Daniel Finke

Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models

This article evaluates, by drawing on Barrys distinction between ‘power’ and ‘luck’, the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making.

Ignoring the Non-ignorables?

Missing or incomplete data on actors’ positions can cause significant problems in political analysis. Research on missing values suggests the use of multiple imputation methods rather than case deletion, but few studies have yet considered the non-ignorable problem - positions that are hidden for strategic purposes. We examine this problem and discuss the advantages and drawbacks of (i) multiple imputation as implemented in AMELIA; (ii) a computationally easy but, in the context of spatial modelling, straightforward measure of indifference and (iii) a conditional averaging algorithm, LDM, which seeks to reasonably fix actors’ positions in the policy space pre- and post-imputation. The analysis suggests that actors biased by the status quo strategically hide their more supportive positions. Although none of the existing methods - which produce quite different results - is perfectly suited for imputing hidden positions, LDM has the highest hit rate for the conjectured more supportive position.

With a little help from the state: interest intermediation in the domestic pre-negotiations of EU legislation

Abstract Theories of interest intermediation maintain that the formation of bargaining positions in the European Union follows a distinctive bargaining style. This article evaluates such claims empirically. It compares the predictive accuracy of Nash bargaining models which take the salient features of five types of interest intermediation into account. We show that the interaction between government agencies, interest groups and parties in the formation of EU legislation is largely étatiste. When important private interests are at stake, the pattern is also quite often clientelistic or corporatist. The dominance of the state in the less politicized decision-making processes is apparent in all four countries under consideration: Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Consociationalist arrangements are rare in this arena of public policy-making.

Domestic scrutiny of European Union politics: Between whistle blowing and opposition control

Some European law proposals are subject to scrutiny by national parliaments while others go unchecked. The analysis in this article indicates that the opposition scrutinises European Union law to gather information on the proceedings inside the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. Yet whereas strong opposition parties scrutinise highly politicised law proposals, weak opposition parties tend to scrutinise those proposals that are negotiated under the non-transparent fast-track procedure. In addition, there is ample evidence that the leading minister initiates scrutiny in order to strengthen his or her intergovernmental bargaining leverage. Yet, this Schelling Conjecture presumes that the party of the minister is located between the expected bargaining position in the Council and the coalition partner. Any other domestic interest constellation could lead to scrutiny motivated by whistle blowing. However, an issues salience helps us to separate the whistle blowing from the Schelling Conjecture.

Proposal stage coalition-building in the European Parliament

Almost all existing studies of conflict and coalitions inside the European Parliament (EP) rely on the statistical analysis of voting behaviour. Yet who proposes the alternatives put to vote? Which political groups jointly co-author legislative amendments? Which strategic considerations (if any) determine legislative coalition-building inside the EP? To answer these questions, this article analyses information on the proposer identity for all legislative amendments drafted in the sixth legislative period. My findings suggest that, when building coalitions, political groups consider the degree of inter-institutional conflict. However, despite the highly proportional rules of procedure, the rapporteur emerges as the most powerful player in proposal stage coalition-building. Other groups may successfully challenge the rapporteur only if they aim at pulling the draft report closer to the floor median. Those who are interested in pulling the outcome away from the median have little choice but to include the rapporteur as a member of their coalition. In this case, rapporteurs must strike a fine balance between convincing their fellow Members of the European Parliament of the strategic exigency of deviating from the median and maintaining their credibility when bargaining with the members of the Council. If rapporteurs are too close to the Council, they forfeit their trustworthiness among their potential coalition partners.

Domestic Politics and European Treaty Reform

This article analyses the extent to which governmental positions on European integration originate from domestic politics. In contrast to previous studies, I apply a longitudinal research design that allows for an empirical analysis of the domestic dynamics that govern position formation. I use advanced statistical measurement techniques to compare national positions across time. Member states’ economic characteristics define a corridor for governmental positions. However, the political dynamics of the domestic arena determine the final position governments adopt at any particular Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). In particular, when formulating the national position, the short-term trend in public opinion limits governmental discretion. This effect is especially strong if the government announced ratification by referendum and in countries with a system of strong parliamentary scrutiny.

The Treaty Reform of the EU: Constitutional Agenda-Setting, Intergovernmental Bargains and the Presidency's Crisis Management of Ratification Failure

This study empirically investigates the two options which were considered by the German presidency for finding a solution to the crisis of the EUs reform process. Our findings reveal that making concessions to the remaining eight ratification countries and renegotiating the text with all Member States were feasible solutions for reform.

ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF NONSEPARABLE PREFERENCES IN EU TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

This article derives theoretical expectations about the importance of nonseparable preferences at EU treaty negotiations. It argues that member states’ positions on the degree of integration depend on the expected reform of the decision rule and vice versa. This nonseparability effect varies across member states. Wealthier member states (net payers) would prefer a more majoritarian and efficient decision rule when confronted with a higher level of vertical integration. The overall size of the nonseparability effect can be explained by the policy area-specific degree of preference asymmetry. In order to test these expectations the article advances existing statistical models of ideal point estimation and derives a model that allows for an explicit estimation of nonseparability effects. It applies this model to data on member states’ positions at the IGC 2003—4. The two-stage estimator presented in this article may be considered useful in other applications of ideal point estimators.

A proteolytic fragment of histone deacetylase 4 protects the heart from failure by regulating the hexosamine biosynthetic pathway

The stress-responsive epigenetic repressor histone deacetylase 4 (HDAC4) regulates cardiac gene expression. Here we show that the levels of an N-terminal proteolytically derived fragment of HDAC4, termed HDAC4-NT, are lower in failing mouse hearts than in healthy control hearts. Virus-mediated transfer of the portion of the Hdac4 gene encoding HDAC4-NT into the mouse myocardium protected the heart from remodeling and failure; this was associated with decreased expression of Nr4a1, which encodes a nuclear orphan receptor, and decreased NR4A1-dependent activation of the hexosamine biosynthetic pathway (HBP). Conversely, exercise enhanced HDAC4-NT levels, and mice with a cardiomyocyte-specific deletion of Hdac4 show reduced exercise capacity, which was characterized by cardiac fatigue and increased expression of Nr4a1. Mechanistically, we found that NR4A1 negatively regulated contractile function in a manner that depended on the HBP and the calcium sensor STIM1. Our work describes a new regulatory axis in which epigenetic regulation of a metabolic pathway affects calcium handling. Activation of this axis during intermittent physiological stress promotes cardiac function, whereas its impairment in sustained pathological cardiac stress leads to heart failure.

Why do European political groups call the roll

Research on legislative behaviour in the European Parliament is heavily reliant on recorded votes. Previous theoretical work has uncovered competing selection mechanisms that might cause a vote to be recorded. It has been argued that European Political Groups call the roll because the voting mode affects MEPs’ voting decisions. However, the underlying causal mechanism, as well as the size and direction of this effect, remains a matter of dispute. Drawing on a unique dataset, the article puts these arguments to an empirical test, the results suggesting that European Political Groups are more likely to call the roll if they stand to benefit from an overall lower level of voting cohesion. Moreover, I find that roll-call votes are frequently motivated by position-taking rather than by policy-seeking motives. These findings have significant, but ambivalent, implications for the analysis of recorded votes in the European Parliament.