Dana Miller

Rhetoric in the Light of Plato's Epistemological Criticisms

Platos chief argument against rhetoric is epistemological. Plato claims that rhetoric accomplishes what it does on the basis of experience, not knowledge. In this article I examine Platos criticisms of rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus . I argue that Plato is right to identify rhetorics empirical basis, but that having this epistemic basis does not constitute an argument against rhetoric. On the contrary, Platos criticism of rhetoric serves to give us an epistemological explanation of rhetorics success.

The Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle's Categories: Text, Translation, and Commentary

Knowability from a broader philosophical perspective Van Benthem (essay 9) looks at the Church–Fitch argument in the setting of dynamic epistemic logic. He argues that propositions such as the Fitch-conjunction have a self-afflicting property: they change their own truth-value when they are announced. Van Benthem shows that similar epistemic phenomena often occur with information update in social dynamic contexts.And he expresses hope that we can broaden our understanding of Fitch-style issues in a richer dynamic–epistemic framework. Burgess (essay 10) investigates a translation of (Knowability) into temporal modal logic: if p is true now, then p will be known at some point in the [open-ended] future. Burgess argues that various restrictions on this principle must be invoked to deal with the fact that propositions are tensed in temporal logic. The problems of finding such restrictions, he claims, can help us shape our understanding of the knowability paradox. Brogaard (essay 15) uses a Church–Fitch style reasoning against strong modal fictionalism, which holds that talk of possible worlds is a useful fiction that is literally false. She argues that fictionalism must acknowledge certain principles that in turn trigger a Church– Fitch style argument showing that fictionalism is committed to the existence of possible worlds. Brogaard speculates that a restriction strategy may be the best way for the fictionalist to avoid this unacceptable commitment. Bueno (essay 16) uses a Church–Fitch style argument to evaluate different views in the philosophy of mathematics. He argues that full-blooded Platonism—roughly the view that all logically possible mathematical objects actually exist—and mathematical fictionalism— roughly the view that mathematical objects do not exist—are particularly vulnerable to Church–Fitch style problems. Although a similar fate need not befall other forms of platonism and fictionalism, Bueno argues that such views cannot easily explain how knowledge of mathematical objects is possible. Let me end by pointing readers looking for a more elaborate overview of the collection to Salerno’s very readable introduction (pp. 1–10). But more than anything, those who are interested in epistemology, logic, or metaphysics should dig into the essays themselves. For they are well worth a read.