Daniele Schilirò

CRISIS IN THE EURO AREA. COOPETITIVE GAME SOLUTIONS AS NEW POLICY TOOLS

The crisis within the Euro area have become frequent during 2010. First was the Greek economy to face a default problem of its sovreign debt, in November it was Ireland who has been in a serious financial situation at the verge of collapse causing difficulties to the euro. In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis and we suggest, through a model of coopetition based on game theory and conceived at a macro level, feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in Germany and Greece, with the aim of improving the position of Greece, Germany and the whole Euro area and also giving a contribution to expand the set of macroeconomic policy tools. By means of our general analytical framework of coopetition, we show the strategies that could bring to feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for Germany and Greece, where these feasible solutions aim at offering a win-win outcome for both countries, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path represented by a non-zero sum game. A remarkable analytical result of our work consists in the determination of the win-win solution by a new selection method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.

Investing in Knowledge: Knowledge, Human Capital and Institutions for the Long Run Growth

The essay aims at arguing that investing in knowledge is one of the main cause of the deep transformations in the structure of modern economies and also a strategic engine for the long run growth. In the recent years a clear long-standing trend in the OECD area have emerged, which is reflected in the expansion of knowledge-related investments and activities, thus transforming the industrial economies into knowledge-based economies. This paper, which is sympathetic with a Schumpeterian view that looks at the modern economic growth as a knowledge-driven process, shows that long run growth is a complex process that cannot be explained by one factor alone. Whereas in the Schumpeterian economy technological progress is the driver of economic growth, so goods are produced under conditions of substantial increasing returns to scale, and innovation becomes the principle source of wealth, in this work the former view is enriched with the idea that institutions have an important role to play in the creation and diffusion of new knowledge and in the process of growth, even if it is difficult to establish ex ante the nature of these relations. The topics of the paper concern scientific and technological knowledge and its relationship with human capital, the issue of open science and the necessary setting of appropriate institutions for knowledge creation. Moreover, an examination of OECD data related to investment in knowledge in OECD countries, with particular attention to human capital, is carried out to evaluate their economic performances. In such a context, the need of a long term growth policy for the EU economies consistent with the Lisbon Agenda is set forth; therefore the paper tries to suggest some proposals for a long term growth policy of the EU economies in this direction. Finally, conclusions end up the paper.

Global Green Economy and Environmental Sustainability: A Coopetitive Model

This paper provides a coopetitive model for a global green economy taking into account the environmental sustainability. In particular we propose a differentiable coopetitive game G (in the sense recently introduced by D. Carfi) to represent a basic green economy interaction among a country c and the rest of the world w. Our game G is a linear parametric (Euclidean) perturbation of the classic Cournot duopoly. In the paper we offer the complete study of the proposed model and in particular a deep examination of its possible coopetitive solutions.

A framework of coopetitive games: applications to the Greek crisis

In the present work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We shall apply this analytical model of coopetition (based on normal form game theory) to the Greek crisis, while conceiving this game theory model at a macro level. We construct two realizations of such model, trying to represent possible realistic macro-economic scenarios of the Germany-Greek strategic interaction. We shall suggest - after a deep and complete study of the two samples - feasible transferable utility solutions in a properly coopetitive perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic policies in the euro area.

Preface: Introducing PISRS

Introductory notes on the Special Issue dedicated to the Permanent International Session of Research Seminars (PISRS) held in 2011 at the DESMaS Department of the University of Messina.

Preface: Introducing PISRS (Part II)

Introductory note on the second part of the Special Issue dedicated to the Permanent International Session of Research Seminars (PISRS) held at the DESMaS Department of the University of Messina.