement was that biology could not be a science, his implicit and more fundamental claim was that the study of living beings necessitates a distinctive mode of thought, a mode that is essentially analogical. I consider the implications of this view, and argue that it is by developing a new methodology for grasping organized beings that Kant makes his most important contribution to the new science of life.

Sensibility and Organic Unity: Kant, Goethe, and the Plasticity of Cognition

In 1796 Friedrich Schiller famously declared that there are two kinds of poets, those who “will be nature” and those who “will seek lost nature.” He called the former “naïve,” identified them with ancient writers, and described their works as more concrete and sensuously immediate. The latter he termed “sentimental” poets, poets of the modern era, whose estrangement from nature went hand in hand with their greater emphasis on reflection and freedom. For Schiller, however, Goethe presented a strange paradox: a modern poet who was nonetheless naïve. The notion that Goethe’s poetry and his approach to the natural world in general are “naïve” has stuck, and become the accepted view of Goethe as both poet and thinker. Indeed, Goethe seems to have agreed with his friend’s characterization, writing some years later that while Schiller “preached the gospel of freedom,” he, Goethe, “defended the rights of nature” (MA 12, 97). In turn, Goethe was often critical of philosophical abstractions, because they had no sense for the concrete, and even declared himself to lack possession of the “organ” necessary for philosophy (MA 12, 94). However, in spite of Goethe’s self-proclaimed incapacity for philosophical reflection, there is ample evidence to the contrary. Not only did he seriously engage with Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, andHegel, but he was also in dialogue with some of themost influential thinkers of the time, including Jacobi, Herder, and Niethammer. Most significantly, his encounter with Schiller did not – as might appear – result in a rejection of philosophy or a refusal to undertake critical enquiry. The opposite was the case: Goethe and Schiller’s famous 1794 meeting prompted Goethe to offer more systematic explications of his methodology and undertake further study of Kantian philosophy. Nonetheless, Goethe’s views were decisively different from those of the philosophers who surrounded him, and this difference concerned the role of sensibility in knowledge. In his Maxims and Reflections, Goethe writes that “we are adequately equipped for all our genuine earthly needs if we will trust our senses, and develop them in such a way that they continue to prove worthy of our confidence” (MA 17, 918). And again, he remarks that “the senses do not deceive; it is judgment that deceives” (MA 17, 917). In deep contrast to his contemporaries, who were largely concerned with establishing pure forms of thought, elaborating their relationships, and, as Fichte put it, offering a “pragmatic history of the spirit,” Goethe was convinced that sensible knowledge must be incorporated into philosophy, and more strikingly, that sensibility provides the foundation for all knowledge.

Pure versus Empirical Forms of Thought: Schelling's Critique of Kant's Categories and the Beginnings of Naturphilosophie

The origins of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and its relation to his transcendental philosophy have for a long time intrigued historians of philosophy. For one, Schelling’s philosophy of nature seems wholly at odds with his earlier transcendental philosophy. Furthermore, the claims that Schelling makes in the Naturphilosophie are not only complex but also, from the perspective of transcendental philosophy, appear to be highly problematic. In attempting to understand the relation between Schelling’s philosophy of nature and his earlier writings, historians of philosophy have thus emphasized a break in his development. For this reason, Schelling’s writings before 1797 are considered to bear little or no relation to his writings on Naturphilosophie. The goal of this paper is to revise the common view of Schelling’s development, by showing that his first systematic works offer significant insights into the way in which he comes to understand the meaning and goal of his philosophy of nature. In particular, I show that Schelling’s appropriation and critique of Kant’s table of categories provides an essential step toward the development of his Naturphilosophie.

Heroes and Fanatics: Discernment and Critique In Hegel’s Political Philosophy

The possibility of positing critiques of the contemporary from within Hegels political philosophy is by no means evident. In fact, Hegels political philosophy has been plagued with accusations of quietism and conservatism and Hegel himself claims that the philosophical task is retrospective and descriptive. Yet, in spite of this claim, Hegel posits a critique of his contemporaries, the Jacobins. I attempt to answer the question, is Hegels critique of the Jacobins consistent with his political philosophy as a whole? Or, is this critique a mere inconsistency in Hegels system? In essence, is Hegel justified, on his own grounds, to criticize the Jacobins? In order to answer this question, I identify what Hegel means by the genuinely philosophical viewpoint, which he equates with the world-historical perspective, and show that this perspective is not limited to historical description, but does in fact allow and even call for political discernment and critique.