Daniela Di Cagno

Do inter-sectoral flows of services matter for productivity growth? an input/output analysis of OECD countries

This article investigates the impact of technology-intensive services sectors on direct and indirect labour coefficients in a sample of OECD countries. We find that both domestic and imported services contribute to increase productivity. We also find that different service industries (transport, communication, financial, and business services) have a different impact on technological change in non-service sectors classified according to the Pavitt taxonomy.This article investigates the impact of technology-intensive services sectors on direct and indirect labour coefficients in a sample of OECD countries. We find that both domestic and imported services contribute to increase productivity. We also find that different service industries (transport, communication, financial, and business services) have a different impact on technological change in non-service sectors classified according to the Pavitt taxonomy.

Sequential Markets: An Experimental Investigation of Clower's Dual-Decision Hypothesis

Countless experimental studies have shown that markets converge quickly and efficiently to the competitive outcome under many trading institutions, particularly the double auction mechanism. This creates difficulties for Keynesian stories of unemployment creation—which suggest a noncompetitive outcome in an essentially competitive world. Such stories were popular in the late 1960s and 1970s. One of these stories—the dual decision hypothesis of Clower—was seen then as the beginning of a story of unemployment. This article reports the results of an experiment designed to test this hypothesis. Specifically, we set up an experiment in which there are two sequential double-auction markets, in the first of which one good (labour) is traded, after which the second market (goods) is opened and the second good traded. We compare the outcome of our experiment with that of the competitive theory. One general finding is that not enough trade takes place in the two markets. In other words, the usual finding that competitive equilibrium is achieved in double-auction markets is not replicated in this sequential setting.

The determinants of individual behaviour in network formation: some experimental evidence

The role of social networks in shaping economic outcomes has received increasing attention in recent years. Network externalities have been extensively studied both in industrial organisations and, more recently, within the theory of social capital and development economics. Most of this literature however takes the structure of the social network as given and analyses the consequences of network externalities on outcomes.

Experience and Gender Effects in an Acquiring-a-Company Experiment Allowing for Value Messages

This paper focuses on a bargaining experiment in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for acquiring the company. Participants are constantly in the role of either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with randomly changing partners in the other role. We test how overstating the value of the company, underpricing the received value message and acceptance of price offers are affected by experience and gender (constellation). Like in our companion paper on single play (Di Cagno et al. 2015) we control via treatments for awareness of gender (constellation). One main hypothesis is that gender (constellation) matters but that the effects become weaker with more experience and that the main experience effects apply across gender (constellations).

Intention-based Social Influence in Sharing Experiments

We experimentally study intention-based social influence from other group members on proposers and recipients in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games allow for bi-dimensional strategy vectors whereas they are uni-dimensional in modified games. The latter reveal more clearly intended fairness that should strengthen others’ influence. Groups are minimally identified by colors and social influence is based on information about median intention(s) in one’s group. Social influence affects bi-dimensional Ultimatum bargaining significantly more than Impunity generosity suggesting that the latter is more immune to social influence, i.e. sharing triggered by intrinsic generosity concerns is less sensitive than sharing, confounded by strategic concerns. Altogether, social influence enhances conformity seeking and thereby efficiency, but its effect is strongly role dependent.We experimentally study how group identity and social influence affect proposers and recipients in Ultimatum and Impunity Games. To induce group identity and social effects, we assign individuals to different color groups and inform them about the median choice of their own group. When testing the relevance of this social signal for intentions and decisions we distinguish uni- and bi-dimensional behavior, the latter to let individuals select on which rule of conduct of the others to condition own behavior. When disagreement and conflicting views are possible, coordinating with group behavior may be less important and individuals may prefer self-serving. The bi-dimensional design apparently allows for more variety: tracking both group medians, only one or none.Social influence significantly affects behavior in Ultimatum but has much weaker impact in Impunity experiments. Social information seems to act in two ways: as a coordination device and as a learning device. However, the marginal impact of the signal and the direction of its influence is strongly role dependent.

Gender Differences in Yielding to Social Influence: An Impunity Experiment

In impunity games proposers, like allocators in dictator games, can take what they want; however, responders can refuse offers deemed unsatisfactory at own cost. We modify the impunity game via allowing offers to condition of another participant’s counterfactual generosity intention. For a given pair of proposer candidates each states, via the strategy vector method, an intended and two adjusted offers: one (possibly) upward adjusted in case the intended offer of the other candidate is higher and one (possibly) downward adjusted in case it is lower. Additionally, each candidate determines an acceptance threshold for the responder role. Only one candidate in each pair is randomly selected and endowed as the actual proposer whose offer is either possibly upward or downward adjusted depending on the counterfactual offer of the other proposer candidate. The endowed proposer of one pair is matched with the non-endowed candidate of another pair in the responder role. The data confirm that counterfactual intentions of others often affect own generosity via substantial and significant average adjustments to the weakest social influence. Overall, offers seem correlated with acceptance thresholds. Furthermore, we find significant gender differences: female participants state lower intended and adjusted offers as well as acceptance thresholds and therefore appear to be less sensitive to social influence.

Intention-based sharing

How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other’s intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.

Voluntary Cooperation in Local Public Goods Provision – An Experimental Study

In a circular neighborhood with each member having a left and a right neighbor, individuals choose two contribution levels, one each for the public good shared with the left, respectively right, neighbor. This allows for general free riders, who do not contribute at all, and general cooperators, who contribute to both local public goods, as well as for differentiating contributors who contribute in a discriminatory way. Although the two-person local public good games are structurally independent, we investigate whether intra- as well as inter-personal spillover effects arise. We find that participants do not behave as if they are playing two separate public good games, hence that both inter-personal and intra-personal behavioral spillovers occur. To investigate more clearly motives for voluntary cooperation via analyzing individual adaptations in playing two structurally independent games, we design treatments differing in cooperation incentives (i.e. different MPCR) and structural (a)symmetry of local public goods. We find that when the MPCR is asymmetric, free-riding occurs less, and contributions are more stable over time. We also find that contributions in the asymmetric treatment when MPCR is low are higher than contributions in symmetric treatments with higher MPCR.