Damiano Bolzoni
University of Twente
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Publication
Featured researches published by Damiano Bolzoni.
Fourth IEEE International Workshop on Information Assurance (IWIA'06) | 2006
Damiano Bolzoni; Sandro Etalle; Pieter H. Hartel
We present POSEIDON, a new anomaly-based network intrusion detection system. POSEIDON is payload-based, and has a two-tier architecture: the first stage consists of a self-organizing map, while the second one is a modified PAYL system. Our benchmarks on the 1999 DARPA data set show a higher detection rate and lower number of false positives than PAYL and PHAD
International Journal of Information Security | 2012
Dina Hadžiosmanović; Damiano Bolzoni; Pieter H. Hartel
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems are used for controlling and monitoring industrial processes. We propose a methodology to systematically identify potential process-related threats in SCADA. Process-related threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights and performs actions, which look legitimate, but which are intended to disrupt the SCADA process. To detect such threats, we propose a semi-automated approach of log processing. We conduct experiments on a real-life water treatment facility. A preliminary case study suggests that our approach is effective in detecting anomalous events that might alter the regular process workflow.
recent advances in intrusion detection | 2009
Damiano Bolzoni; Sandro Etalle; Pieter H. Hartel
Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems are usually criticized because they lack a classification of attacks, thus security teams have to manually inspect any raised alert to classify it. We present a new approach, Panacea, to automatically and systematically classify attacks detected by an anomaly-based network intrusion detection system.
2012 Complexity in Engineering (COMPENG). Proceedings | 2012
Dina Hadziosmanovic; Damiano Bolzoni; Sandro Etalle; Pieter H. Hartel
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used for operating and monitoring industrial processes. Recent reports state that current ICS infrastructures are not sufficiently protected against cyber threats. Unfortunately, due to the specific nature of these systems, the application of common security counter-measures is often not effective. This paper summarizes experiences over a series of research efforts for building tools and mechanisms to improve the security and awareness in ICS. In particular, we discuss challenges and opportunities identified during an extensive analysis of ICS data resources. We believe that such insights are valuable for further research in the ICS context.
2007 2nd IEEE/IFIP International Workshop on Business-Driven IT Management | 2007
Emmanuele Zambon; Damiano Bolzoni; Sandro Etalle; Marco Salvato
The assessment and mitigation of risks related to the availability of the IT infrastructure is becoming increasingly important in modern organizations. Unfortunately, present standards for risk assessment and mitigation show limitations when evaluating and mitigating availability risks. This is due to the fact that they do not fully consider the dependencies between the constituents of an IT infrastructure that are paramount in large enterprises. These dependencies make the technical problem of assessing availability issues very challenging. In this paper we define a method and a tool for carrying out a risk mitigation activity which allows us to assess the global impact of a set of risks and to choose the best set of countermeasures to cope with them. To this end, the presence of a tool is necessary, due to the high complexity of the assessment problem. Our approach can be integrated in present risk management methodologies (e.g. COBIT) to provide a more precise risk mitigation activity. We substantiate the viability of this approach by showing that most of the input required by the tool is available as part of a standard business continuity plan, and/or by performing a common tool-assisted risk management.
electronic commerce | 2011
Dina Hadziosmanovic; Damiano Bolzoni; Pieter H. Hartel; Sandro Etalle
We address the detection of process-related threats in control systems used in critical infrastructures. Process-related threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights and performs actions, which look legitimate, but which are intended to disrupt the industrial process. We use logs to detect anomalous patterns of user actions on process control application. A preliminary case study suggests that our approach is effective in detecting anomalous events that might alter the regular process workflow.
Nuclear Instruments & Methods in Physics Research Section A-accelerators Spectrometers Detectors and Associated Equipment | 2008
Damiano Bolzoni; S Sandro Etalle
Anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) can take into consideration packet headers, the payload, or a combination of both. We argue that payload-based approaches are becoming the most effective methods to detect attacks. Nowadays, attacks aim mainly to exploit vulnerabilities at application level: thus, the payload contains the most important information to differentiate normal traffic from anomalous activity. To support our thesis, we present a comparison between different anomaly-based NIDSs, focusing in particular on the data analyzed by the detection engine to discover possible malicious activities. Furthermore, we present a comparison of two payload and anomaly-based NIDSs: PAYL and POSEIDON.
recent advances in intrusion detection | 2010
Dina Hadžiosmanović; Damiano Bolzoni; Pieter H. Hartel
Standard approaches for detecting malicious behaviors, e.g. monitoring network traffic, cannot address process-related threats in SCADA(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems. These threats take place when an attacker gains user access rights and performs actions which look legitimate, but which can disrupt the industrial process. We believe that it is possible to detect such behavior by analysing SCADA system logs. We present MEDUSA, an anomaly-based tool for detecting user actions that may negatively impact the system.
recent advances in intrusion detection | 2012
Dina Hadžiosmanović; Lorenzo Simionato; Damiano Bolzoni; Emmanuele Zambon; Sandro Etalle
usenix large installation systems administration conference | 2007
Damiano Bolzoni; Bruno Crispo; Sandro Etalle