Daniel W. Conway

Whither the "Good Europeans"?: Nietzsche's New World Order

Call that in which the distinction of the European is sought civilization or humanization or progress, or call it simply—without praise or blame— using a political formula, Europe’s democratic movement: behind all the moral and political foregrounds to which such formulas point, a tremendous physiological process is taking place and gaining momentum. The Europeans are becoming more similar to each other [. . .] [T]he democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the cultivation of tyrants—taking that word in every sense, including the most spiritual.

Recognition and Its Discontents: Johannes de Silentio and the Preacher

Abstract Johannes’ invocation of the hypocritical preacher marks the rhetoricaldramatic center of Fear and Trembling. His labor of expectoration has granted him the opportunity to measure himself against his unknown twin (viz., the hypocritical preacher) and his/their alter ego (viz. the knight of morality). As we see, however, Johannes squanders this opportunity to advance his quest for self-understanding. Refusing to recognize himself in the figure of the hypocritical preacher, he is altogether unprepared to acknowledge his own status and service as a knight of morality. Frightened by his sudden transformation, Johannes hastily steers “Problema III” toward the artless conclusion it receives in Fear and Trembling.

The Drama of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments

The “thought-project” of Philosophical Fragments is interrupted periodically by a series of exchanges between Johannes Climacus and an unnamed critic. Over the course of these exchanges, Johannes apparently matures from a detached, self-absorbed “loafer” into an aspiring initiate. His maturation is catalyzed, moreover, by the provocations of the unnamed critic, who repeatedly exhorts him to improve the presentation of his “thought-project.” As it turns out, however, the apparent maturation of Johannes Climacus is either illusory or transient. Kierkegaard thus demonstrates how difficult it is to renounce a self-limiting mythology and how easy it is to fool oneself – and others! – that one has in fact done so. The “thought-project” of Philosophical Fragments is interrupted periodically by a series of exchanges between Johannes Climacus and an unnamed critic. The point of these interruptions is neither immediately nor entirely clear. True, they fragment the ongoing discussion and thus earn for the book the title it bears. It is also true that these interruptions furnish a kind of comic relief, albeit in a manner that verges upon mockery of the ostensibly serious subject matter of Philosophical Fragments.1 For the most part, these interruptions have received scant attention from scholars and commentators. Even self-styled “literary” interpreters of Kierkegaard have had little to say about these interrup1 In the words of Stephen Mulhall, Johannes “construct[s] a text that develops a progressively more baroque parody of Christianity to the point where its implications subvert its own foundations and bring down the whole edifice,” Stephen Mulhall “God’s Plagiarist: The Philosophical Fragments of Johannes Climacus” in Philosophical Investigations 22:1, January 1999, pp. 1-34; p. 31. 140 Daniel W. Conway tions and the exchanges they enable.2 On the one hand, the scholarly neglect of these exchanges is entirely understandable. They have no obvious bearing on what is widely agreed to be the central topic of the book. Also, the comic relief they supposedly provide is neither always welcome nor always humorous. Through the first three Chapters and the Appendix, moreover, these exchanges give every appearance of having been obviously – and even artlessly – scripted; as such, their apparent contributions to the faux drama of Fragments can be readily discounted. Some readers may also find these exchanges tedious, especially in Chapters IV and V, where the unnamed critic becomes fixated on the possibility that the god’s immediate contemporaries might have enjoyed a decisive advantage over all followers at second hand.3 On the other hand, the scholarly neglect of these exchanges is also curious, especially in light of Kierkegaard’s reputation for psychological experimentation and literary innovation. These exchanges not only sustain the internal drama of Fragments, but also encourage Johannes to implement some of the most important refinements of his evolving “thought-project.” Absent the provocations of the unnamed critic, in fact, Johannes might never have completed his “thoughtproject,” and he certainly would not have issued his valedictory “promise” that his second installment, if he ever produces it, will address its subject matter more honestly. This series of interruptions and exchanges furthermore embeds the book with its sites of greatest intensity and passion. The real action of Fragments takes place not only in the philosophical exposition of the “poem,” but also in the increasingly intimate exchanges between Johannes and his unnamed critic. 2 Notable exceptions to this practice of neglect include books by Roberts and Evans, both of whom locate these exchanges within the pervasive irony of Fragments, cf. Robert C. Roberts Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Macon, GA: Mercer University Press 1986 (hereafter Faith, Reason, and History); C. Stephen Evans Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1992 (hereafter Passionate Reason). 3 Evans suggests that “in essence, then, the problem posed in Chapter 5 has already been answered in Chapter 4,” and he observes that the interlocutor’s “dimness is becoming a bit tiresome,” Passionate Reason, p. 143. While it may very well be true that the argumentation of Chapter 5 is redundant, the drama of Chapter 5 is anything but redundant. Indeed, the rising drama of Chapter 5 may help to explain why Johannes continues to take seriously the objections of an interlocutor whom he might otherwise dismiss as “dim.” The Drama of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments 141 Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to identify this series of exchanges as occupying the dramatic center of the book.4 What these exchanges both chronicle and enact is nothing less than the spiritual growth of Johannes Climacus. Over the course of these exchanges, Johannes matures from a detached, self-absorbed “loafer” into an aspiring initiate. Along the way, he drops the mask of the apolitical aesthete and discloses his motivations for proceeding so furtively. In the final paragraphs of Fragments, Johannes reveals his deepest anxiety to his unnamed critic and finally names historical Christianity as the model for his “thought-project.” His maturation is catalyzed, moreover, by the provocations of the unnamed critic, who repeatedly exhorts him to improve the presentation of his “thoughtproject.” Emboldened by these provocations, Johannes apparently ventures beyond the confines of his self-contained existence and joins in a collaborative enterprise with his new partner. Together, they bring the “thought-project” to completion, an achievement that positions Johannes to contemplate a sequel to his “poem.” A parallel story could be told about the maturation and growth of the unnamed critic, who initially was disturbed by Johannes’ carefree use of scriptural and literary allusions. As their exchanges grow progressively more intimate, however, the unnamed critic gradually relaxes his suspicions of Johannes. As we shall see, in fact, the unnamed critic actually acquires a voice and identity of his own over the course of his increasingly passionate exchanges with Johannes. Toward the end of Fragments, he too risks an intimate revelation about himself, exposing himself to rejection and humiliation in order to further their partnership. The important point here is that either story must account for a project of mutual elevation. Johannes and his unnamed critic both grow as a result of the partnership into which they have entered. Each simultaneously serves the other, as Johannes’ borrowed surname connotes, as a “ladder” on which the other may climb to greater spiritual heights. Or so it seems. Of course, it could never be so simple with Kierkegaard. The apparent maturation of Johannes Climacus turns out to involve a potentially painful lesson for us. The internal drama of Fragments, wherein Johannes responds positively to the productive provocations of his 4 Although proposing a very different approach to the reading of Fragments, Peter Fenves similarly marks the importance of this series of exchanges, Peter Fenves “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard, Stanford, CA: Stanford University

