Daniel Moseley

Paternalism, Autonomy, and the Good

Brent Kious presents an important meditation on the relation of paternalism, autonomy, and values in “Autonomy and Values: Why the Conventional Theory of Values Is Not Value-Neutral.” We begin by giving a brief overview of the main argument. Kious claims that if a paternalistic intervention is justified, then that intervention does not impede an agent’s autonomous decision: considerations of autonomy are necessary for justifying paternalistic interventions. He also maintains that considerations of autonomy may focus on either competence or voluntariness. Accordingly, individuals that lack autonomy either lack competence or lack voluntariness. Kious argues that individuals with certain mental illnesses possess competence and therefore it is a lack of voluntariness, and not a lack of competence, that undermines their autonomy. Although many authors agree with Kious that a lack of autonomy in many cases of mental illness is the result of non-voluntariness, they have often tried to give value-neutral accounts of voluntary decision making. Kious proposes a non-value neutral (or as we shall call it ‘normative’) account of voluntariness. Kious maintains that all voluntary actions are motivated by values, where ‘values’ are defined as psychological states that provide the motivational component of action and decision, but value-neutral accounts of autonomy and voluntariness deny that voluntariness requires a voluntary action to meet any standard of objective goodness (or any other standard external to that agent’s goals, preferences, desires, or other conative states). Kious defends a normative account of autonomy because, in the cases of mental illness that he describes, a person’s autonomy is “undermined when a person’s values do not accurately reflect her own objective good.” (2015, 1). Our evaluation of Kious’s arguments proceeds as follows. First, we raise some worries that psychiatrists may have with Kious’s account. Next, we consider some concerns with the philosophical content of the arguments.

A Lockean Argument for Basic Income

Libertarians should not reject the goal of establishing a global basic income program. There are strong Lockean considerations that favor such a program. This article explains a conception of equal share left-libertarianism that is supported by the rights of full self-ownership and world ownership. It argues that an appropriately constructed basic income program would be a key institution for promoting those rights.