Daniel A. Bens

Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises

This paper examines a real cost of awarding employee stock options. Based on the observation that managers are extremely concerned about earnings-per-share dilution in equity related compensation, we predict and find that firms experiencing significant employee stock option (ESO) exercises shift resources away from real investments towards the repurchase of their own stocks. We further find weak evidence of a decline in subsequent firm performance (as measured by return on assets) for several years following the cut in discretionary investments as a result of stock option exercises, though this result is sensitive to the metric used to measure performance. Collectively, our findings indicate that ESO exercises potentially impose a real cost on the firm in terms of foregone investment opportunities.

The Information Content of Goodwill Impairments and SFAS 142

Accounting standard setters face a perpetual challenge in balancing relevance and reliability when establishing generally accepted accounting principles. This tension is especially heightened when the nature of the economic information concerns intangible assets. This article presents exploratory evidence about standard setters’ response to this challenge by examining whether Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142): Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets altered the information content of goodwill write-offs. To more accurately capture the information of goodwill write-offs, the authors first create a model to estimate expected impairments. The difference between actual write-offs and expected write-offs represents write-off surprises or unexpected goodwill write-offs. The authors document a negative and significant stock market reaction to unexpected goodwill write-offs. On a cross-sectional basis, they find that the market reaction is attenuated for firms with low information asymmetry (their proxy is a high analyst following) and for firms that find it relatively costly to implement impairment tests (their proxy is the inverse of firm size). The authors find no variation in market reaction based on firm complexity (their proxy is the number of firm segments). The negative reaction for the high information asymmetry and larger firms weakens following the adoption of SFAS 142. The latter result is consistent with SFAS 142 critics’ claims that more relevant accounting information, captured by fair value methods, is difficult to implement reliably and thus can reduce the information content of accounting reports.

Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data

We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms’ plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm’s plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a “pseudo-segment.�? We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudosegments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.

The Effect of Aggregation of Accounting Information via Segment Reporting on Accounting Conservatism

Abstract In a sample of U.S. multiple-segment firms, we document a negative association between aggregation via segment reporting and timely loss recognition. A higher level of aggregation, as reflected in a firm’s reported organizational structure (the definition and characteristics of its segments), causes a multiple-segment firm to exhibit less cross-segment variation in profitability than a matched control portfolio of single-segment firms. We find that firms that engage in more aggregation report accounting numbers that provide less timely information about economic losses. We also observe that firms that provide more disaggregated segment data subsequent to adopting SFAS 131 experienced an increase in timely loss recognition. This result implies that higher quality segment reporting leads to an increase in timely loss recognition, which, per extant research, is associated with better governance. Our results complement results in Berger and Hann [2003. The impact of SFAS No. 131 on information and monitoring. Journal of Accounting Research, 41, 163–223] that show a decline in inefficient internal-capital-market transfers subsequent to the adoption of SFAS 131. Overall, we provide evidence supporting Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther’s [2010. The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, 296–343] contention that accounting conservatism is, in part, a function of managers’ aggregation choices.