Daniel Baldino

Defence diplomacy and the Australian defence force: smokescreen or strategy?

ABSTRACT The practice of military-to-military engagement has been strongly embraced in the last few decades as a central tool for strategic management. Many governments in the Asia-Pacific, including Australia, have accepted the practice as an instrument of statecraft to achieve comprehensive strategic outcomes: as a means of defusing tensions, reducing hostility and shaping the behaviour of states towards each other. This article examines Australias broad approach and practice, and argues that such transformative ambitions are overstated. The evidence suggests that the benefits from defence diplomacy are evident at the tactical and operational level. It is a mode to deal with precise and immediate security issues, as opposed to the moulding of major strategic settings. This indicates the need to better recognise the limitations and conceptual flaws of defence diplomacy, and to reformulate Australian defence channels and related engagement prescriptions towards a more cautious, pragmatic and ultimately security-related stance. Through the use of case-study analysis, this research identifies both opportunities and constraints in conducting defence diplomacy, while offering guidelines for its future implementation in the region.

Iran and the emergence of information and communications technology: the evolution of revolution?

This study examines the emergence of information and communications technology (ICT) in facilitating political protest in the Middle East, with a focus on the Iranian experience. With the rise of ‘emancipating technology’ to mobilise popular support, many had hoped that the incumbent regime in Iran would be steered towards a more democratic and less authoritarian path. At the same time, the Iranian regime itself has shown an increasingly sophisticated technical nous, constructing a centralised censorship network and using available technology to proliferate propaganda and control and subdue cyber-protest. As such, ICT has acted as a complex dual-edged sword in both mutually supporting and suppressing political activism in modern-day Iran.

An Indo-Pacific norm entrepreneur? Australia and defence diplomacy

The Indian Ocean is a region of increasing importance, with booming economic opportunities, shifting power dynamics and rising geopolitical competition. To manage this transition some Australian policy-makers are advocating the practice of defence diplomacy as a mechanism to help mould cooperative practices and to build regional trust while dissipating potential or ongoing regional flashpoints. Australias 2013 Defence White Paper identified Australia as an agent who can play a critical part in the emergence of certain types of norms as a means of conflict prevention and crisis management in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper explores the use of defence diplomacy as a means for seeking regional influence. It uses an innovative new framework of norm entrepreneurship to examine the choices facing Australian policy-makers in increasingly complex security environment. This paper argues that while Australia should aim to promote defence diplomacy as a central part of rising security dialogue and practice with ‘like-mined’ countries, there must also be careful reflection to ensure that this objective is a constructive use of a middle powers limited resources and influence.

The politics of intelligence sharing in the Indian Ocean Rim

The Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), with nearly half the world’s population by 2050, in geo-political terms, is moving away from being identified as the ‘Ocean of the South’ to the ‘Ocean of the Center’ and the ‘Ocean of the Future’ with a core position in terms of global security, data collection and information transfer that will increasingly shape the planet in the twenty-first Century. Given such interdependencies, there is clearly a need for intelligence acquisition, data analysis and the provision of relevant and timely information to help to facilitate coherent, clear-eyed decision-making. It can be argued that a nation without intelligence is like an individual without eyes and ears – intelligence which no single country can gather, process or disseminate on its own. For instance, in 2017, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) had declared the need to upgrade intelligence-sharing capabilities and explore a regional surveillance network of existing member state institutions that included sharing of data and exchange of information on maritime transportation systems. Similarly, a range of regional leaders, such as India’s former Vice President Hamid Ansari, have emphasized the importance of gathering intelligence and closer defence integration alongside the task of creating pragmatic regional networks that can link maritime operations and facilitate co-ordination among regional actors including coastguards, police, customs and other intelligence officials. The success of anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden is perhaps the best example of a unified platform for coordination and information sharing across multiple sectors to address maritime threats. Overall, this type of information exchange impetus is about trying to avoid strategic surprises, support risk mitigation strategies and ensure that intelligence analysis, situational awareness and response capability will remain ahead of threats to national security. The nature of issues like climate change, illegal fishing, terrorism, transnational crime, drug smuggling, cyber-sabotage and arms trafficking all continue to pose serious security threats to littoral states regardless of size and stature. As such, a drive for greater all-source intelligence information ‘fusion’ will demand both people and systems to increase communication and coordination across parallel issues, alter bureaucratic relationships and adapt to technology trends. Everything is about adding insights for decision-making, setting priorities and protocols and supporting specific operations in competitive conditions. Critically, it will be argued that a wide range of non-traditional security issues do provide genuine openings to develop a level of trust, confidence and habits of cooperation that is required to advance security in the Indo-Pacific. Certainly, factors such as a lack of leadership and suspicion or rising geopolitical rivalries will present significant normative as well as political challenges that could inhibit effective bilateral and broader region-wide intelligence sharing arrangements. All nations will therefore need to carefully consider the effectiveness and limitations of current and proposed information sharing networks and associated political and institutional reforms in the region. Such revised arrangements might conceivably incorporate investments into more flexible network-based approaches that have low political barriers to entry and that can concentrate on issue-specific competencies and commonalties among states.

A network maritime security approach to intelligence sharing in the IOR

ABSTRACT The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become an area of critical strategic interest. It is also a region that contains a range of serious and evolving non-traditional security problems, including the problem of maritime terrorism. As a result, many IOR states have called for stronger pan-regional intelligence collaboration to assist in risk mitigation against such violent and destabilizing threats. This article explores the challenges involved in establishing an effective intelligence exchange network in a region characterized by mistrust, diversity and a lack of established security priorities and protocols. Building upon the success of the IOR’s joint counter-piracy operations, it will argue that a less burdensome network-based approach is needed that can concentrate on issue-specific competencies and commonalties among states. In particular, while not without limitations, a more loosely coordinated and informal network governance approach can enhance opportunities to improve information-sharing to address common maritime security challenges, such as maritime terrorism, among IOR and extra-regional states.

New engagement: contemporary Australian foreign policy towards Africa

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

Extended ‘Stop and Search’ Powers in Australia: A challenge for relations between police officers and citizens

This paper will provide an investigation, both theoretical and empirical, into the use of ‘stop and search’ powers in Australia. It will provide a detailed analysis of the legislation, its impact and the implications surrounding ‘stop and search’ powers in Western Australia and, in part, Victoria and the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (Perth, October 2011) has also provided a unique opportunity to study a range of special policing laws and potential problems.