Daniel S. Geller

Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads

The relationship between static and dynamic power distributions and war is a central element in the realist literature of international politics. The distribution of power and shifts in these distributions are held to be a principal source of conflict in works from Thucydides to Waltz. Most attempts to test empirically for a structural association between capability distributions and conflict have treated disputes as independent events; however, over the last two centuries a disproportionate amount of interstate conflict has occurred in the context of extended dyadic rivalries. This study focuses on the conflict patterns of these “enduring rivals.” Based on a Markov chain analysis of 456 militarized disputes occurring between 1816 and 1986, the findings indicate that power parity and shifts toward parity are approximately twice as likely to be associated with war as is a condition of power preponderance. By definition, rival dyads have issues in conflict. Equality of power or shifts toward equality create a situation in which both sides can perceive the potential for successful use of force. The findings generated in this analysis indicate that with such power distributions war between rival nations is most probable.

Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation

The effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on patterns of international conflict is the subject of an extensive but generally impressionistic body of work. Assumptions in this area determine ones confidence in superpower deterrence and fuel the debate over the proper expenditure of military allocations. This study presents an analysis of escalation patterns in interstate disputes among nations with both identical and different levels of weapons technology. The results demonstrate that the distribution of nuclear capabilities does impact the patterns of escalation in serious international conflicts. The findings are supportive of the thesis of competitive risk taking in disputes between nuclear powers but also indicate that the possession of nuclear weapons has no apparent inhibitory effect on the escalatory propensities of nonnuclear opponents. The principal policy implication of this analysis is that nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to impede escalatory dispute behavior by either nuclear or nonnuclear antagonists.

Capability concentration, power transition, and war

Theories of international politics and war are generally formulated at the state, dyad, or system level of analysis. Systemic theories focus on structural attributes of the international system such as the distribution of capabilities. Alternatively, state‐level theories tend to emphasize national attributes, whereas dyadic theories concentrate on relational qualities between paired sets of states. This study presents an analysis of war at these analytic levels and explores the possibilities of synergistic empirical linkage. The results of a simple statistical experiment demonstrate that the two higher levels of aggregation are not separate and independent: The interaction of system and dyad‐level power dynamics is associated with patterns of international conflict, and the integration of shifting capability distributions at these levels produces a more adequate explanation of the sources of major power war.

Power Transition and Conflict Initiation

Most theories of war and lesser forms of international conflict rest on assumptions of rational choice. Moreover, many of these explanations explicitly incorporate decision maker estimates of relative power among competitors. However, a major theory of great power war-power transition theory-postulates initiation by the weaker contender. This study demonstrates that among the strongest states an interactive relationship exists between the static power balance, differential growth rates in capabilities, and conflict initiation: initiation patterns are associated with changes in a states relative military/economic power and power potential. The findings are consistent with the inherent logic of power transition theory and are consonant with an assumption of rational calculation in decisions involving conflict initiation. The results may be interpreted as reinforcing the realist contention that a shifting power balance is of critical significance among the causes of war and peace.

Status Quo Orientation, Capabilities, and Patterns of War Initiation in Dyadic Rivalries

The relationship between dyadic power balances and the onset of war is a principal element in realist theories of international politics. The influence of the status quo orientation of the belligerents has also been specified in power transition theory as a factor which impacts on the patterns of conflict. However, despite this theoretical underpinning, the question of the probabilistic identity of war initiators constitutes a gap in the understanding of factors associated with international conflict. This study examines the identity of war initiators as it relates to both power balances and status quo orientation for a set of nation-dyads that have formed long-term rivalries. The results of the analysis indicate that for rival dyads: (1) status quo challengers rather than defenders are the most probable war initiators; (2) status quo challengers are equally likely to initiate wars whether they are superior or inferior in capabilities to their rivals; and (3) status quo defenders initiate wars almost solely under unstable military balances. This last pattern suggests that stable military balances of either preponderance or parity are generally interpreted by status quo defenders as supportive of deterrence, whereas unstable balances producing capability shifts or transitions are deemed dangerous enough to provoke preemptive military action. The distribution is such that it approximates a necessary condition for the initiation of war by the status quo defender in an enduring rivalry. All three of the above findings are consistent with A.F.K. Organskis original formulation of power transition theory.

Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-pakistani Conflict: Global Implications of a Regional Power Cycle

This article examines the implications of possession of nuclear weapons for war between India and Pakistan. Existing literature derived from us-Soviet interaction during the Cold War may have little relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals. Applying power cycle theory within a regional context, this study explores possible global ramifications of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Power cycle theory suggests that Indo-Pakistani military competition may accelerate shifts in the relative power trends throughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policy expectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the United States.

The Impact of Political System Structure on Probability Patterns of Internal Disorder

This study presents a stochastic interpretation of domestic conflict processes. It determines the probabilistic patterns of two dimensions of political violence and examines the effects of system structure on those patterns. Specifically, system structure appears to influence both the type and magnitude of conflict within nations. Among the principal findings are indications that (1) centrist regimes suppress civil violence more quickly and efflciently than either polyarchic or personalist systems, (2) turmoil is more likely to occur in polyarchies than in centrist nations, and (3) internal war is less probable in either polyarchic or centrist systems than in personalist states. In short, centrist systems manifest less violence and for briefer durations than either polyarchic or personalist states. Indeed, in the long run the future levels of internal war (none, moderate, or high) for personalist nations are equiprobable, irrespective of the current level of violence. The distribution is unique to the personalist group of states and suggests that revolutionary behavior is strongly associated with this system structure. In recent years the internal conflict processes of nations have become the subject of considerable theoretical and empirical inquiry. Most of the work in this area has focused upon proximate causal elements in the initiation of violent political behavior. Empirical studies have usually involved the attempt to weight mathematically various factors presumed to influence the form, intensity, or extent of civil strife and to integrate these factors in general causal models. In contrast, this study presents a stochastic interpretation of domestic conflict processes. It determines probability patterns of two dimensions of political violence. At a simple level the question is whether the presence or absence of conflict at a given time is dependent upon the presence or absence of conflict at a prior point in time; and if linkages do exist, are they of short- or long-term duration? The violence-breeds-violence thesis forms the broad theoretical background * This project was funded by the University of Mississippi through a Faculty Research

Power System Membership and Patterns of War

This study presents national-level findings pertaining to the basic stochastic patterns of war duration and severity, and determines the effects of power system membership on those patterns. The results have theoretical and empirical relevance to general contagion hypotheses of war and specific import to the negative addiction (or war-weariness) thesis. Among the principal findings are indications that irrespective of the characteristics of past or current war behavior, in the long run: (1) a nation that fights a war has more than a one-in-three probability of fighting for over two years and sustaining over 15,000 battle fatalities; (2) major powers are more likely to fight severe wars and less likely to fight moderate wars than are minor powers, whereas they are equally likely to fight small wars; (3) major powers and minor powers have roughly equiprobable chances of fighting wars at short, moderate, and long duration levels. It is concluded that power distinctions among nations have significant effects on long-term probability patterns of war severity but not on war duration. Regarding war-to-war linkages, the probable duration or severity of a nations next war is unaffected by the duration or severity of its last war. In other words, there is no evidence indicating either a systematic increase or decrease in war-to-war cost-tolerance levels. Therefore, decisions on allocations of resources in current or future wars appear to be unaffected by the past: a nations aggregate capability (i.e. power status)—not its antecedent experience—is a determinant of the scale of its wars.

A dynamic model of suicide terrorism and political mobilization

This study considers the problem of suicide terrorism, government counterterror responses, and the mobilization of recruits in support of the contending parties. A model is developed that enables predictions as to what factors should be emphasized or de-emphasized by the forces protecting society. The article presents a linear mathematical analysis of the logical interrelationships involved in the confrontation and embeds the study within the framework of previous mathematical and empirical work on the subject. It is concluded that governments should avoid inflicting collateral damage on the general population in counterterrorist activities and should pursue policies (both in counterterrorist operations and otherwise) that contribute to the political quiescence of the populace.