Dania Thomas

Depletion: THE COST OF SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

Abstract In this article we explore the concept of depletion through social reproduction (DSR). We describe depletion, identify its key indicators and suggest different methodologies that could be used to measure it. We discuss issues having to do with gendered harm as well as questions about how depletion might be reversed. We conclude that recognizing DSR in this way can be a powerful tool for understanding the consequences of non-recognition of the value of domestic work to national economies, as well as the harm that might accrue in the doing of this work at both a systemic and individual level.In this article we explore the concept of depletion through social reproduction (DSR). We describe depletion, identify its key indicators and suggest different methodologies that could be used to measure it. We discuss issues having to do with gendered harm as well as questions about how depletion might be reversed. We conclude that recognizing DSR in this way can be a powerful tool for understanding the consequences of non-recognition of the value of domestic work to national economies, as well as the harm that might accrue in the doing of this work at both a systemic and individual level.

Sovereign debt restructuring in the Eurozone: A polanyian reading of private law enforcement

Abstract The social protests on the streets of indebted sovereigns in crises across the Eurozone have made debt restructuring an imperative. Further delay in achieving this expeditiously and equitably significantly exacerbates the social costs of crises from which current and future generations will struggle to recover. This article examines the feasibility of the drastic and widespread debt restructuring needed to resolve the problem in the face of existing private law sanctions that protect individual creditor rights. It relies on an analysis of US policy in the transition to a securitized market and of key sovereign debt cases to reveal the historical contingency of private law protections. It concludes by showing that the effectiveness of private law protections have always been constrained by the overriding imperative to achieve debt sustainability with negotiated and consensual workouts. This can be achieved in the Eurozone with statutory constraints on enforcement action pending the settlement of debt workouts as suggested in a recent proposal.

Judicial Review in the Eurozone: The Court System as Regulator? The Case of the Sovereign Debt Crisis

This chapter examines the possibilities for judicial review of regulatory and supervisory acts in the current legal framework for capital markets at European Union level and its legal nature. After introducing the legal framework in general, the focus is on the first ever referral made to the Court of Justice of the European Union by the German Federal Constitutional Court as an example of the role of the judiciary within this framework. The authors critically enquire into the possibilities of retrospective adjudication of regulatory and monetary decisions, here the decision by the European Central Bank to purchase sovereign bonds of certain Member States on the open market, so called outright monetary transactions. The authors observe that while the decision itself may have supported markets as expected the ensuing litigation has the potential to do a disservice to the rule of law. They contend—subject to a defined understanding of regulation—that the courts can indeed be said to assume a role as regulator, however involuntary and however desirable this may be.

Good Faith in Sovereign Debt Restructuring : Mapping a Shift from Enforcement to Voluntary Compliance

Abstract Our examination of changes in the period leading up to the Argentine debt exchange and after, reveals that with Collective Action Clauses (CACs), the sovereign debt market is increasingly reliant on good faith as a standard of fair dealing to ensure fair and orderly debt restructurings in the future. Unlike the entrenched, enforceable, doctrinal good faith in domestic jurisdictions such as the U.S., the norm relied on in the sovereign debt market is a contextual open norm similar to the notion of Treu und Glauben, section 242 BGB of the German civil code. It is not a legal rule with specific requirements that need to be fulfilled. This paper reveals that reliance on a contextual, open norm is evidence of a shift in the framework that regulates sovereign debt restructurings: a shift from enforcement to voluntary compliance. Further, we argue that in the absence of a multilateral, regulatory, framework that embeds good faith as a specific standard of fair dealing, this reliance will exacerbate not solve the problem of sovereign debt restructurings.