Revisiting the Will to Power: Active Nihilism and the Project of Trans-human Philosophy

This chapter undertakes an investigation of the productive possibilities engendered by nihilism for the experimental project of ‘trans-human’ philosophy. While viewed by some critics as an event of strictly negative and stultifying consequence, the advent of European nihilism may actually furnish an interpretive context within which philosophers might finally ‘let drop’ their nagging anthropocentric prejudices. Against the blighted backdrop of European nihilism, that is, philosophers might progress significantly toward (and eventually complete?) the untimely agenda set for them by Friedrich Nietzsche: ‘to translate man back into Nature’ (Nietzsche 1989, 230), and thus behold the world in its sheer, amoral immanence.

Unfinished Business: The Time and Space of Irony

Kierkegaard’s provocative treatment of Socrates in The Concept of Irony fails to provide an adequate account of the time and space of irony, i.e., the social, cultural, and political conditions under which Socrates determined that he had no choice but to withdraw from the “given actuality” of Athenian culture. Understandably concerned to isolate the agency that is native to the “ironic subject,” and to account thereby for the novel qualification of subjectivity achieved by Socrates, Kierkegaard neglected to explore the possibility (or likelihood) that Socrates’ decision to withdraw from his “given actuality” was prompted by the onset of cultural decay.

