Daniel Kenealy

No, prime minister: explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria

ABSTRACT On 29 August 2013, the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a Prime Minister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders’ statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor – the role of historical precedent – was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.

Precedents, parliaments, and foreign policy: historical analogy in the House of Commons vote on Syria

Abstract This analysis investigates the role of historical analogies in the influence that parliaments have in foreign policy. Our empirical focus is the UK Parliament’s unusual opposition to the Prime Minister on UK involvement in Syria in 2013. The vote challenges many conventional expectations about the role of parliament in security affairs. Important in this vote were lessons learned and strategically used from UK participation in the intervention of Iraq in 2003. This argument is developed theoretically based on research on historical analogies: parliaments, ‘learn’ (primarily negative) lessons about past foreign policy events which guide parliamentary preferences and procedures and can enhance parliaments’ role in subsequent foreign policy. The article contributes to research on analogies by extending the logic to lessons on process. This use of precedents can offer more structurally oriented perspectives that translate critical junctures into reforms in procedures and policy-making practices.

Concordats and International Relations: Binding in Honour Only?

Concordats were established to formalize working practices between the UK government and the administrations established in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast after the devolution settlement of 1999. After an initial period of academic scrutiny the concordats have been largely forgotten in the academic literature on post-devolution intergovernmental relations (IGR) as relations between the UK and the devolved administrations settled into a relatively non-contentious pattern, perhaps the result of Labours dominance across the UK. More recently, that non-contentious pattern has started to fray at the edges. This paper examines a set of decisions leading up to the release of the Lockerbie bomber by the Scottish Executive on 20 August 2009. It argues that IGR, for the most part, did not function effectively because of a lack of willingness on the part of the UK government to work to the letter and the spirit of the concordats. While the concordats are intended to be binding ‘in honour only’ this paper argues that until the UK government affords the Scottish Executive parity of esteem, relations between London and Edinburgh will continue to suffer from moments of turbulence. The paper concludes by calling for a formalization of the system of IGR in post-devolution UK.

The English Question I: Is EVEL the Answer?

This chapter offers an in-depth look at views held by people in England to a range of governance proposals. The chapter analyses how people in England view several distinct proposals, investigating whether there are differences between particular groups of people. It goes on to consider whether people have a favoured option and whether that option differs across different groups. In addition to exploring preference for governance options, the chapter presents findings on people’s preferred mechanism of making change. The chapter reveals a public open to multiple options for reforming the way that England is governed.

Voting at 16: Lessons from Scotland for the Rest of the UK?

In 2014, 16- and 17-year-olds in Scotland were allowed to vote in the independence referendum. Subsequently, it was decided that 16- and 17-year-olds should be able to vote in Scottish elections. 16 and 17-year-olds in England have not been similarly enfranchised. Using that situation as a form of natural experiment, this chapter considers whether 16 and 17-year-olds in Scotland express different political attitudes and behaviour compared to their counterparts in the rest of the UK. The chapter identifies higher levels of political engagement amongst 16- and 17-year-olds in Scotland and argues that further steps, including in the area of civic education, is required to generate lasting positive change.

The Smith Commission: An Elite-Driven Process

Drawing on an extensive set of elite interviews, this chapter offers insights into the Smith Commission, convened by David Cameron the morning after the Scottish independence referendum to agree a package of new powers for the Scottish Parliament. Exploring the attitudes of politicians, civil servants and civic leaders, the chapter argues that this was an elite-driven process that, whilst technically successful in delivering an outcome by an agreed deadline, was lacking in terms of public engagement and participation.

The English Question II: Elite-Driven Devolution Deals

Drawing on an extensive set of elite interviews with politicians and civil servants at local and national level, this chapter considers the process that led to the announcement of a devolution deal for Greater Manchester in November 2014. The chapter shows how the devolution model has become a template for other deals, marking a significant development in the governance of England. It reconstructs what was an elite-driven process, with a deal negotiated in secret, and poses questions about the democratic legitimacy of that process.

How Do You Solve a Problem like Scotland? A Proposal Regarding ‘Internal Enlargement’

ABSTRACT The prospect of a constituent part of a European Union (EU) Member State attaining independence is growing. The year 2012 saw the confirmation of an independence referendum in Scotland, to take place in the fall of 2014, and sub-state nationalism returned to the fore in Spain, Belgium and Italy. Currently, there is no clear mechanism through which to deal with a part of a Member State becoming an independent state. The premise of this article is that such a state of confusion is not conducive to the smooth functioning of the EU. The article argues that, in order to remain faithful to its normative principles and to avoid a dislocation in the single market, the EU must find a way to handle internal enlargement short of expelling new states that might emerge from existing Member States. The official position set out by the European Commission thus needs to be problematised.