Darryl Howlett

Neorealism versus strategic culture

The debate between Neorealists and Strategic Culturalists centres on whether it is possible to explain/predict state behaviour without taking into account the particular characteristics of the state, such as its historical experiences, geographical context and cultural constitution. This informative debate is encapsulated in the first section of the book, which considers the theoretical issues raised by both Neorealism and Strategic Culture. These issues are then explored in the second section by assessing their relevance to six country case studies: Australia, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria and Russia. Contents: Part I: Theoretical Overview: Introduction; Neorealism, John Glenn and Darryl Howlett; Strategic culture, Stuart Poore. Part II: The Case Studies: India, Marcus Kim; Nigeria, David Francis; Japan, Yuri Kase; Australia, Stuart Poore; Russia, John Glenn; Germany, Sameera Dalvi; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995

I A l t h o u g h a number of states could provide the world with a “proliferation shock” over the next few years, the greatest uncertainty in the nuclear non-proliferation area remains the outcome of the 1995 Conference to review and extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).’ This Conference, to be convened in New York from April 17 to May 12, 1995, marks a critical juncture for global non-proliferation policies as the delegates will have the opportunity to determine for how long the NPT is to endure. Since it entered into force on March 5, 1970, the NPT has become the mainstay of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the key international standard-setting document for conduct in the nuclear area.2 With its 164

Epilogue: Nordic Strategic Culture:

Over the past decade there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of strategic culture. The articles in this special issue consequently address important aspects of this resurgence, especially the use of empirical case studies of specific countries and theoretical themes related to how we conceptualize strategic culture itself. Equally, the case studies in this volume examine Nordic strategic culture during changing times, while the theoretical article illuminates a novel means both for understanding the issue of change and how the concept of culture itself could be re-formulated. What is also a noticeable factor in these studies is that the end of the Cold War, although heartily welcomed, has generated new questions that have challenged the traditional strategies of the Nordic countries. These states thus provide an interesting array of conceptual and empirical issues related to strategic culture that are explored in this epilogue.

The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Notes on the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) - Notes on the Contributors - Preface - Introduction - The 1995 NPT Conference: an Overview J.Simpson & D.Howlett - Nuclear Non-proliferation: the Current Context J.Dhanapala - PART 1: THE EXTENSION OF THE NPT - The 1995 NPT Conference: A Preliminary Review of the Issues D.A.V.Fischer - Preparing for 1995: Substantive and Organisation Work by Parties and Secretariat B.Sanders - Procedural Issues for the Review and Extension Conference G.Bunn - PART 2: REVIEW OF THE TREATY: SECURITY QUESTIONS - The Obligations of Parties: Review of Articles I and II L.A.Dunn - Nuclear Disarmament: Review of Article IV T.Rauf - Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones J.Goldblat - Security Assurances O.Adeniji - PART 3: REVIEW OF THE TREATY: PEACEFUL USES AND VERIFICATION - Peaceful Uses: Review of Articles IV and V D.Ahimsa - National and International Verification and Action in the Event of Non-Compliance: Review of Article III L.Scheinman - Export Controls: Review of Article III H.M ller - PART 4: REVIEW OF THE TREATY: REGIONAL ISSUES - North Koreas Bid to Withdraw from the NPT Y.Okawa - The Middle East, Israel nd Iraq M.I.Shaker - The Commonwealth of Independent States R.Timerbaev - Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Non-Proliferation Initiatives J.R.Redick - Conclusion - Issues at the 1995 NPT Conference J.Simpson & D.Howlett - Draft Resolution adopted by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the 1995 Extension of the NPT - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Freshwater and the Post‐UNCED agenda

Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource. The fragility of the worlds water resources is likely to become more acute unless future strategies recognise the crucial links between water, the environment, development and international security. Environmental change could have resounding effects on water, leading to extreme scenarios of drought or flooding. Developmental practices that treat water as a plentiful and robust resource are likely to result in severe depletion of its quality and thereby diminish its capacity for human consumption and other uses. Water is already scarce in certain regions of the world. Uncertainty about future supplies may exacerbate political tensions within states and lead to conflict between them, especially over international watercourses.

The emergence of stability: deterrence-in-motion and deterrence reconstructed

Deterrence has been a perennial feature of human relations throughout history: as a subject for theoretical and empirical investigation, it has spawned numerous conceptual models and case studies; and, as a debating topic concerned with the propensities for war in the nuclear age, it has generated intense reflection about the content of such strategies. In the period after 1945, and until the end of the 1980s, discussion about the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence dominated the agenda of the East–West Cold War. In those four-plus decades, the formulation of nuclear deterrence strategies in the West involved analysts and policymakers from a wide range of backgrounds and academic disciplines. It also embraced recurrent themes and concerns, which, in turn, produced diverse viewpoints and policy responses. Strategies of nuclear deterrence thus underwent several modifications, not only in response to developments in the East–West relationship, but also because technological innovation itself was a significant generator of new possibilities and challenges. Throughout the Cold War, a major preoccupation concerned the question of what if conflict broke out. It was generally assumed that, if the worst came to pass, nuclear weapons would be used (although strategies were not always explicit about the timing at which this would happen). As we are now aware, this scenario never occurred: for although the Cold War precipitated several crises, none led to overt conflict and nuclear weapons were never used. It is noteworthy, also, when assessing the history of ideas about deterrence, that leading writers on the subject have drawn similar conclusions concerning how this history has unfolded. Rather than viewing the history of theorizing about nuclear deterrence as an evolution in thinking, these writers suggest it is more appropriate to characterize this history in terms of cyclical debates in which key themes recurred. Among these themes were: the arrival of the nuclear age and its impact on the nature of war; fear of pre-emption, surprise

The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: an Overview

The prevention of further nuclear proliferation will result from the interaction of two forces: the demand felt by individual states to possess nuclear weapons and their technical capacity to produce them, on the one hand; and the international arrangements to restrict that demand and to deny states the ability to acquire weapons, on the other.

Issues at the 1995 NPT Conference

In the course of the seminar held at Chilworth, Southampton in July 1993, several issues were highlighted. Some were procedural or related to Treaty interpretation. Others dealt with the substantive debate. All were considered to have a significant bearing on the outcome of the 1995 NPT Conference.

The 1990 NPT Review Conference

On 20 August 1990, delegates will assemble in Geneva for the fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the five years since the third Review Conference, there has been no case of overt nuclear proliferation, and fears regarding the intentions of at least three states (Argentina, Brazil and South Africa) have abated. At the same time, the context in which the Treaty operates has been subject to considerable change: the nuclear-energy industry is in recession; the superpowers have signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and are near a Strategic Arms Reduction (START) agreement; nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles have been transferred to non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS); and additional countries, such as North Korea, have become the focus of concern regarding proliferation. The 1990 Review Conference will thus have both new issues to discuss and old ones to reconsider.