Daniel J. Hill

Abortion and conscientious objection

In this article I do not seek to discuss when, if ever, abortion is morally permissible. Rather I seek to analyse the precise legal status of the exemptions afforded under British law to those with a conscientious objection to abortion. I then argue that the legal status quo in Britain is not morally satisfactory, and that the law urgently needs to be changed.

Reach's Puzzle and Mention

We analyse Reachs puzzle, according to which it is impossible to be told anyones name, because the statement conveying it can be understood only by someone who already knows what it says. We argue that the puzzle can be solved by adverting to the systematic nature of mention when it involves the use of standard quotation marks or similar devices. We then discuss mention more generally and outline an account according to which any mentioning expressions that are competent to solve Reachs puzzle – and in particular those consisting of standard quotation marks and their fillings – have a descriptive analysis: we rebut the usual objections to this account, and show how it is superior to some of the alternatives in the literature. We conclude by briefly connecting the foregoing discussions with semantic theory.

The right to wear religious symbols

Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Table of Cases Table of Statutes & Treaties Introduction: Philosophy of Religion goes to Court PART I: TRENDS IN ARTICLE 9(1) 1. The Manifestation Test 2. The Myth of the Necessity Test 3. The Practical Turn PART II: UNDERSTANDING THE PRACTICAL TURN 4. The UK Government and Generally Recognized Practices 5. The Participative Symbol 6. High-level and Low-level Beliefs Conclusion: Why Eweida Won Bibliography Index

The morality of the separation of the conjoined attard twins of Manchester.

I argue that the separation of the conjoined Attard twins of Manchester was not morally justified as it involved intentionally internally affecting (“invading”) the body of the weaker twin without permission and without any advantage to her.

The Practical Turn

We argue that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has noticeably shifted over the past couple of decades. We call this shift from concentrating on beliefs to concentrating on actions or practices ‘the practical turn’. Before the shift, we contend, the courts tended to view actions, such as the exhibition or wearing of religious symbols, solely in the light of their function of expressing antecedent religious beliefs. The courts then asked themselves whether the actions really manifested the beliefs. Recently, we suggest, the courts have been happier to assume that the actions do manifest the beliefs, and then to weigh up the believer’s right to manifest faith in that way with the competing rights of others.

Introduction: Philosophy of Religion Goes to Court

The introduction attempts to demonstrate that philosophers do have a distinctive contribution to make to the study of the role of religious symbols in the law of human rights. Court judgments often explicitly or implicitly make significant assertions concerning the role of religious symbols, for example that religious symbols exist merely to express antecedent religious beliefs. These assertions are properly philosophical rather than legal, and therefore should be subjected to philosophical scrutiny. Philosophers have the necessary training and knowledge of the discussion of assertions like these in order properly to evaluate them.

The Myth of the Necessity Test

One test that has been advanced as an analysis of the basis of the ECtHR’s decisions is the so-called necessity test, aka the Arrowsmith test: an action is a manifestation of a belief if and only if the belief necessitates, that is makes obligatory, the action. We argue in detail that the necessity test has never been a basis for any decision of the ECtHR, at least with respect to determining manifestation. Therefore, when it comes to manifestation, the necessity test is a myth.

High-Level and Low-Level Beliefs

In this chapter we formulate in more detail one understanding of the practical turn, namely the understanding that the practical turn consists principally in a shift from the consideration of high-level theoretical systems of religious or philosophical belief to the consideration of individual low-level practical beliefs. This translates into a shift in the burden of the courts’ argument: previously it was difficult to say whether an action manifested a belief, but easy to say whether, if it did, it would be protected, but now, after the practical turn, the situation is reversed: it is easy to say whether an action manifests a belief, but difficult to say whether it is protected.

The UK Government and Generally Recognized Practices

In this chapter we engage in a detailed analysis and critique of the observations submitted by the UK Government to the ECtHR in connection with the case Eweida v UK. The Government asserts that past decisions of the ECtHR have been based on the principle that only generally recognized forms of religious practice are eligible in principle for the protection of the ECHR. We contend that the ECtHR has not based its decisions on this principle, and that it would be unjust for this principle to be adopted, since it would arbitrarily disadvantage minority religions, and the decision on which religious and philosophical practices were generally recognized would either presume too much religious literacy or involve the courts in ‘playing God’.

The Participative Symbol

In this chapter we delve into the theory of the symbol, drawing on recent (and older) work in the philosophy of religion and in philosophy more generally. We examine various functions that symbols have and, in the light of the work of such philosophers as Todorov and Ricoeur, as well as philosophical theologians such as Tillich, identify for special attention the participative function, whereby the wearing or use of the symbol brings about the inclusion of the user in a certain community of symbolusers. We suggest that legal thinking in general, and case judgments in particular, would be much enriched if, in addition to that paid to the expressive function, attention were also paid to the participative function.