Daniel R. Marburger

Does Mandatory Attendance Improve Student Performance

Abstract: Previous empirical literature indicates that student performance is inversely correlated with absenteeism. The author investigates the impact of enforcing an attendance policy on absenteeism and student performance. The evidence suggests that an enforced mandatory attendance policy significantly reduces absenteeism and improves exam performance.

Optimal ticket pricing for performance goods

When purchasing a ticket to a performance good, such as a movie or sporting event, the consumer does not actually buy the product, but simply access to viewing the product. Although the performance is the primary impetus for the ticket purchase, many performance goods offer complementary products such as concessions to their patrons. This paper suggests that when the price setter receives a share of revenues from concessions, overall profits will be maximized when tickets are priced in the inelastic section of demand. The model can be used to explain inelastic point estimates for ticket pricing found in other performance good studies.

Comparing Student Performance Using Cooperative Learning

The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically student performance in principles of microeconomics classes taught via co-operative learning versus the traditional lecture. In a fall semester, I taught one cohort of micro principles students as a traditional lecture, while presenting the course content to the other cohort via co-operative learning. A major distinction between this study and previous empirical works is that co-operative learning did not serve as a supplement to the traditional lecture. Rather, co-operative learning exercises essentially replaced the traditional lecture. The evidence reveals that whereas performance on multiple choice exams was fairly comparable, students who were enrolled in the co-operative learning class were better able to apply theory on a project that required a higher level of economic reasoning than those who learned the course content through the lecture.

Property rights and unilateral player transfers in a multiconference sports league.

According to the invariance hypothesis, the allocation of players in sports leagues is the same, regardless of who owns their property rights. However, when a player moves to a new team, the absolute quality of the new team increases while the absolute quality of the former team decreases. This implies that intraconference teams will be willing to bid more for players than interconference teams. However, the asking price for player sales to intraconference teams will be higher than for interconference clubs. If clubs own player property rights, the intraconference effects are built into the ask/bid price. When players own property rights, however, the effect of the transfer on the former club’s revenue stream is ignored. This suggests that free agency should result in a higher percentage of intraconference player transfers than player sales. Player sale data from 1964-1975 and free agency data between 1976-1992 reveal evidence consistent with theory.

Do negotiated and arbitrated salaries differ under final-offer arbitration?

The authors investigate whether negotiated settlements differ from arbitrated ones under final-offer arbitration. Examining the salaries of all major league baseball players eligible to participate in final-offer arbitration between 1986 and 1991, they find that arbitration awards won by players are higher and those won by management are lower than negotiated settlements for players of comparable value. This evidence suggests that arbitrated settlements are of “low quality” relative to negotiated ones, in the sense that they tend to fall outside the bounds of potential negotiated settlements. Another implication of these findings, however, is that the bargaining agents retain substantial freedom to negotiate salaries that are not determined solely by arbitrator preferences.

Does the Assignment of Property Rights Encourage or Discourage Shirking? Evidence From Major League Baseball

Economic organization literature suggests that property rights assignment affects employee incentives to shirk. Specifically, when firms own employee property rights, the rents from increased effort accrue to the employer and encourage shirking. Applied to major league baseball (MLB), this suggests that the conversion from the reserve clause to free agency should increase player effort. However, free agency also saw an increase in the number of guaranteed multiyear contracts, which also creates shirking incentives. This article investigates the net impact of property rights assignment on shirking in MLB. An empirical model reveals that free agents with 1- and 2-year contracts outperform comparable reserve era players over the same time frame. The performance of free agents with contracts exceeding 2 years do not differ from that of comparable reserve era players over the same time period.

Risk and Final Offer Arbitration Usage Rates: Evidence from Major League Baseball*

We use major league baseball data to examine risk and final-offer arbitration usage. Risk attitudes are proxied by the likelihood that FOA-generated salary increases place the player’s baseball employment at risk. Employment risk is inversely related to player quality. Our evidence suggests that higher-quality (low-risk) players are more likely to file for arbitration and seek an arbitrated settlement than lowerquality (high-risk) players.

How Are Athletic Directors Rewarded in the NCAA Football Bowl Subdivision

Intercollegiate athletics has been a source of ongoing controversy regarding the potential conflict in pursuing athletic success while maintaining academic standards. This study examines the implicit reward system for athletic directors (ADs) in the National Collegiate Athletic Association Football Bowl Subdivision. Using AD compensation for 2010-2011, the evidence shows that base salaries are largely determined by revenues generated within the athletic department. Earned bonuses are unrelated to revenues but are correlated positively with football success, the tenure of the AD, and the number of teams sponsored by the school.

Reconciling Cost Theory with Cost Accounting Practices

Despite its critical importance in the theory of the firm, marginal cost is unobservable in most production settings. Most cost accounting practices substitute average cost estimates for the unobservable marginal cost; moreover, some cost accounting measures include fixed costs as a component of unit cost whereas others do not. Because of the critical role that marginal cost plays in the theory of the firm, it is essential that economics instructors be aware not only of various cost accounting practices, but how these practices may bias the short-run pricing and output decisions of firms.

Can Prior Offers and Arbitration Outcomes Be Used to Predict the Winners of Subsequent Final-Offer Arbitration Cases?

The purpose of interest arbitration is to encourage bargainers to negotiate their own mutually agreeable settlement. In final-offer arbitration (FOA), the bargainers exchange final offers. If a settlement is not reached, an independent arbitrator selects one of the final offers as the award. At the beginning of each arbitration period, the only information available to bargainers relating to arbitrator preferences is past outcomes. Given its goal of driving negotiated settlements, an effective FOA process requires bargainers to infer useful information about arbitrator preferences from past outcomes. Using data from major league baseball, this article provides evidence that past FOA decisions are positively correlated with the outcomes of future FOA cases.