Daniel Berliner
University of Minnesota
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Publication
Featured researches published by Daniel Berliner.
The Journal of Politics | 2014
Daniel Berliner
Transparency has been hailed as the key to better governance, yet political actors have many reasons to resist transparency. This article studies one prominent transparency policy, Freedom of Information (FOI) laws, which have been passed by over 80 countries. By institutionalizing transparency, FOI laws increase the costs for political actors to use public office—and public information—for private gain. Why have so many states passed FOI laws despite this? I argue that, in competitive political environments, FOI laws can create benefits for political actors as well as costs. Uncertainty over future control creates incentives for incumbents to pass FOI laws in order to ensure their own future access to government information and to credibly commit to future transparency. Event-history-model results show that FOI law passage is more likely when opposition parties pose more credible challenges to incumbents and when recent turnover in executive office has been frequent.
American Political Science Review | 2015
Daniel Berliner; Aaron Erlich
Why do political actors undertake reforms that constrain their own discretion? We argue that uncertainty generated by political competition is a major driver of such reforms, and test this argument using subnational data on Mexican states’ adoption of state-level access to information (ATI) laws. Examining data from 31 Mexican states plus the Federal District, we find that more politically competitive states passed ATI laws more rapidly, even taking into account the party in power, levels of corruption, civil society, and other factors. The fine-grained nature of our data, reflecting the staggered timing of elections, inauguration dates, and dates of passage, allows us to distinguish between different theoretical mechanisms. We find the greatest evidence in favor of an insurance mechanism, by which incumbent parties who face uncertainty over future political control seek to ensure access to government information, and means of monitoring incumbents, in the future in case they lose power.
Archive | 2015
Daniel Berliner; Anne Regan Greenleaf; Milli Lake; Margaret Levi; Jennifer Noveck
Labor Standards in International Supply Chains examines developments in working conditions over the past thirty years. The authors analyze the stakeholders and mechanisms that create challenges and opportunities for improving labor rights around the world, in sectors including apparel, footwear and electronics. Extended examples from China, Honduras, Bangladesh and the United States, as well as new quantitative evidence, illustrate the complex dynamics within and among key groups, including brands, suppliers, governments, workers and consumers.
Policy Studies Journal | 2015
Daniel Berliner; Aseem Prakash
World Development | 2015
Daniel Berliner; Anne Regan Greenleaf; Milli Lake; Jennifer Noveck
International Studies Quarterly | 2014
Daniel Berliner; Aseem Prakash
Journal of Business Ethics | 2014
Daniel Berliner; Aseem Prakash
Annual Review of Law and Social Science | 2015
Daniel Berliner; Anne Regan Greenleaf; Milli Lake; Margaret Levi; Jennifer Noveck
Governance | 2017
Daniel Berliner
Review of International Organizations | 2016
Daniel Berliner