Daniel P. Murphy

Cultures of Commemoration: War Memorials Ancient and Modern

prime purpose, the evolution of working relationships between the ground components and the evolution of joint ground doctrine, this study succeeds. Especially laudable is her discussion of the ongoing issue of ground command during amphibious operations and the iterative process of learning that took place. Something she does not include, however, is a systematic treatment of how the lessons learned were codified, approved, and disseminated. How were they cycled back into training programs? How much of information was shared between the Pacific theaters? Were the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Marines working in MacArthur’s theater shared with the Central Pacific folks, and vice versa? A more comprehensive study may have done more to examine this issue. On the positive side, the chapter on the Marianas operation and the relief of Major General Ralph Smith by Holland Smith goes a long way toward correcting the historical myth that Ralph Smith deserved what he got. The way Smith’s Twenty-seventh Division was trained, organized, and thrown into combat were factors over which he had little control, and Lacey does a fine job of explaining how and why the units he commanded performed as they did. He probably did as well anyone could have, and the officer who relieved him reaped where Smith had sown. Her point about this episode poisoning Marine-army relations is well made (164–65). Finally, although Lacey does a pretty good job of keeping up with the voluminous scholarship about the Pacific War, the work, unfortunately, continues to propagate a number of myths and misconceptions that have too long hindered the scholarship of the conflict. Exhibit A is her treatment of Frank Jack Fletcher, who cannot do anything right. Although Lacey lists John B. Lundstrom’s powerful corrective scholarship Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Naval Institute Press, 2006) in her sources (262), she seems to buy into the myths that S. E. Morison, naval aviators, and the Marine Corps have propagated for years about this heroic and unsung officer. Part of why Fletcher’s reputation has been besmirched for so long actually lies without comment on in her notes (n150, 222–23). Fletcher refused to give an interview to Morison, the Harvard don turned naval officer, who, in a fit of pique, went on to present Fletcher in the worst possible light in his histories. This example points to a larger weakness: Lacey’s reliance on conventionally accepted narratives for the naval and air contexts for the ground discussions. This, in turn, influences her analysis of what succeeded, what failed, and why. One also finds too little discussion of Nimitz’s role in driving the timetable for the opening of the drive in the Gilberts. Also, the effects on operational and strategic calculations of threat factors such as the Japanese land-based air threat (including the new night attack tactics) from the Marshalls or, later, Admiral Ozawa’s Mobile Fleet in the Philippine Sea are little mentioned. The availability of low density amphibious shipping and assets such as amphibious tractors is also slighted. Ultimately, Lacey’s work is two steps forward and at least one step back. Her conclusion states that leadership was the most important factor in explaining the Americans’ success in these operations (211). This seems rather trite and old-fashioned—leadership is always critical in war, but the heroes of logistics, detailed planning, and maintenance need attention, too. Her great men of history answer hides a much more complex reality. Although this book directs muchneeded attention to the under-studied evolution of joint doctrine in World War II, it needs more research and synthesis to illuminate the air, sea and ground combined arms in the central Pacific from 1943 to late 1944. The work also should have debunked the myths that have long held sway over Pacific war historiography, as well as giving fuller knowledge of these dynamics. Lacey has only given us part of the story.