Daryl Fougnie

Visual Short-Term Memory Load Suppresses Temporo-Parietal Junction Activity and Induces Inattentional Blindness

The right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is critical for stimulus-driven attention and visual awareness. Here we show that as the visual short-term memory (VSTM) load of a task increases, activity in this region is increasingly suppressed. Correspondingly, increasing VSTM load impairs the ability of subjects to consciously detect the presence of a novel, unexpected object in the visual field. These results not only demonstrate that VSTM load suppresses TPJ activity and induces inattentional blindness, but also offer a plausible neural mechanism for this perceptual deficit: suppression of the stimulus-driven attentional network.

Distinct Capacity Limits for Attention and Working Memory Evidence From Attentive Tracking and Visual Working Memory Paradigms

A hallmark of both visual attention and working memory is their severe capacity limit: People can attentively track only about four objects in a multiple object tracking (MOT) task and can hold only up to four objects in visual working memory (VWM). It has been proposed that attention underlies the capacity limit of VWM. We tested this hypothesis by determining the effect of varying the load of a MOT task performed during the retention interval of a VWM task and comparing the resulting dual-task costs with those observed when a VWM task was performed concurrently with another VWM task or with a verbal working memory task. Instead of supporting the view that the capacity limit of VWM is solely attention based, the results indicate that VWM capacity is set by the interaction of visuospatial attentional, central amodal, and local task-specific sources of processing.

Variability in the quality of visual working memory

Working memory is a mental storage system that keeps task-relevant information accessible for a brief span of time, and it is strikingly limited. Its limits differ substantially across people but are assumed to be fixed for a given person. Here we show that there is substantial variability in the quality of working memory representations within an individual. This variability can be explained neither by fluctuations in attention or arousal over time, nor by uneven distribution of a limited mental commodity. Variability of this sort is inconsistent with the assumptions of the standard cognitive models of working memory capacity, including both slot- and resource-based models, and so we propose a new framework for understanding the limitations of working memory: a stochastic process of degradation that plays out independently across memories.

What are the units of storage in visual working memory

An influential theory suggests that integrated objects, rather than individual features, are the fundamental units that limit our capacity to temporarily store visual information (S. J. Luck & E. K. Vogel, 1997). Using a paradigm that independently estimates the number and precision of items stored in working memory (W. Zhang & S. J. Luck, 2008), here we show that the storage of features is not cost-free. The precision and number of objects held in working memory was estimated when observers had to remember either the color, the orientation, or both the color and orientation of simple objects. We found that while the quantity of stored objects was largely unaffected by increasing the number of features, the precision of these representations dramatically decreased. Moreover, this selective deterioration in object precision depended on the multiple features being contained within the same objects. Such fidelity costs were even observed with change detection paradigms when those paradigms placed demands on the precision of the stored visual representations. Taken together, these findings not only demonstrate that the maintenance of integrated features is costly; they also suggest that objects and features affect visual working memory capacity differently.

Object features fail independently in visual working memory: Evidence for a probabilistic feature-store model

The world is composed of features and objects and this structure may influence what is stored in working memory. It is widely believed that the content of memory is object-based: Memory stores integrated objects, not independent features. We asked participants to report the color and orientation of an object and found that memory errors were largely independent: Even when one of the objects features was entirely forgotten, the other feature was often reported. This finding contradicts object-based models and challenges fundamental assumptions about the organization of information in working memory. We propose an alternative framework involving independent self-sustaining representations that may fail probabilistically and independently for each feature. This account predicts that the degree of independence in feature storage is determined by the degree of overlap in neural coding during perception. Consistent with this prediction, we found that errors for jointly encoded dimensions were less independent than errors for independently encoded dimensions.

Attentive tracking disrupts feature binding in visual working memory

One of the most influential theories in visual cognition proposes that attention is necessary to bind different visual features into coherent object percepts (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Although considerable evidence supports a role for attention in perceptual feature binding, whether attention plays a similar function in visual working memory (VWM) remains controversial. To test the attentional requirements of VWM feature binding, here we gave participants an attention-demanding multiple object tracking task during the retention interval of a VWM task. Results show that the tracking task disrupted memory for colour-shape conjunctions above and beyond any impairment to working memory for object features, and that this impairment was larger when the VWM stimuli were presented at different spatial locations. These results demonstrate that the role of visuospatial attention in feature binding is not unique to perception, but extends to the working memory of these perceptual representations as well.

