Daniel A. Crane

The institutional structure of antitrust enforcement

Acknowledgments Introduction Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different? Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions? Index

Compensation for Antitrust Violations An Economic Perspective

Antitrust systems that permit private enforcement must choose between prioritizing compensation or deterrence as primary goals given the inevitable trade-offs. Although a number of systems that have been transitioning towards private enforcement—the EU in particular—have recently sided with compensation as the primary goal, it is doubtful that antitrust generally can achieve effective compensation to consumers as compensation is traditionally understood in remedial systems. This article considers the possibility of reaching for a different definition of compensation than conventionally understood and casts doubt on the advisability of such a move.