Daniel Oesch

Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure An Analysis of Employment Stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

Over the last 30 years, trends such as service sector growth, welfare state expansion and rising female participation rates have promoted increasing heterogeneity within the occupational system. Accordingly, this article argues that the class map has to be redrawn in order to grasp these changes in the employment structure. For that purpose, it develops the bases of a new class schema that partly shifts its focus from hierarchical divisions to horizontal cleavages. The middle class is not conceptualized as a unitary grouping and the manual/non-manual divide is not used as a decisive class boundary. Instead, emphasis is put on differences in marketable skills and the work logic. The schema is expected to more accurately reflect the class location of unskilled service employees and to make visible the political divide within the salaried middle class. This expectation is empirically examined with survey data from Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Findings for earnings and promotion prospects indicate that the schema successfully captures the hierarchical dimension in the class structure. Moreover, results for party support and union membership suggest that the schema grasps a salient horizontal cleavage between managers and sociocultural professionals.

What explains high unemployment among low-skilled workers? Evidence from 21 OECD countries:

In OECD countries, unemployment disproportionately affects low-skilled workers. This article examines four explanations: wage-setting institutions, employment regulation, globalization and monetary policy. The analysis is based on pooled regressions for 21 affluent countries over the period 1991—2006. We find no support for the argument that low-skilled workers’ employment prospects are hindered by legal minimum wages or strict employment protection, nor that wage inequality improves low-skilled employment. By contrast, investment in active labour market policies pays off and low real interest rates are associated with significantly less low-skilled unemployment. Hence, low-skilled workers’ job prospects seem enhanced by a combination of active labour market programmes with monetary policy that fully exploits the economy’s growth potential.

THE CHANGING SHAPE OF CLASS VOTING

ABSTRACT In the 1990s, sociologists engaged in a heated controversy about class voting. Although empirical evidence accumulated, positions remained surprisingly divided. This paper argues that this disagreement is due to two factors. Firstly, it reflects diverging understandings as to the concept of class voting. Secondly, it is explained by the use of class models that do not satisfactorily represent todays social stratification in Western Europe. In consequence, this paper uses a detailed multi-class schema and examines two cleavages running through the social structure: (i) the economic divide separating holders of organizational power from the workingclass, (ii) the cultural divide opposing high-skilled classes engaged in interpersonal work settings (who hold a liberation view of community) from low-skilled classes occupied in object-related tasks (who hold an authoritarian view of community). Based on individual level data, our analyses show that classes continue to systematically differ in their party support. There is strong electoral evidence for the traditional economic cleavage in Britains and Germanys class structure, while in Switzerland the cultural cleavage seems more salient. Hence, class voting continues but appears to involve more (and different) class-party alliances than just leftvoting by the woking class. Among others, we find salaried professionals in the social and cultural services to rally the libertarian left, while managers support parties on the right. Moreover, where a right-wing populist party alternative exists, it attracts disproportionate support from production workers and small business owners.

Welfare regimes and change in the employment structure: Britain, Denmark and Germany since 1990

Welfare states are often reduced to their role as providers of social protection and redistribution. In 1990, Esping-Andersen argued that they also affect employment creation and the class structure. We analyse the stratification outcomes for three welfare regimes – Britain, Germany and Denmark – over the 1990s and 2000s. Based on individual-level surveys, we observe a disproportionate increase among professionals and managers, and a decline among production workers and clerks. The result is clear-cut occupational upgrading in Denmark and Germany. In Britain, high and low-end service jobs expanded, resulting in a polarized version of upgrading. Growth in low-end service jobs – and thus polarization – is no precondition for full employment. Both Britain and Denmark halved their low-educated unemployment rate between 1995 and 2008. Yet low-end service jobs expanded only in Britain, not in Denmark. The cause is the evolution of labour supply: rising educational attainment means that fewer low-educated workers look for low-skilled jobs.

Upgrading or Polarization? Occupational Change in Britain, Germany, Spain and Switzerland, 1990-2008

We analyze the pattern of occupational change over the last two decades in Britain, Germany, Spain and Switzerland: which jobs have been expanding – high-paid jobs, low-paid jobs or both? Based on individual-level data, we examine what hypothesis is most consistent with the observed change: skill-biased technical change, routinization, skill supply evolution or wage-setting institutions? Our analysis reveals massive occupational upgrading that closely matches educational expansion: employment expanded most at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. In parallel, mid-range occupations (clerks and production workers) declined relative to those at the bottom (interpersonal service workers). This U-shaped pattern of upgrading is consistent with the routinization hypothesis: technology seems a better substitute for average-paid clerical and manufacturing jobs than for low-end service employment. Yet country differences in low-paid service job creation suggest that wage-setting institutions play an important role, channelling technological change into more or less polarized patterns of upgrading.

Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space : class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right

The rise of the radical right fundamentally changes the face of electoral competition in Western Europe. Bipolar competition is becoming tripolar, as the two dominant party poles of the twentieth century – the left and the centre‐right – are challenged by a third pole of the radical right. Between 2000 and 2015, the radical right has secured more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western European countries. This article shows how electoral competition between the three party poles plays out at the micro level of social classes. It presents a model of class voting that distinguishes between classes that are a partys preserve, classes that are contested strongholds of two parties and classes over which there is an open competition. Using seven rounds of the European Social Survey, it shows that sociocultural professionals form the party preserve of the left, and large employers and managers the preserve of the centre‐right. However, the radical right competes with the centre‐right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the left over its working‐class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the co‐existence of old and new patterns of class voting. Old patterns are structured by an economic conflict: Production workers vote for the left and small business owners for the centre‐right based on their economic attitudes. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the radical right and structured by a cultural conflict.

The Working Class Left Behind ? The Class Gap in Life Satisfaction in Germany and Switzerland over the Last Decades

ABSTRACT The 1990s and 2000s were a gloomy period for Germany’s working class, hit by mass unemployment, welfare retrenchment and wage stagnation. We examine whether the growing economic disparity between the top and the bottom of Germany’s class structure was accompanied by a widening class gap in life satisfaction. We analyse whether there is a social class gradient in life satisfaction and whether, over the last decades, this class gradient increased in Germany, relative to the comparison case of Switzerland. We use panel data for Germany (1984–2014) and Switzerland (2000–2015) and check the robustness of our results by replicating our analysis with the pooled German and Swiss samples of the European Social Survey (2002–2014). In both countries, respondents in higher classes report substantially higher life satisfaction than those in lower classes. The class gap is twice as large in Germany than in Switzerland. In Germany, the class gap in life satisfaction narrowed between 1984 and 1990, strongly widened between 1990 and 2005 and then decreased again after 2010. In Switzerland, the class gap did not follow a clear time trend, but remained basically constant. In Germany, differences in unemployment risks and household income account for half of the class gap and its evolution over time.

Is employment polarisation inevitable? Occupational change in Ireland and Switzerland, 1970–2010

The routinisation thesis expects technology to hollow out the middle of the employment structure, leading to a uniform pattern of polarisation across affluent countries. This article argues that occupational change is also shaped by labour supply – particularly education and immigration – and institutions. Polarisation therefore represents just one scenario of occupational change. Our study of Ireland and Switzerland examines long-term change in the employment structure (1970–2010), using census data and an encompassing definition of the labour force. Results show no simple trend of occupational upgrading morphing into polarisation. Occupational upgrading occurred in both countries, with the largest employment gains in high-paid occupations and the largest losses in low-paid ones. Patterns of occupational change largely aligned with the evolution of labour supply, upgrading in the 1990s and 2000s being driven in both countries by higher educated women. Immigration supplied labour for low-end and mid-level jobs in Ireland during the Celtic Tiger era, and for low-paid occupations in Switzerland during the 1980s.

La classe moyenne n’est pas en déclin, mais en croissance. L’évolution de la structure des emplois en Suisse depuis 1970

Une these influente en sciences economiques affirme que la mutation technologique entraine une polarisation de la structure des emplois. Des postes seraient ainsi crees surtout en haut et en bas du marche du travail, tandis que la classe moyenne serait videe de sa substance. Les faits contredisent cette these de la polarisation pour la Suisse. Les recensements de la population entre 1970 et 2010 ainsi que l’enquete suisse sur la population active entre 1991 et 2016 montrent que ce sont surtout des emplois hautement qualifies qui ont ete crees ces dernieres decennies en Suisse, a savoir des postes dans le management, la gestion de projet et les professions academiques. Dans le meme temps, de nombreux emplois peu qualifies ont disparu dans l’agriculture et l’industrie, traditionnellement attribues a la classe ouvriere, ainsi que dans le back office. L’evolution structurelle n’a par consequent pas erode la classe moyenne, mais clairseme les rangs des ouvriers industriels et du personnel de bureau.

Keine Erosion, sondern Wachstum der Mittelklasse : der Wandel der Schweizer Berufsstruktur seit 1970

In der Wirtschaftswissenschaft wird oft behauptet, der technologische Wandel fuhre zu einer Polarisierung der Berufsstruktur: Stellen wurden vor allem an den Randern des Arbeitsmarkts geschaffen, wahrend die Mittelklasse ausgehohlt werde. Die Empirie widerspricht dieser Polarisierungsthese. Die Auswertung der Volkszahlungen zwischen 1970 und 2010 sowie der Schweizerischen Arbeitskrafteerhebung zwischen 1991 und 2016 zeigt, dass in den letzten Jahrzehnten vor allem hoch qualifizierte Stellen im Management, der Projektarbeit und den akademischen Berufen geschaffen wurden. Zugleich sind viele niedrig qualifizierte Stellen in der Landwirtschaft, der Industrie und dem Back Office verschwunden – in Berufen, die traditionell der Arbeiterklasse zugerechnet werden. Der Strukturwandel hat daher nicht die Mittelklasse erodiert, sondern die Range der Industriearbeiter und Burohilfskrafte ausgedunnt.