Dapeng Cai

Constructing the Optimal Solutions to the Undiscounted Continuous-Time Infinite Horizon Optimization Problems

We aim to construct the optimal solutions to the undiscounted continuous-time infinite horizon optimization problems, the objective functionals of which may be unbounded. We identify the condition under which the limit of the solutions to the finite horizon problems is optimal for the infinite horizon problems under the overtaking criterion.

Limit of the solutions for the finite horizon problems as the optimal solution to the infinite horizon optimization problems

In this paper, we consider how to construct the optimal solutions for the undiscounted discrete time infinite horizon optimization problems. We present the conditions under which the limit of the solutions for the finite horizon problems is optimal among all attainable paths for the infinite horizon problem under two modified overtaking criteria, as well as the conditions under which it is the unique optimum under the sum-of-utilities criterion. The results are applied to a parametric example of a simple one-sector growth model to examine the impacts of discounting on the optimal path.

Sustainable Constant Consumption in a Semi-Open Economy with Exhaustible Resources

To sustain constant consumption, Hartwicks rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwicks rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi-open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter.

Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms

This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike.

Quid pro quo and the enforcement of intellectual property rights protection: A bargaining approach

This article models a North–South negotiation where the North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when Northern and Southern firms compete on quantity in the Southern market, the Souths optimal choice is either complete protection or complete violation, irrespective of different levels of IPR protection being available. We show this to depend on the Southern governments valuation of the quid pro quo and the Northern firms level of technology.

To List or to Merge? Endogenous Choice of Privatization Methods in a Mixed Market

When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare‐enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private‐firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the governments choices concerning privatization.

Mutual Recognition for Sale: International Bargaining over Product Standards

We model a two-country bargaining process over the coordination of a horizontally differentiated product standard. We show that the necessary conditions for bargaining to take place are (i) firm heterogeneity and (ii) sufficiently high complying costs. When firms compete a la Cournot in the Home market and when bargaining takes place, our results suggest that mutual recognition of standards, and not the harmonization of standards, inevitably emerges as Home’s optimal choice. We also demonstrate that mutual recognition can maximize global welfare. Our results largely hold when firms compete a la Bertrand.

Heterogeneous Individuals and the Optimal Level of Higher Education

We examine the effects of public funding on higher education within a game-theoretical framework, in which universities choose students according to their abilities to learn, whereas to widen the opportunity of receiving higher education, the tuition fees are partially financed by a graduate-tax subsidy system. We find that when individuals are impatient, partial public financing of higher education results in an overinvestment in higher education, which is, however, desirable in terms of improved access.