Framing a new reality: documenting genocide in District 9

ABSTRACT In his 2009 film District 9, Neill Blomkamp employs a handheld camera to create the effect of an embedded documentary film, which ostensibly is devoted to an objective treatment of the escalating tensions between a stranded alien race – known only (and derogatorily) as the ‘Prawns’ – and the increasingly agitated citizens of Johannesburg. Mobilizing the self-critical perspective afforded him by this mise en abyme, Blomkamp demonstrates the extent to which the presumption of objectivity allows the documentary filmmaker to frame the new reality to which a reluctant populace gradually accustoms itself. As depicted in the embedded documentary, the new reality is that human–Prawn relations have been damaged beyond repair. As such, the proposed relocation of the Prawns, which initially may have been utterly unthinkable to most residents of Johannesburg, rounds into view as the best and most reasonable option for all involved. According to Blomkamp, that is, the anonymous documentarians not only report the slow, incremental embrace of genocide – represented in the film by the unseen District 10 – but also play a largely unacknowledged role in promoting this transition.

Much Ado About (Almost) Nothing: In Defense of “Magister Kierkegaard”

Abstract Kierkegaard’s account of Socratic irony in The Concept of Irony is often criticized for neglecting the “positive” articulation of “mastered” irony. Scholars regularly cite the superior authority of Johannes Climacus, who, in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, chides “Magister Kierkegaard” for this precise lapse. In this essay, I develop an interpretation of Socratic irony that is faithful both to the account elaborated in The Concept of Irony and to the wider contemporaneous reception of Socratic irony. The most plausible explanation for this reception is that the irony of Socrates was exclusively negative-just as “Magister Kierkegaard” proposed in The Concept of Irony

Going No Further: Toward an Interpretation of “Problema III” in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling

Abstract The concluding paragraphs of “Problema III” in Fear and Trembling feature a narrator determined to defend the good name of Abraham. Rejuvenated by his excursion to the aesthetic-ethical confinium, Johannes de silentio endeavors to defend the ethical merit of Abraham’s notorious promise of divine providence. Along the way, however, Johannes unexpectedly arrives at the realization that his supposed bond with Abraham is little more than a fabrication on his part. As “Problema III” approaches its conclusion, Johannes suspends his quest for self-understanding. Without Abraham as his traveling companion, he will go no further

Beyond Truth and Appearance: Nietzsche’s Emergent Realism

Nietzsche should have known better. His withering critique of the Kantian Ding an sich launched the anti-foundationalism that continues to define the agenda of twentieth-century philosophy. His figural definition of truth issued marching orders to a “movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms,”3 which, having established command centers in Paris and New Haven, quickly colonized a transatlantic empire. His celebrated “perspectivism,” which is now firmly entrenched as the official dogma of post-Kantian epistemology, linked the pursuit of objectivity to the “castration of the intellect.” His textbook debunking of the metaphysical prejudices of folk psychology paved the way for behaviorism, epiphenomenalism, functionalism, eliminative materialism, and various other reductionist approaches to the philosophy of mind. His stirring exhortations to “become what we are,” and thereby own the world that we have pre-reflectively fashioned from our primitive superstitions and archaic fetishisms, have spurred the development of cottage industries in worldmaking and narrative redescription. Widely recognized as a “master of suspicion,” he is revered as the progenitor of post-modern philosophy and the arch-villain of speculative system-building. In short, his anti-metaphysical influences on the career of twentieth-century philosophy are indisputable.

Annunciation and Rebirth: The Prefaces of 1886

In August 1886, Nietzsche turned to the task of drafting a new preface for a forthcoming new edition of The Birth of Tragedy. In the final section of this preface, he pauses to take issue with a book that has recently caused him significant distress. He judges the book in question to be ‘badly written, ponderous, embarrassing, image-mad and image-confused, sentimental, in places saccharine to the point of effeminacy’ (ASC 3), and he rebukes its author for ‘conceal[ing] himself … under the scholar’s hood, under the gravity and dialectical ill humor of the German, even under the bad manners of the Wagnerian’ (ASC 3). Concluding his review of this ‘arrogant and rhapsodic book’ (ASC 3), Nietzsche directly addresses himself to its confused author: But my dear sir, what in the world is romantic if your book is not? Can deep hatred against ‘the Now/ against ‘reality’ and ‘modern ideas’ be pushed further than you pushed it in your artists’ metaphysics? … Isn’t this the typical creed of the romantic of 1830, masked by the pessimism of 1850? Even the usual romantic finale is sounded — break, breakdown, return and collapse before an old faith, before the old God. (ASC 7)