Modeling visual working memory with the MemToolbox

The MemToolbox is a collection of MATLAB functions for modeling visual working memory. In support of its goal to provide a full suite of data analysis tools, the toolbox includes implementations of popular models of visual working memory, real and simulated data sets, Bayesian and maximum likelihood estimation procedures for fitting models to data, visualizations of data and fit, validation routines, model comparison metrics, and experiment scripts. The MemToolbox is released under the permissive BSD license and is available at http://memtoolbox.org.

What limits working memory capacity? Evidence for modality-specific sources to the simultaneous storage of visual and auditory arrays.

There is considerable debate on whether working memory (WM) storage is mediated by distinct subsystems for auditory and visual stimuli (Baddeley, 1986) or whether it is constrained by a single, central capacity-limited system (Cowan, 2006). Recent studies have addressed this issue by measuring the dual-task cost during the concurrent storage of auditory and visual arrays (e.g., Cocchini, Logie, Della Sala, MacPherson, & Baddeley, 2002; Fougnie & Marois, 2006; Saults & Cowan, 2007). However, studies have yielded widely different dual-task costs, which have been taken to support both modality-specific and central capacity-limit accounts of WM storage. Here, we demonstrate that the controversies regarding such costs mostly stem from how these costs are measured. Measures that compare combined dual-task capacity with the higher single-task capacity support a single, central WM store when there is a large disparity between the single-task capacities (Experiment 1) but not when the single-task capacities are well equated (Experiment 2). In contrast, measures of the dual-task cost that normalize for differences in single-task capacity reveal evidence for modality-specific stores, regardless of single-task performance. Moreover, these normalized measures indicate that dual-task cost is much smaller if the tasks do not involve maintaining bound feature representations in WM (Experiment 3). Taken together, these experiments not only resolve a discrepancy in the field and clarify how to assess the dual-task cost but also indicate that WM capacity can be constrained both by modality-specific and modality-independent sources of information processing.

Terms of the Debate on the Format and Structure of Visual Memory

Our ability to actively maintain information in visual memory is strikingly limited. There is considerable debate about why this is so. As with many questions in psychology, the debate is framed dichotomously: Is visual working memory limited because it is supported by only a small handful of discrete “slots” into which visual representations are placed, or is it because there is an insufficient supply of a “resource” that is flexibly shared among visual representations? Here, we argue that this dichotomous framing obscures a set of at least eight underlying questions. Separately considering each question reveals a rich hypothesis space that will be useful for building a comprehensive model of visual working memory. The questions regard (1) an upper limit on the number of represented items, (2) the quantization of the memory commodity, (3) the relationship between how many items are stored and how well they are stored, (4) whether the number of stored items completely determines the fidelity of a representation (vs. fidelity being stochastic or variable), (5) the flexibility with which the memory commodity can be assigned or reassigned to items, (6) the format of the memory representation, (7) how working memories are formed, and (8) how memory representations are used to make responses in behavioral tasks. We reframe the debate in terms of these eight underlying questions, placing slot and resource models as poles in a more expansive theoretical space.

The Attentional Blink Reveals the Probabilistic Nature of Discrete Conscious Perception

Attention and awareness are two tightly coupled processes that have been the subject of the same enduring debate: Are they allocated in a discrete or in a graded fashion? Using the attentional blink paradigm and mixture-modeling analysis, we show that awareness arises at central stages of information processing in an all-or-none manner. Manipulating the temporal delay between two targets affected subjects’ likelihood of consciously perceiving the second target, but did not affect the precision of its representation. Furthermore, these results held across stimulus categories and paradigms, and they were dependent on attention having been allocated to the first target. The findings distinguish the fundamental contributions of attention and awareness at central stages of visual cognition: Conscious perception emerges in a quantal manner, with attention serving to modulate the probability that representations reach awareness.